versions: Update version to 4.3.0

CI: fix connection failures in asio example tests (4.3)

See merge request espressif/esp-idf!13903

.github/workflows/release_zips.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+name: Create zip file with recursive source clone for release
+
+on:
+  push:
+    tags:
+      - v*
+
+jobs:
+  release_zips:
+    name: Create release zip file
+    runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
+    steps:
+      - name: Create a recursive clone source zip
+        uses: espressif/github-actions/release_zips@master
+        env:
+            RELEASE_PROJECT_NAME: ESP-IDF
+            GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

.gitmodules

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
 	path = components/esptool_py/esptool
 	url = ../../espressif/esptool.git
 
-[submodule "components/bt/controller/lib"]
-	path = components/bt/controller/lib
+[submodule "components/bt/controller/lib_esp32"]
+	path = components/bt/controller/lib_esp32
 	url = ../../espressif/esp32-bt-lib.git
 
 [submodule "components/bootloader/subproject/components/micro-ecc/micro-ecc"]
@@ -90,3 +90,7 @@
 [submodule "components/cmock/CMock"]
 	path = components/cmock/CMock
 	url = ../../ThrowTheSwitch/CMock.git
+
+[submodule "components/bt/controller/lib_esp32c3_family"]
+	path = components/bt/controller/lib_esp32c3_family
+	url = ../../espressif/esp32c3-bt-lib.git

components/app_trace/linker.lf

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ entries:
       SEGGER_SYSVIEW_Config_FreeRTOS (noflash)
       SEGGER_SYSVIEW_FreeRTOS (noflash)
 
-[mapping:driver]
+[mapping:app_trace_driver]
 archive: libdriver.a
 entries:
     if SYSVIEW_TS_SOURCE_TIMER_00 = y || SYSVIEW_TS_SOURCE_TIMER_01 = y

components/app_update/esp_ota_ops.c

@@ -41,16 +41,6 @@
 #include "esp_efuse.h"
 #include "esp_attr.h"
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32
-#include "esp32/rom/crc.h"
-#elif CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2
-#include "esp32s2/rom/crc.h"
-#include "esp32s2/rom/secure_boot.h"
-#elif CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3
-#include "esp32c3/rom/crc.h"
-#include "esp32c3/rom/secure_boot.h"
-#endif
-
 #define SUB_TYPE_ID(i) (i & 0x0F)
 
 /* Partial_data is word aligned so no reallocation is necessary for encrypted flash write */

components/bootloader/Kconfig.projbuild

@@ -274,6 +274,10 @@ menu "Bootloader config"
 
     config BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_IN_DEEP_SLEEP
         bool "Skip image validation when exiting deep sleep"
+        # note: dependencies for this config item are different to other "skip image validation"
+        # options, allowing to turn on "allow insecure options" and have secure boot with
+        # "skip validation when existing deep sleep". Keeping this to avoid a breaking change,
+        # but - as noted in help - it invalidates the integrity of Secure Boot checks
         depends on (SECURE_BOOT && SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE) || !SECURE_BOOT
         default n
         help
@@ -286,6 +290,48 @@ menu "Bootloader config"
             partition as this would skip the validation upon first load of the new
             OTA partition.
 
+            It is possible to enable this option with Secure Boot if "allow insecure
+            options" is enabled, however it's strongly recommended to NOT enable it as
+            it may allow a Secure Boot bypass.
+
+    config BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_ON_POWER_ON
+        bool "Skip image validation from power on reset (READ HELP FIRST)"
+        # only available if both Secure Boot and Check Signature on Boot are disabled
+        depends on !SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT
+        default n
+        help
+            Some applications need to boot very quickly from power on. By default, the entire app binary
+            is read from flash and verified which takes up a significant portion of the boot time.
+
+            Enabling this option will skip validation of the app when the SoC boots from power on.
+            Note that in this case it's not possible for the bootloader to detect if an app image is
+            corrupted in the flash, therefore it's not possible to safely fall back to a different app
+            partition. Flash corruption of this kind is unlikely but can happen if there is a serious
+            firmware bug or physical damage.
+
+            Following other reset types, the bootloader will still validate the app image. This increases
+            the chances that flash corruption resulting in a crash can be detected following soft reset, and
+            the bootloader will fall back to a valid app image. To increase the chances of successfully recovering
+            from a flash corruption event, keep the option BOOTLOADER_WDT_ENABLE enabled and consider also enabling
+            BOOTLOADER_WDT_DISABLE_IN_USER_CODE - then manually disable the RTC Watchdog once the app is running.
+            In addition, enable both the Task and Interrupt watchdog timers with reset options set.
+
+    config BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_ALWAYS
+        bool "Skip image validation always (READ HELP FIRST)"
+        # only available if both Secure Boot and Check Signature on Boot are disabled
+        depends on !SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT
+        default n
+        select BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_IN_DEEP_SLEEP
+        select BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_ON_POWER_ON
+        help
+            Selecting this option prevents the bootloader from ever validating the app image before
+            booting it. Any flash corruption of the selected app partition will make the entire SoC
+            unbootable.
+
+            Although flash corruption is a very rare case, it is not recommended to select this option.
+            Consider selecting "Skip image validation from power on reset" instead. However, if boot time
+            is the only important factor then it can be enabled.
+
     config BOOTLOADER_RESERVE_RTC_SIZE
         hex
         default 0x10 if BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_IN_DEEP_SLEEP || BOOTLOADER_CUSTOM_RESERVE_RTC
@@ -378,7 +424,7 @@ menu "Security features"
             1. ECDSA based secure boot scheme. (Only choice for Secure Boot V1)
             Supported in ESP32 and ESP32-ECO3.
             2. The RSA based secure boot scheme. (Only choice for Secure Boot V2)
-            Supported in ESP32-ECO3. (ESP32 Chip Revision 3 onwards)
+            Supported in ESP32-ECO3 (ESP32 Chip Revision 3 onwards), ESP32-S2, ESP32-C3, ESP32-S3.
 
         config SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
             bool "ECDSA"
@@ -390,7 +436,7 @@ menu "Security features"
 
         config SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
             bool "RSA"
-            depends on SECURE_BOOT_SUPPORTS_RSA && SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
+            depends on SECURE_BOOT_SUPPORTS_RSA && (SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT || SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED)
             help
                 Appends the RSA-3072 based Signature block to the application.
                 Refer to <Secure Boot Version 2 documentation link> before enabling.
@@ -399,7 +445,7 @@ menu "Security features"
     config SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT_NO_SECURE_BOOT
         bool "Bootloader verifies app signatures"
         default n
-        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+        depends on SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_NO_SECURE_BOOT && SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
         help
             If this option is set, the bootloader will be compiled with code to verify that an app is signed before
             booting it.
@@ -425,7 +471,7 @@ menu "Security features"
     config SECURE_BOOT
         bool "Enable hardware Secure Boot in bootloader (READ DOCS FIRST)"
         default n
-        depends on !IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3 # IDF-2647
+        depends on IDF_TARGET_ESP32 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2 || ESP32C3_REV_MIN_3
         help
             Build a bootloader which enables Secure Boot on first boot.
 
@@ -442,7 +488,7 @@ menu "Security features"
         help
             Select the Secure Boot Version. Depends on the Chip Revision.
             Secure Boot V2 is the new RSA based secure boot scheme.
-            Supported in ESP32-ECO3. (ESP32 Chip Revision 3 onwards)
+            Supported in ESP32-ECO3 (ESP32 Chip Revision 3 onwards), ESP32-S2, ESP32-C3 ECO3.
             Secure Boot V1 is the AES based secure boot scheme.
             Supported in ESP32 and ESP32-ECO3.
 
@@ -456,8 +502,6 @@ menu "Security features"
         config SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
             bool "Enable Secure Boot version 2"
             depends on SECURE_BOOT_SUPPORTS_RSA
-            select SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE if !IDF_TARGET_ESP32 && !SECURE_INSECURE_ALLOW_DL_MODE && !SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE # NOERROR
-            select SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE if ESP32_REV_MIN_3 && !SECURE_INSECURE_ALLOW_DL_MODE
             help
                 Build a bootloader which enables Secure Boot version 2 on first boot.
                 Refer to Secure Boot V2 section of the ESP-IDF Programmer's Guide for this version before enabling.
@@ -626,8 +670,6 @@ menu "Security features"
 
         config SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE_RELEASE
             bool "Release"
-            select SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE if SECURE_TARGET_HAS_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE && !SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE # NOERROR
-
     endchoice
 
     menu "Potentially insecure options"
@@ -692,19 +734,6 @@ menu "Security features"
                 key digest, causing an immediate denial of service and possibly allowing an additional fault
                 injection attack to bypass the signature protection.
 
-        config SECURE_INSECURE_ALLOW_DL_MODE
-            bool "Don't automatically restrict UART download mode"
-            depends on SECURE_BOOT_INSECURE && SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
-            default N
-            help
-                By default, enabling either flash encryption in release mode or secure boot will automatically
-                disable UART download mode on ESP32 ECO3, or enable secure download mode on newer chips.
-                This is recommended to reduce the attack surface of the chip.
-
-                To allow the full UART download mode to stay enabled, enable this option and ensure
-                the options SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE and SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE are disabled as applicable.
-                This is not recommended.
-
         config SECURE_FLASH_UART_BOOTLOADER_ALLOW_ENC
             bool "Leave UART bootloader encryption enabled"
             depends on SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE_DEVELOPMENT
@@ -752,47 +781,58 @@ menu "Security features"
 
     endmenu  # Potentially Insecure
 
-    config SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE
-        bool "Permanently disable ROM Download Mode"
+    choice SECURE_UART_ROM_DL_MODE
+        bool "UART ROM download mode"
+        default SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE if SECURE_TARGET_HAS_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE && !SECURE_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_MODE_DEVELOPMENT # NOERROR
+        default SECURE_INSECURE_ALLOW_DL_MODE
+        depends on SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED || SECURE_FLASH_ENC_ENABLED
         depends on !IDF_TARGET_ESP32 || ESP32_REV_MIN_3
-        default n
-        help
-            If set, during startup the app will burn an eFuse bit to permanently disable the UART ROM
-            Download Mode. This prevents any future use of esptool.py, espefuse.py and similar tools.
 
-            Once disabled, if the SoC is booted with strapping pins set for ROM Download Mode
-            then an error is printed instead.
+        config SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE
+            bool "UART ROM download mode (Permanently disabled (recommended))"
+            help
+                If set, during startup the app will burn an eFuse bit to permanently disable the UART ROM
+                Download Mode. This prevents any future use of esptool.py, espefuse.py and similar tools.
 
-            It is recommended to enable this option in any production application where Flash
-            Encryption and/or Secure Boot is enabled and access to Download Mode is not required.
+                Once disabled, if the SoC is booted with strapping pins set for ROM Download Mode
+                then an error is printed instead.
 
-            It is also possible to permanently disable Download Mode by calling
-            esp_efuse_disable_rom_download_mode() at runtime.
+                It is recommended to enable this option in any production application where Flash
+                Encryption and/or Secure Boot is enabled and access to Download Mode is not required.
 
-    config SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE
-        bool "Permanently switch to ROM UART Secure Download mode"
-        depends on SECURE_TARGET_HAS_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE && !SECURE_DISABLE_ROM_DL_MODE
-        select ESPTOOLPY_NO_STUB
-        help
-            If set, during startup the app will burn an eFuse bit to permanently switch the UART ROM
-            Download Mode into a separate Secure Download mode. This option can only work if
-            Download Mode is not already disabled by eFuse.
+                It is also possible to permanently disable Download Mode by calling
+                esp_efuse_disable_rom_download_mode() at runtime.
 
-            Secure Download mode limits the use of Download Mode functions to simple flash read,
-            write and erase operations, plus a command to return a summary of currently enabled
-            security features.
+        config SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE
+            bool "UART ROM download mode (Permanently switch to Secure mode (recommended))"
+            depends on SECURE_TARGET_HAS_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE
+            select ESPTOOLPY_NO_STUB
+            help
+                If set, during startup the app will burn an eFuse bit to permanently switch the UART ROM
+                Download Mode into a separate Secure Download mode. This option can only work if
+                Download Mode is not already disabled by eFuse.
 
-            Secure Download mode is not compatible with the esptool.py flasher stub feature,
-            espefuse.py, read/writing memory or registers, encrypted download, or any other
-            features that interact with unsupported Download Mode commands.
+                Secure Download mode limits the use of Download Mode functions to simple flash read,
+                write and erase operations, plus a command to return a summary of currently enabled
+                security features.
 
-            Secure Download mode should be enabled in any application where Flash Encryption
-            and/or Secure Boot is enabled. Disabling this option does not immediately cancel
-            the benefits of the security features, but it increases the potential "attack
-            surface" for an attacker to try and bypass them with a successful physical attack.
+                Secure Download mode is not compatible with the esptool.py flasher stub feature,
+                espefuse.py, read/writing memory or registers, encrypted download, or any other
+                features that interact with unsupported Download Mode commands.
 
-            It is also possible to enable secure download mode at runtime by calling
-            esp_efuse_enable_rom_secure_download_mode()
+                Secure Download mode should be enabled in any application where Flash Encryption
+                and/or Secure Boot is enabled. Disabling this option does not immediately cancel
+                the benefits of the security features, but it increases the potential "attack
+                surface" for an attacker to try and bypass them with a successful physical attack.
 
+                It is also possible to enable secure download mode at runtime by calling
+                esp_efuse_enable_rom_secure_download_mode()
 
+        config SECURE_INSECURE_ALLOW_DL_MODE
+            bool "UART ROM download mode (Enabled (not recommended))"
+            help
+                This is a potentially insecure option.
+                Enabling this option will allow the full UART download mode to stay enabled.
+                This option SHOULD NOT BE ENABLED for production use cases.
+    endchoice
 endmenu  # Security features

components/bootloader/Makefile.projbuild

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY ?=
 SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY=$(abspath $(call dequote,$(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY)))
 export SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY  # used by bootloader_support component
 
+BOOTLOADER_SIGNED_BIN ?=
+
 # Has a matching value in bootloader_support esp_flash_partitions.h
 BOOTLOADER_OFFSET := 0x1000
 

components/bootloader/subproject/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -28,10 +28,11 @@ set(COMPONENTS
     micro-ecc
     main
     efuse
-    esp_system)
+    esp_system
+    newlib)
 set(BOOTLOADER_BUILD 1)
 include("${IDF_PATH}/tools/cmake/project.cmake")
-set(common_req log esp_rom esp_common esp_hw_support hal)
+set(common_req log esp_rom esp_common esp_hw_support hal newlib)
 if(LEGACY_INCLUDE_COMMON_HEADERS)
     list(APPEND common_req soc hal)
 endif()
@@ -53,6 +54,9 @@ string(REPLACE ";" " " esptoolpy_write_flash
 string(REPLACE ";" " " espsecurepy "${ESPSECUREPY}")
 string(REPLACE ";" " " espefusepy "${ESPEFUSEPY}")
 
+# Suppress warning: "Manually-specified variables were not used by the project: SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY"
+set(ignore_signing_key "${SECURE_BOOT_SIGNING_KEY}")
+
 if(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_REFLASHABLE)
     if(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY_ENCODING_192BIT)
         set(key_digest_len 192)

components/bootloader/subproject/Makefile

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ endif
 
 PROJECT_NAME := bootloader
 
-COMPONENTS := esp_hw_support esptool_py bootloader_support log spi_flash micro-ecc soc main efuse esp_rom hal
+COMPONENTS := esp_hw_support esptool_py bootloader_support log spi_flash micro-ecc soc main efuse esp_rom hal xtensa
 
 # Clear C and CXX from top level project
 CFLAGS =

components/bootloader/subproject/main/ld/esp32/bootloader.ld

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ SECTIONS
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_encrypt.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_partitions.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
-    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
+    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libmicro-ecc.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libspi_flash.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libhal.a:wdt_hal_iram.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
@@ -167,6 +167,14 @@ SECTIONS
     *(.fini.literal)
     *(.fini)
     *(.gnu.version)
+
+    /** CPU will try to prefetch up to 16 bytes of
+      * of instructions. This means that any configuration (e.g. MMU, PMS) must allow
+      * safe access to up to 16 bytes after the last real instruction, add
+      * dummy bytes to ensure this
+      */
+    . += 16;
+
     _text_end = ABSOLUTE(.);
     _etext = .;
   } > iram_seg

components/bootloader/subproject/main/ld/esp32c3/bootloader.ld

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SECTIONS
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_encrypt.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_partitions.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
-    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
+    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libmicro-ecc.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libspi_flash.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libhal.a:wdt_hal_iram.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
@@ -156,6 +156,14 @@ SECTIONS
     *(.fini.literal)
     *(.fini)
     *(.gnu.version)
+
+    /** CPU will try to prefetch up to 16 bytes of
+      * of instructions. This means that any configuration (e.g. MMU, PMS) must allow
+      * safe access to up to 16 bytes after the last real instruction, add
+      * dummy bytes to ensure this
+      */
+    . += 16;
+
     _text_end = ABSOLUTE(.);
     _etext = .;
   } > iram_seg

components/bootloader/subproject/main/ld/esp32s2/bootloader.ld

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SECTIONS
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_encrypt.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_partitions.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
-    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
+    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libmicro-ecc.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libspi_flash.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libhal.a:wdt_hal_iram.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
@@ -155,6 +155,14 @@ SECTIONS
     *(.fini.literal)
     *(.fini)
     *(.gnu.version)
+
+    /** CPU will try to prefetch up to 16 bytes of
+      * of instructions. This means that any configuration (e.g. MMU, PMS) must allow
+      * safe access to up to 16 bytes after the last real instruction, add
+      * dummy bytes to ensure this
+      */
+    . += 16;
+
     _text_end = ABSOLUTE(.);
     _etext = .;
   } > iram_seg

components/bootloader/subproject/main/ld/esp32s3/bootloader.ld

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SECTIONS
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_encrypt.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:flash_partitions.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
-    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
+    *libbootloader_support.a:secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libmicro-ecc.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libspi_flash.a:*.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
     *libhal.a:wdt_hal_iram.*(.literal .text .literal.* .text.*)
@@ -156,6 +156,14 @@ SECTIONS
     *(.fini.literal)
     *(.fini)
     *(.gnu.version)
+
+    /** CPU will try to prefetch up to 16 bytes of
+      * of instructions. This means that any configuration (e.g. MMU, PMS) must allow
+      * safe access to up to 16 bytes after the last real instruction, add
+      * dummy bytes to ensure this
+      */
+    . += 16;
+
     _text_end = ABSOLUTE(.);
     _etext = .;
   } > iram_seg

components/bootloader_support/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ set(srcs
     "src/bootloader_utility.c"
     "src/esp_image_format.c"
     "src/flash_encrypt.c"
+    "src/secure_boot.c"
     "src/flash_partitions.c"
     "src/flash_qio_mode.c"
     "src/bootloader_flash_config_${IDF_TARGET}.c"
@@ -34,16 +35,28 @@ else()
         "src/idf/bootloader_sha.c")
     set(include_dirs "include")
     set(priv_include_dirs "include_bootloader")
-    set(priv_requires spi_flash mbedtls efuse)
+    set(priv_requires spi_flash mbedtls efuse app_update)
 endif()
 
-if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME OR CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME)
-    if(BOOTLOADER_BUILD)
-        list(APPEND srcs
-        "src/${IDF_TARGET}/secure_boot_signatures.c")
-    else()
-        list(APPEND srcs
-            "src/idf/secure_boot_signatures.c")
+if(BOOTLOADER_BUILD)
+    if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT)
+        if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME)
+            list(APPEND srcs "src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.c")
+        endif()
+
+        if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME)
+            list(APPEND srcs "src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.c")
+        endif()
+    endif()
+else()
+    if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE)
+        if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME)
+            list(APPEND srcs "src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_app.c")
+        endif()
+
+        if(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME)
+            list(APPEND srcs "src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_app.c")
+        endif()
     endif()
 endif()
 

components/bootloader_support/component.mk

@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ else
 COMPONENT_PRIV_INCLUDEDIRS := include_bootloader
 endif
 
-COMPONENT_SRCDIRS := src
+COMPONENT_SRCDIRS := src \
+			src/secure_boot_v2 \
+			src/secure_boot_v1
 
 ifndef IS_BOOTLOADER_BUILD
 COMPONENT_SRCDIRS += src/idf  # idf sub-directory contains platform agnostic IDF versions
@@ -33,12 +35,27 @@ COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/bootloader_flash_config_esp32s2.o \
 			src/bootloader_random_esp32s3.o \
 			src/bootloader_random_esp32c3.o
 
-ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
-ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
-COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/$(IDF_TARGET)/secure_boot_signatures.o \
-			src/idf/secure_boot_signatures.o
-endif
-endif
+ifdef IS_BOOTLOADER_BUILD
+	ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
+		COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.o
+	endif
+
+	ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
+		COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.o
+	endif
+	COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_app.o \
+				src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_app.o
+else
+	ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
+		COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_app.o
+	endif
+
+	ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
+		COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_app.o
+	endif
+	COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.o \
+				src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.o
+endif # IS_BOOTLOADER_BUILD
 
 ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT
 COMPONENT_OBJEXCLUDE += src/$(IDF_TARGET)/secure_boot.o

components/bootloader_support/include/esp_image_format.h

@@ -106,6 +106,20 @@ _Static_assert(sizeof(rtc_retain_mem_t) <= ESP_BOOTLOADER_RESERVE_RTC, "Reserved
  */
 esp_err_t esp_image_verify(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data);
 
+/**
+ * @brief Get metadata of app
+ *
+ * If encryption is enabled, data will be transparently decrypted.
+ *
+ * @param part Partition to load the app from.
+ * @param[out] metadata Pointer to the image metadata structure which is be filled in by this function.
+ *                      Fields will all be initialised by this function.
+ *
+ * @return
+ * - ESP_OK if filling of metadata was successful
+ */
+esp_err_t esp_image_get_metadata(const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *metadata);
+
 /**
  * @brief Verify and load an app image (available only in space of bootloader).
  *

components/bootloader_support/include/esp_secure_boot.h

@@ -19,17 +19,22 @@
 #include "esp_image_format.h"
 #include "esp_rom_efuse.h"
 #include "sdkconfig.h"
+#include "esp_rom_crc.h"
 
 #if CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+#include "esp32/rom/efuse.h"
 #include "esp32/rom/secure_boot.h"
 #elif CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2
 #include "esp32s2/rom/efuse.h"
+#include "esp32s2/rom/secure_boot.h"
 #elif CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3
 #include "esp32c3/rom/efuse.h"
+#include "esp32c3/rom/secure_boot.h"
+#elif CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3
+#include "esp32s3/rom/efuse.h"
+#include "esp32s3/rom/secure_boot.h"
 #endif
 
-typedef struct ets_secure_boot_signature ets_secure_boot_signature_t;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ENABLED
 #if !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT) || !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE) || !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS)
 #error "internal sdkconfig error, secure boot should always enable all signature options"
@@ -45,6 +50,8 @@ extern "C" {
    Can be compiled as part of app or bootloader code.
 */
 
+#define ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN 32
+
 /** @brief Is secure boot currently enabled in hardware?
  *
  * This means that the ROM bootloader code will only boot
@@ -181,6 +188,16 @@ typedef struct {
  */
 esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest);
 
+#if !CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32 || CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN_3
+/**
+ * @brief Structure to hold public key digests calculated from the signature blocks of a single image.
+ *
+ * Each image can have one or more signature blocks (up to SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS). Each signature block includes a public key.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    uint8_t key_digests[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS][ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];    /* SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
+    unsigned num_digests;                                       /* Number of valid digests, starting at index 0 */
+} esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t;
 
 /** @brief Verify the RSA secure boot signature block for Secure Boot V2.
  *
@@ -194,6 +211,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig
  *
  */
 esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest);
+#endif // !CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32 || CONFIG_ESP32_REV_MIN_3
 
 /** @brief Legacy ECDSA verification function
  *
@@ -214,6 +232,45 @@ typedef struct {
     uint8_t digest[64];
 } esp_secure_boot_iv_digest_t;
 
+/** @brief Check the secure boot V2 during startup
+ *
+ * @note This function is called automatically during app startup,
+ * it doesn't need to be called from the app.
+ *
+ * Verifies the secure boot config during startup:
+ *
+ * - Correct any insecure secure boot settings
+ */
+void esp_secure_boot_init_checks(void);
+
+#if !BOOTLOADER_BUILD && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
+
+/** @brief Scan the current running app for signature blocks
+ *
+ * @note This function doesn't verify that the signatures are valid or the
+ * corresponding public keys are trusted, it only reads the number of signature
+ * blocks present and optionally calculates the digests of the public keys
+ * provided in the signature blocks.
+ *
+ * @param digest_public_keys If true, the key_digests fields in the
+ * public_key_digests structure will be filled with the digests of the public
+ * key provided in each signature block. Note that if Secure Boot V2 is enabled,
+ * each public key will only be trusted if the same digest is also present in
+ * eFuse (but this is not checked by this function).
+ *
+ * @param public_key_digests[out] Structure is initialized with the num_digests
+ * field set to the number of signatures found. If digest_public_keys is set,
+ * the public key digests are also calculated and stored here.
+ *
+ * @return
+ *  - ESP_OK - At least one signature was found
+ *  - ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND - No signatures were found, num_digests value will be zero
+ *  - ESP_FAIL - An error occured trying to read the signature blocks from flash
+ */
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_get_signature_blocks_for_running_app(bool digest_public_keys, esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests);
+
+#endif // !BOOTLOADER_BUILD && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

components/bootloader_support/src/bootloader_common_loader.c

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "soc/gpio_periph.h"
 #include "soc/rtc.h"
 #include "soc/efuse_reg.h"
+#include "soc/soc_memory_layout.h"
 #include "hal/gpio_ll.h"
 #include "esp_image_format.h"
 #include "bootloader_sha.h"
@@ -76,7 +77,9 @@ esp_err_t bootloader_common_check_chip_validity(const esp_image_header_t* img_hd
     }
     uint8_t revision = bootloader_common_get_chip_revision();
     if (revision < img_hdr->min_chip_rev) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "can't run on lower chip revision, expected %d, found %d", revision, img_hdr->min_chip_rev);
+        /* To fix this error, please update mininum supported chip revision from configuration,
+         * located in TARGET (e.g. ESP32) specific options under "Component config" menu */
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "This chip is revision %d but the application is configured for minimum revision %d. Can't run.", revision, img_hdr->min_chip_rev);
         err = ESP_FAIL;
     } else if (revision != img_hdr->min_chip_rev) {
 #ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
@@ -138,7 +141,18 @@ esp_err_t bootloader_common_get_partition_description(const esp_partition_pos_t
 
 #if defined( CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_IN_DEEP_SLEEP ) || defined( CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_CUSTOM_RESERVE_RTC )
 
-rtc_retain_mem_t *const rtc_retain_mem = (rtc_retain_mem_t *)(SOC_RTC_DRAM_HIGH - sizeof(rtc_retain_mem_t));
+#define RTC_RETAIN_MEM_ADDR (SOC_RTC_DRAM_HIGH - sizeof(rtc_retain_mem_t))
+
+rtc_retain_mem_t *const rtc_retain_mem = (rtc_retain_mem_t *)RTC_RETAIN_MEM_ADDR;
+
+#if !IS_BOOTLOADER_BUILD
+/* The app needs to be told this memory is reserved, important if configured to use RTC memory as heap.
+
+   Note that keeping this macro here only works when other symbols in this file are referenced by the app, as
+   this feature is otherwise 100% part of the bootloader. However this seems to happen in all apps.
+ */
+SOC_RESERVE_MEMORY_REGION(RTC_RETAIN_MEM_ADDR, RTC_RETAIN_MEM_ADDR + sizeof(rtc_retain_mem_t), rtc_retain_mem);
+#endif
 
 static bool check_rtc_retain_mem(void)
 {

components/bootloader_support/src/bootloader_console.c

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "soc/gpio_sig_map.h"
 #include "soc/rtc.h"
 #include "hal/clk_gate_ll.h"
+#include "hal/gpio_hal.h"
 #if CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2
 #include "esp32s2/rom/usb/cdc_acm.h"
 #include "esp32s2/rom/usb/usb_common.h"
@@ -69,8 +70,8 @@ void bootloader_console_init(void)
             uart_tx_gpio != UART_NUM_0_TXD_DIRECT_GPIO_NUM ||
             uart_rx_gpio != UART_NUM_0_RXD_DIRECT_GPIO_NUM) {
         // Change default UART pins back to GPIOs
-        PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_U0RXD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-        PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_U0TXD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+        gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_U0RXD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+        gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_U0TXD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
         // Route GPIO signals to/from pins
         const uint32_t tx_idx = uart_periph_signal[uart_num].tx_sig;
         const uint32_t rx_idx = uart_periph_signal[uart_num].rx_sig;

components/bootloader_support/src/bootloader_flash_config_esp32.c

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "soc/spi_reg.h"
 #include "soc/soc_caps.h"
 #include "soc/soc_pins.h"
+#include "hal/gpio_hal.h"
 #include "flash_qio_mode.h"
 #include "bootloader_common.h"
 #include "bootloader_flash_config.h"
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ void IRAM_ATTR bootloader_flash_gpio_config(const esp_image_header_t* pfhdr)
         pkg_ver == EFUSE_RD_CHIP_VER_PKG_ESP32PICOV302) {
         // For ESP32D2WD or ESP32-PICO series,the SPI pins are already configured
         // flash clock signal should come from IO MUX.
-        PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
+        gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
         SET_PERI_REG_BITS(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUN_DRV, drv, FUN_DRV_S);
     } else {
         const uint32_t spiconfig = esp_rom_efuse_get_flash_gpio_info();
@@ -102,14 +103,14 @@ void IRAM_ATTR bootloader_flash_gpio_config(const esp_image_header_t* pfhdr)
             esp_rom_gpio_connect_out_signal(SPI_IOMUX_PIN_NUM_HD, SPIHD_OUT_IDX, 0, 0);
             esp_rom_gpio_connect_in_signal(SPI_IOMUX_PIN_NUM_HD, SPIHD_IN_IDX, 0);
             //select pin function gpio
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA0_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA1_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA2_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA3_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CMD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA0_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA1_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA2_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA3_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CMD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
             // flash clock signal should come from IO MUX.
             // set drive ability for clock
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
             SET_PERI_REG_BITS(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUN_DRV, drv, FUN_DRV_S);
 
             uint32_t flash_id = g_rom_flashchip.device_id;

components/bootloader_support/src/bootloader_flash_config_esp32c3.c

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 #include "soc/efuse_reg.h"
 #include "soc/spi_reg.h"
 #include "soc/spi_mem_reg.h"
-#include "soc/spi_caps.h"
+#include "soc/soc_caps.h"
 #include "flash_qio_mode.h"
 #include "bootloader_flash_config.h"
 #include "bootloader_common.h"

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32/bootloader_esp32.c

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include "soc/io_mux_reg.h"
 #include "soc/rtc.h"
 #include "soc/spi_periph.h"
+#include "hal/gpio_hal.h"
 
 #include "esp32/rom/cache.h"
 #include "esp_rom_gpio.h"
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ void bootloader_configure_spi_pins(int drv)
         pkg_ver == EFUSE_RD_CHIP_VER_PKG_ESP32PICOV302) {
         // For ESP32D2WD or ESP32-PICO series,the SPI pins are already configured
         // flash clock signal should come from IO MUX.
-        PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
+        gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
         SET_PERI_REG_BITS(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUN_DRV, drv, FUN_DRV_S);
     } else {
         const uint32_t spiconfig = esp_rom_efuse_get_flash_gpio_info();
@@ -76,14 +77,14 @@ void bootloader_configure_spi_pins(int drv)
             esp_rom_gpio_connect_out_signal(FLASH_SPIHD_IO, SPIHD_OUT_IDX, 0, 0);
             esp_rom_gpio_connect_in_signal(FLASH_SPIHD_IO, SPIHD_IN_IDX, 0);
             //select pin function gpio
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA0_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA1_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA2_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA3_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CMD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA0_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA1_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA2_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_DATA3_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CMD_U, PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
             // flash clock signal should come from IO MUX.
             // set drive ability for clock
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUNC_SD_CLK_SPICLK);
             SET_PERI_REG_BITS(PERIPHS_IO_MUX_SD_CLK_U, FUN_DRV, drv, FUN_DRV_S);
 
 #if CONFIG_SPIRAM_TYPE_ESPPSRAM32 || CONFIG_SPIRAM_TYPE_ESPPSRAM64

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32/secure_boot.c

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #include "esp_log.h"
 
 #include "esp32/rom/cache.h"
-#include "esp_rom_crc.h"
 
 #include "soc/efuse_periph.h"
 #include "soc/rtc_periph.h"
@@ -223,16 +222,12 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable(void)
 #define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
 static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
 
-#define SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE 0xe7
-#define CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN 1196
-#define SIG_BLOCK_PADDING 4096
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-
 static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, uint8_t *digest)
 {
     uint32_t crc = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)sig_block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN);
-    if (sig_block->block[0].magic_byte == SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE && sig_block->block[0].block_crc == crc && !memcmp(digest, sig_block->block[0].image_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+    if (sig_block->block[0].magic_byte == ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC
+        && sig_block->block[0].block_crc == crc
+        && !memcmp(digest, sig_block->block[0].image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
         ESP_LOGI(TAG, "valid signature block found");
         return ESP_OK;
     }
@@ -243,7 +238,7 @@ static esp_err_t secure_boot_v2_digest_generate(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t
 {
     esp_err_t ret = ESP_FAIL;
 
-    uint8_t image_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t image_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
     size_t sig_block_addr = flash_offset + ALIGN_UP(flash_size, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
     ret = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(flash_offset, sig_block_addr - flash_offset, image_digest);
     if (ret != ESP_OK) {
@@ -266,7 +261,7 @@ static esp_err_t secure_boot_v2_digest_generate(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t
     }
 
     /* Verifying Signature block */
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
 
     /* Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
     bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha;
@@ -318,7 +313,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *imag
         return ret;
     }
 
-    uint8_t boot_pub_key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+    uint8_t boot_pub_key_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
     uint32_t dis_reg = REG_READ(EFUSE_BLK0_RDATA0_REG);
     bool efuse_key_read_protected = dis_reg & EFUSE_RD_DIS_BLK2;
     bool efuse_key_write_protected = dis_reg & EFUSE_WR_DIS_BLK2;
@@ -350,7 +345,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *imag
         }
 
         ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Burning public key hash to efuse.");
-        ret = esp_efuse_write_block(EFUSE_BLK2, boot_pub_key_digest, 0, (DIGEST_LEN * 8));
+        ret = esp_efuse_write_block(EFUSE_BLK2, boot_pub_key_digest, 0, (ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN * 8));
         if (ret != ESP_OK) {
             ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Writing public key hash to efuse failed.");
             return ret;
@@ -366,7 +361,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *imag
         efuse_blk2_digest[5] = efuse_blk2_r5;
         efuse_blk2_digest[6] = efuse_blk2_r6;
         efuse_blk2_digest[7] = efuse_blk2_r7;
-        memcpy(boot_pub_key_digest, efuse_blk2_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+        memcpy(boot_pub_key_digest, efuse_blk2_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
         ESP_LOGW(TAG, "Using pre-loaded secure boot v2 public key digest in EFUSE block 2");
     }
 
@@ -380,7 +375,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *imag
         efuse_key_write_protected = true;
     }
 
-    uint8_t app_pub_key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+    uint8_t app_pub_key_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
     ret = secure_boot_v2_digest_generate(image_data->start_addr, image_data->image_len - SIG_BLOCK_PADDING, app_pub_key_digest);
     if (ret != ESP_OK) {
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Application signature block is invalid.");
@@ -388,7 +383,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *imag
     }
 
     /* Confirming if the public key in the bootloader's signature block matches with the one in the application's signature block */
-    if (memcmp(boot_pub_key_digest, app_pub_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
+    if (memcmp(boot_pub_key_digest, app_pub_key_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Application not signed with a valid private key.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     }

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32/secure_boot_signatures.c

@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-#include "sdkconfig.h"
-
-#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
-#include "bootloader_sha.h"
-#include "bootloader_utility.h"
-#include "esp_log.h"
-#include "esp_image_format.h"
-#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
-#include "esp_spi_flash.h"
-#include "esp_fault.h"
-#include "esp32/rom/sha.h"
-#include "uECC_verify_antifault.h"
-
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-static const char *TAG = "secure_boot";
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
-extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_start[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_start");
-extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_end");
-
-#define SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN 64
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* ignored in this function */
-    const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    // Map the signature block
-    sigblock = (const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *) bootloader_mmap(src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
-    if(!sigblock) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-    // Verify the signature
-    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
-    // Unmap
-    bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
-
-    return err;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest)
-{
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 };
-    return esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sig_block, image_digest, verified_digest);
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-    ptrdiff_t keylen;
-
-    keylen = signature_verification_key_end - signature_verification_key_start;
-    if (keylen != SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Embedded public verification key has wrong length %d", keylen);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    if (sig_block->version != 0) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image has invalid signature version field 0x%08x", sig_block->version);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
-
-    bool is_valid;
-    is_valid = uECC_verify_antifault(signature_verification_key_start,
-                           image_digest,
-                           DIGEST_LEN,
-                           sig_block->signature,
-                           uECC_secp256r1(),
-                           verified_digest);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", is_valid);
-
-    return is_valid ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
-}
-
-#elif CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
-#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; // ignored in this function
-    const uint8_t *data;
-
-    /* Padding to round off the input to the nearest 4k boundary */
-    int padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying src_addr 0x%x length", src_addr, padded_length);
-
-    data = bootloader_mmap(src_addr, padded_length + sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
-    if (data == NULL) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr, padded_length);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    /* Calculate digest of main image */
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
-        bootloader_munmap(data);
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block = (const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *)(data + padded_length);
-    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig_block, digest, verified_digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
-    }
-
-    bootloader_munmap(data);
-    return err;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-    secure_boot_v2_status_t r;
-    uint8_t efuse_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}, sig_block_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-
-    memcpy(efuse_trusted_digest, (uint8_t *)EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG, DIGEST_LEN); /* EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG - Stores the Secure Boot Public Key Digest */
-
-    if (!ets_use_secure_boot_v2()) {
-        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure Boot eFuse bit(ABS_DONE_1) not yet programmed.");
-
-        /* Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
-        bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha;
-        sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
-        bootloader_sha256_data(sig_block_sha, &sig_block->block[0].key, sizeof(sig_block->block[0].key));
-        bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, (unsigned char *)sig_block_trusted_digest);
-
-#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
-        if (memcmp(efuse_trusted_digest, sig_block_trusted_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
-            /* Most likely explanation for this is that BLK2 is empty, and we're going to burn it
-               after we verify that the signature is valid. However, if BLK2 is not empty then we need to
-               fail here.
-            */
-            bool all_zeroes = true;
-            for (int i = 0; i < DIGEST_LEN; i++) {
-                all_zeroes = all_zeroes && (efuse_trusted_digest[i] == 0);
-            }
-            if (!all_zeroes) {
-                ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Different public key digest burned to eFuse BLK2");
-                return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;
-            }
-        }
-
-        ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(!ets_use_secure_boot_v2());
-#endif
-
-        memcpy(efuse_trusted_digest, sig_block_trusted_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
-    }
-
-    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS...");
-    r = ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig_block, image_digest, efuse_trusted_digest, verified_digest);
-    if (r != SBV2_SUCCESS) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
-    }
-
-    return (r == SBV2_SUCCESS) ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
-}
-#endif

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32c3/bootloader_esp32c3.c

@@ -264,24 +264,33 @@ static void bootloader_super_wdt_auto_feed(void)
 
 static inline void bootloader_hardware_init(void)
 {
-    // TODO ESP32-C3 IDF-2452
-    REGI2C_WRITE_MASK(I2C_ULP, I2C_ULP_IR_FORCE_XPD_IPH, 1);
-    REGI2C_WRITE_MASK(I2C_BIAS, I2C_BIAS_DREG_1P1_PVT, 12);
+    // This check is always included in the bootloader so it can
+    // print the minimum revision error message later in the boot
+    if (bootloader_common_get_chip_revision() < 3) {
+        REGI2C_WRITE_MASK(I2C_ULP, I2C_ULP_IR_FORCE_XPD_IPH, 1);
+        REGI2C_WRITE_MASK(I2C_BIAS, I2C_BIAS_DREG_1P1_PVT, 12);
+    }
 }
 
-/* There happend clock glitch reset for some chip when testing wifi[BIT0] and brownout reset when chip startup[BIT1].
- * But super_watch_dog_reset function is ok, so open it[BIT2].
- * Whether this api will deleted or not depends on analog design & test result when ECO chip come back.
- */
 static inline void bootloader_glitch_reset_disable(void)
 {
-    // TODO ESP32-C3 IDF-2453
-    REG_SET_FIELD(RTC_CNTL_FIB_SEL_REG, RTC_CNTL_FIB_SEL, BIT2);
+    /*
+      For origin chip & ECO1: only support swt reset;
+      For ECO2: fix brownout reset bug, support swt & brownout reset;
+      For ECO3: fix clock glitch reset bug, support all reset, include: swt & brownout & clock glitch reset.
+    */
+    uint8_t chip_version = bootloader_common_get_chip_revision();
+    if (chip_version < 2) {
+        REG_SET_FIELD(RTC_CNTL_FIB_SEL_REG, RTC_CNTL_FIB_SEL, RTC_CNTL_FIB_SUPER_WDT_RST);
+    } else if (chip_version == 2) {
+        REG_SET_FIELD(RTC_CNTL_FIB_SEL_REG, RTC_CNTL_FIB_SEL, RTC_CNTL_FIB_SUPER_WDT_RST | RTC_CNTL_FIB_BOR_RST);
+    }
 }
 
 esp_err_t bootloader_init(void)
 {
     esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK;
+
     bootloader_hardware_init();
     bootloader_glitch_reset_disable();
     bootloader_super_wdt_auto_feed();

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32c3/secure_boot.c

@@ -31,17 +31,11 @@
 static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
 #define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
 
-#define SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE 0xe7
-#define CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN 1196
-#define SIG_BLOCK_PADDING 4096
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-
 /* A signature block is valid when it has correct magic byte, crc and image digest. */
 static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block, int block_num, const uint8_t *image_digest)
 {
     uint32_t crc = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN);
-    if (block->magic_byte != SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE) {
+    if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC) {
         // All signature blocks have been parsed, no new signature block present.
         ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block(%d) invalid/absent.", block_num);
         return ESP_FAIL;
@@ -50,7 +44,7 @@ static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *blo
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte correct but incorrect crc.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     }
-    if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+    if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte & CRC correct but incorrect image digest.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     } else {
@@ -61,19 +55,6 @@ static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *blo
     return ESP_FAIL;
 }
 
-/* Structure to hold public key digests calculated from the signature blocks of a single image.
-
-   Each image can have one or more signature blocks (up to SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS). Each signature block
-   includes a public key.
-
-   Different to the ROM ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t structure which holds pointers to eFuse data with digests,
-   in this data structure the digest data is included.
-*/
-typedef struct {
-    uint8_t key_digests[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS][DIGEST_LEN];
-    unsigned num_digests; /* Number of valid digests, starting at index 0 */
-} image_sig_public_key_digests_t;
-
 /* Generates the public key digests of the valid public keys in an image's
    signature block, verifies each signature, and stores the key digests in the
    public_key_digests structure.
@@ -89,16 +70,16 @@ typedef struct {
    @return - ESP_OK if no signatures failed to verify, or if no valid signature blocks are found at all.
            - ESP_FAIL if there's a valid signature block that doesn't verify using the included public key (unexpected!)
 */
-static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
+static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
 {
     esp_err_t ret;
-    uint8_t image_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t image_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
     size_t sig_block_addr = flash_offset + ALIGN_UP(flash_size, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
 
     ESP_LOGD(TAG, "calculating public key digests for sig blocks of image offset 0x%x (sig block offset 0x%x)", flash_offset, sig_block_addr);
 
-    bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
+    bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
 
     ret = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(flash_offset, sig_block_addr - flash_offset, image_digest);
     if (ret != ESP_OK) {
@@ -129,7 +110,7 @@ static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uin
         bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, key_digest);
 
         // Check we can verify the image using this signature and this key
-        uint8_t temp_verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+        uint8_t temp_verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
         bool verified = ets_rsa_pss_verify(&block->key, block->signature, image_digest, temp_verified_digest);
 
         if (!verified) {
@@ -142,7 +123,7 @@ static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uin
         }
         ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block (%d) is verified", i);
         /* Copy the key digest to the buffer provided by the caller */
-        memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+        memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
         public_key_digests->num_digests++;
     }
 
@@ -173,8 +154,8 @@ static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t
     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure boot digests %s", has_secure_boot_digest ? "already present":"absent, generating..");
 
     if (!has_secure_boot_digest) {
-        image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
-        image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
+        esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
+        esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
 
         /* Generate the bootloader public key digests */
         ret = s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(bootloader_data.start_addr, bootloader_data.image_len - SIG_BLOCK_PADDING, &boot_key_digests);
@@ -234,7 +215,7 @@ static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t
             }
 
             for (int j = 0; j < app_key_digests.num_digests; j++) {
-                if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], DIGEST_LEN)) {
+                if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
                     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Application key(%d) matches with bootloader key(%d).", j, i);
                     match = true;
                 }

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32c3/secure_boot_signatures.c

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015-2020 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-#include "sdkconfig.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "esp_fault.h"
-#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
-#include "bootloader_sha.h"
-#include "bootloader_utility.h"
-#include "esp_log.h"
-#include "esp_image_format.h"
-#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
-#include "esp32c3/rom/secure_boot.h"
-
-static const char* TAG = "secure_boot";
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* Note: this function doesn't do any anti-FI checks on this buffer */
-    const uint8_t *data;
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-
-    /* Padding to round off the input to the nearest 4k boundary */
-    int padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying src_addr 0x%x length", src_addr, padded_length);
-
-    data = bootloader_mmap(src_addr, length + sizeof(struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block));
-    if (data == NULL) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr, length+sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    /* Calculate digest of main image */
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
-        bootloader_munmap(data);
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig = (const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *)(data + length);
-    int r = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig, digest, verified_digest);
-    bootloader_munmap(data);
-
-    return (r == ETS_OK) ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_keys;
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_key_copies[2];
-    ETS_STATUS r;
-    ets_secure_boot_status_t sb_result;
-
-    memset(&trusted_keys, 0, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
-    memset(trusted_key_copies, 0, 2 * sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
-
-    if (!esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
-        return ESP_OK;
-    }
-
-    r = ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_keys);
-    if (r != ETS_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Could not read secure boot digests!");
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    // Create the copies for FI checks (assuming result is ETS_OK, if it's not then it'll fail the fault check anyhow)
-    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[0]);
-    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[1]);
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[0], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[1], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
-
-    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS boot...");
-    sb_result = ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig_block, image_digest, &trusted_keys, verified_digest);
-    return (sb_result == SB_SUCCESS) ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL;
-}

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32s2/secure_boot.c

@@ -31,17 +31,11 @@
 static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
 #define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
 
-#define SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE 0xe7
-#define CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN 1196
-#define SIG_BLOCK_PADDING 4096
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-
 /* A signature block is valid when it has correct magic byte, crc and image digest. */
 static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block, int block_num, const uint8_t *image_digest)
 {
     uint32_t crc = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN);
-    if (block->magic_byte != SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE) {
+    if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC) {
         // All signature blocks have been parsed, no new signature block present.
         ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block(%d) invalid/absent.", block_num);
         return ESP_FAIL;
@@ -50,7 +44,7 @@ static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *blo
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte correct but incorrect crc.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     }
-    if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+    if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte & CRC correct but incorrect image digest.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     } else {
@@ -61,19 +55,6 @@ static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *blo
     return ESP_FAIL;
 }
 
-/* Structure to hold public key digests calculated from the signature blocks of a single image.
-
-   Each image can have one or more signature blocks (up to SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS). Each signature block
-   includes a public key.
-
-   Different to the ROM ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t structure which holds pointers to eFuse data with digests,
-   in this data structure the digest data is included.
-*/
-typedef struct {
-    uint8_t key_digests[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS][DIGEST_LEN];
-    unsigned num_digests; /* Number of valid digests, starting at index 0 */
-} image_sig_public_key_digests_t;
-
 /* Generates the public key digests of the valid public keys in an image's
    signature block, verifies each signature, and stores the key digests in the
    public_key_digests structure.
@@ -89,16 +70,16 @@ typedef struct {
    @return - ESP_OK if no signatures failed to verify, or if no valid signature blocks are found at all.
            - ESP_FAIL if there's a valid signature block that doesn't verify using the included public key (unexpected!)
 */
-static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
+static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
 {
     esp_err_t ret;
-    uint8_t image_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t image_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
     size_t sig_block_addr = flash_offset + ALIGN_UP(flash_size, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
 
     ESP_LOGD(TAG, "calculating public key digests for sig blocks of image offset 0x%x (sig block offset 0x%x)", flash_offset, sig_block_addr);
 
-    bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
+    bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
 
     ret = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(flash_offset, sig_block_addr - flash_offset, image_digest);
     if (ret != ESP_OK) {
@@ -129,7 +110,7 @@ static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uin
         bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, key_digest);
 
         // Check we can verify the image using this signature and this key
-        uint8_t temp_verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+        uint8_t temp_verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
         bool verified = ets_rsa_pss_verify(&block->key, block->signature, image_digest, temp_verified_digest);
 
         if (!verified) {
@@ -142,7 +123,7 @@ static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uin
         }
         ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block (%d) is verified", i);
         /* Copy the key digest to the buffer provided by the caller */
-        memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+        memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
         public_key_digests->num_digests++;
     }
 
@@ -173,8 +154,8 @@ static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t
     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure boot digests %s", has_secure_boot_digest ? "already present":"absent, generating..");
 
     if (!has_secure_boot_digest) {
-        image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
-        image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
+        esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
+        esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
 
         /* Generate the bootloader public key digests */
         ret = s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(bootloader_data.start_addr, bootloader_data.image_len - SIG_BLOCK_PADDING, &boot_key_digests);
@@ -234,7 +215,7 @@ static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t
             }
 
             for (int j = 0; j < app_key_digests.num_digests; j++) {
-                if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], DIGEST_LEN)) {
+                if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
                     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Application key(%d) matches with bootloader key(%d).", j, i);
                     match = true;
                 }

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32s2/secure_boot_signatures.c

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-#include "sdkconfig.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "esp_fault.h"
-#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
-#include "bootloader_sha.h"
-#include "bootloader_utility.h"
-#include "esp_log.h"
-#include "esp_image_format.h"
-#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
-#include "esp32s2/rom/secure_boot.h"
-
-static const char* TAG = "secure_boot";
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* Note: this function doesn't do any anti-FI checks on this buffer */
-    const uint8_t *data;
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-
-    /* Padding to round off the input to the nearest 4k boundary */
-    int padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying src_addr 0x%x length", src_addr, padded_length);
-
-    data = bootloader_mmap(src_addr, length + sizeof(struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block));
-    if (data == NULL) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr, length+sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    /* Calculate digest of main image */
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
-        bootloader_munmap(data);
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig = (const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *)(data + length);
-    int r = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig, digest, verified_digest);
-    bootloader_munmap(data);
-
-    return (r == ETS_OK) ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_keys;
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_key_copies[2];
-    ETS_STATUS r;
-    ets_secure_boot_status_t sb_result;
-
-    memset(&trusted_keys, 0, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
-    memset(trusted_key_copies, 0, 2 * sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
-
-    if (!esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
-        return ESP_OK;
-    }
-
-    r = ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_keys);
-    if (r != ETS_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Could not read secure boot digests!");
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    // Create the copies for FI checks (assuming result is ETS_OK, if it's not then it'll fail the fault check anyhow)
-    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[0]);
-    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[1]);
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[0], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[1], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
-
-    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS boot...");
-    sb_result = ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig_block, image_digest, &trusted_keys, verified_digest);
-    return (sb_result == SB_SUCCESS) ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL;
-}

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32s3/secure_boot.c

@@ -31,17 +31,11 @@
 static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
 #define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
 
-#define SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE 0xe7
-#define CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN 1196
-#define SIG_BLOCK_PADDING 4096
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-
 /* A signature block is valid when it has correct magic byte, crc and image digest. */
 static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block, int block_num, const uint8_t *image_digest)
 {
     uint32_t crc = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN);
-    if (block->magic_byte != SIG_BLOCK_MAGIC_BYTE) {
+    if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC) {
         // All signature blocks have been parsed, no new signature block present.
         ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block(%d) invalid/absent.", block_num);
         return ESP_FAIL;
@@ -50,7 +44,7 @@ static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *blo
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte correct but incorrect crc.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     }
-    if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+    if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte & CRC correct but incorrect image digest.");
         return ESP_FAIL;
     } else {
@@ -61,19 +55,6 @@ static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *blo
     return ESP_FAIL;
 }
 
-/* Structure to hold public key digests calculated from the signature blocks of a single image.
-
-   Each image can have one or more signature blocks (up to SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS). Each signature block
-   includes a public key.
-
-   Different to the ROM ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t structure which holds pointers to eFuse data with digests,
-   in this data structure the digest data is included.
-*/
-typedef struct {
-    uint8_t key_digests[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS][DIGEST_LEN];
-    unsigned num_digests; /* Number of valid digests, starting at index 0 */
-} image_sig_public_key_digests_t;
-
 /* Generates the public key digests of the valid public keys in an image's
    signature block, verifies each signature, and stores the key digests in the
    public_key_digests structure.
@@ -89,16 +70,16 @@ typedef struct {
    @return - ESP_OK if no signatures failed to verify, or if no valid signature blocks are found at all.
            - ESP_FAIL if there's a valid signature block that doesn't verify using the included public key (unexpected!)
 */
-static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
+static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
 {
     esp_err_t ret;
-    uint8_t image_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t image_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
     size_t sig_block_addr = flash_offset + ALIGN_UP(flash_size, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
 
     ESP_LOGD(TAG, "calculating public key digests for sig blocks of image offset 0x%x (sig block offset 0x%x)", flash_offset, sig_block_addr);
 
-    bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
+    bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
 
     ret = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(flash_offset, sig_block_addr - flash_offset, image_digest);
     if (ret != ESP_OK) {
@@ -129,7 +110,7 @@ static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uin
         bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, key_digest);
 
         // Check we can verify the image using this signature and this key
-        uint8_t temp_verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+        uint8_t temp_verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
         bool verified = ets_rsa_pss_verify(&block->key, block->signature, image_digest, temp_verified_digest);
 
         if (!verified) {
@@ -142,7 +123,7 @@ static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uin
         }
         ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block (%d) is verified", i);
         /* Copy the key digest to the buffer provided by the caller */
-        memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+        memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
         public_key_digests->num_digests++;
     }
 
@@ -173,8 +154,8 @@ static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t
     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure boot digests %s", has_secure_boot_digest ? "already present":"absent, generating..");
 
     if (!has_secure_boot_digest) {
-        image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
-        image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
+        esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
+        esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
 
         /* Generate the bootloader public key digests */
         ret = s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(bootloader_data.start_addr, bootloader_data.image_len - SIG_BLOCK_PADDING, &boot_key_digests);
@@ -234,7 +215,7 @@ static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t
             }
 
             for (int j = 0; j < app_key_digests.num_digests; j++) {
-                if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], DIGEST_LEN)) {
+                if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
                     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Application key(%d) matches with bootloader key(%d).", j, i);
                     match = true;
                 }

components/bootloader_support/src/esp32s3/secure_boot_signatures.c

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "sdkconfig.h"
-#include "esp_fault.h"
-#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
-#include "bootloader_sha.h"
-#include "bootloader_utility.h"
-#include "esp_log.h"
-#include "esp_image_format.h"
-#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
-#include "esp32s3/rom/secure_boot.h"
-
-static const char* TAG = "secure_boot";
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* Note: this function doesn't do any anti-FI checks on this buffer */
-    const uint8_t *data;
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-
-    /* Padding to round off the input to the nearest 4k boundary */
-    int padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying src_addr 0x%x length", src_addr, padded_length);
-
-    data = bootloader_mmap(src_addr, length + sizeof(struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block));
-    if (data == NULL) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr, length+sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    /* Calculate digest of main image */
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
-        bootloader_munmap(data);
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig = (const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *)(data + length);
-    int r = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig, digest, verified_digest);
-    bootloader_munmap(data);
-
-    return (r == ETS_OK) ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_keys;
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_key_copies[2];
-    ETS_STATUS r;
-    ets_secure_boot_status_t sb_result;
-
-    memset(&trusted_keys, 0, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
-    memset(trusted_key_copies, 0, 2 * sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
-
-    if (!esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
-        return ESP_OK;
-    }
-
-    r = ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_keys);
-    if (r != ETS_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Could not read secure boot digests!");
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    // Create the copies for FI checks (assuming result is ETS_OK, if it's not then it'll fail the fault check anyhow)
-    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[0]);
-    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[1]);
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[0], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[1], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
-
-    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS boot...");
-    sb_result = ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig_block, image_digest, &trusted_keys, verified_digest);
-    return (sb_result == SB_SUCCESS) ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL;
-}

components/bootloader_support/src/esp_image_format.c

@@ -327,11 +327,24 @@ err:
 
 esp_err_t bootloader_load_image(const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
 {
-#ifdef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
-    return image_load(ESP_IMAGE_LOAD, part, data);
-#else
+#if !defined(BOOTLOADER_BUILD)
     return ESP_FAIL;
-#endif
+#else
+    esp_image_load_mode_t mode = ESP_IMAGE_LOAD;
+
+#if !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT)
+    /* Skip validation under particular configurations */
+#if CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_ALWAYS
+    mode = ESP_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_VALIDATE;
+#elif CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_SKIP_VALIDATE_ON_POWER_ON
+    if (rtc_get_reset_reason(0) == POWERON_RESET) {
+        mode = ESP_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_VALIDATE;
+    }
+#endif // CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_SKIP_...
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT
+
+ return image_load(mode, part, data);
+#endif // BOOTLOADER_BUILD
 }
 
 esp_err_t bootloader_load_image_no_verify(const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *data)
@@ -348,6 +361,45 @@ esp_err_t esp_image_verify(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_t
     return image_load(mode, part, data);
 }
 
+esp_err_t esp_image_get_metadata(const esp_partition_pos_t *part, esp_image_metadata_t *metadata)
+{
+    if (metadata == NULL || part == NULL || part->size > SIXTEEN_MB) {
+        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+    }
+
+    memset(metadata, 0, sizeof(esp_image_metadata_t));
+    metadata->start_addr = part->offset;
+
+    esp_err_t err = bootloader_flash_read(metadata->start_addr, &metadata->image, sizeof(esp_image_header_t), true);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        return err;
+    }
+    uint32_t next_addr = metadata->start_addr + sizeof(esp_image_header_t);
+    for (int i = 0; i < metadata->image.segment_count; i++) {
+        esp_image_segment_header_t *header = &metadata->segments[i];
+        err = process_segment(i, next_addr, header, true, false, NULL, NULL);
+        if (err != ESP_OK) {
+            return err;
+        }
+        next_addr += sizeof(esp_image_segment_header_t);
+        metadata->segment_data[i] = next_addr;
+        next_addr += header->data_len;
+    }
+    metadata->image_len = next_addr - metadata->start_addr;
+
+    // checksum
+    uint32_t unpadded_length = metadata->image_len;
+    uint32_t length = unpadded_length + 1; // Add a byte for the checksum
+    length = (length + 15) & ~15; // Pad to next full 16 byte block
+    if (metadata->image.hash_appended) {
+        // Account for the hash in the total image length
+        length += HASH_LEN;
+    }
+    metadata->image_len = length;
+
+    return ESP_OK;
+}
+
 static esp_err_t verify_image_header(uint32_t src_addr, const esp_image_header_t *image, bool silent)
 {
     esp_err_t err = ESP_OK;
@@ -808,18 +860,18 @@ static esp_err_t verify_secure_boot_signature(bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_han
 
     // Use hash to verify signature block
     esp_err_t err = ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME) || defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME)
     const void *sig_block;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
     ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(image_digest, verified_digest, HASH_LEN) != 0); /* sanity check that these values start differently */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
     sig_block = bootloader_mmap(data->start_addr + data->image_len, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
     err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sig_block, image_digest, verified_digest);
-#elif CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
-    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(image_digest, verified_digest, HASH_LEN) != 0);  /* sanity check that these values start differently */
+#else
     sig_block = bootloader_mmap(end, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
     err = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig_block, image_digest, verified_digest);
 #endif
-
     bootloader_munmap(sig_block);
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME or CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
     if (err != ESP_OK) {
         ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure boot signature verification failed");
 

components/bootloader_support/src/idf/secure_boot_signatures.c

@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-#include "sdkconfig.h"
-
-#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
-#include "bootloader_sha.h"
-#include "bootloader_utility.h"
-#include "esp_log.h"
-#include "esp_image_format.h"
-#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
-#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
-#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2
-#include <esp32s2/rom/secure_boot.h>
-#elif CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3
-#include <esp32c3/rom/secure_boot.h>
-#endif
-
-#define DIGEST_LEN 32
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
-static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v1";
-
-extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_start[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_start");
-extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_end");
-
-#define SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN 64
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-    const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    // Map the signature block and verify the signature
-    sigblock = (const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *)bootloader_mmap(src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
-    if (sigblock == NULL) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
-    bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
-    return err;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-#if !(defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED))
-    ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Signature verification requires ECDSA & SECP256R1 curve enabled");
-    return ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-#else
-    ptrdiff_t keylen;
-
-    /* Note: in IDF app image verification we don't add any fault injection resistance, boot-time checks only */
-    memset(verified_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
-
-    keylen = signature_verification_key_end - signature_verification_key_start;
-    if (keylen != SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Embedded public verification key has wrong length %d", keylen);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    if (sig_block->version != 0) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image has invalid signature version field 0x%08x", sig_block->version);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
-
-    int ret;
-    mbedtls_mpi r, s;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
-
-    /* Extract r and s components from RAW ECDSA signature of 64 bytes */
-#define ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN 32
-    ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, &sig_block->signature[0], ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(1), err:%d", ret);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, &sig_block->signature[ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN], ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(2), err:%d", ret);
-        mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    /* Initialise ECDSA context */
-    mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_context;
-    mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa_context);
-
-    mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecdsa_context.grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
-    size_t plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa_context.grp.P);
-    if (keylen != 2 * plen) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Incorrect ECDSA key length %d", keylen);
-        ret = ESP_FAIL;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /* Extract X and Y components from ECDSA public key */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ecdsa_context.Q.X, signature_verification_key_start, plen));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ecdsa_context.Q.Y, signature_verification_key_start + plen, plen));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ecdsa_context.Q.Z, 1));
-
-    ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecdsa_context.grp, image_digest, DIGEST_LEN, &ecdsa_context.Q, &r, &s);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", ret);
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
-    mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa_context);
-    return ret == 0 ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
-#endif // CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
-}
-
-#elif CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME
-
-static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
-#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
-#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 384 /* RSA 3072 Bits */
-
-#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
-inline static bool digest_matches(const void *trusted, const void *computed)
-{
-    if (trusted == NULL) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    // 'trusted' is probably a pointer to read-only efuse registers,
-    // which only support word reads. memcmp() cannot be guaranteed
-    // to do word reads, so we make a local copy here (we know that
-    // memcpy() will do word operations if it can).
-    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) trusted_local[ETS_DIGEST_LEN];
-    uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) computed_local[ETS_DIGEST_LEN];
-
-    memcpy(trusted_local, trusted, ETS_DIGEST_LEN);
-    memcpy(computed_local, computed, ETS_DIGEST_LEN);
-    return memcmp(trusted_local, computed_local, ETS_DIGEST_LEN) == 0;
-}
-#endif /* SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1 */
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
-{
-    uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-    uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-
-    /* Rounding off length to the upper 4k boundary */
-    uint32_t padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
-
-    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
-        return err;
-    }
-
-    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block = bootloader_mmap(src_addr + padded_length, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
-    if (sig_block == NULL) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to mmap data at offset 0x%x", src_addr + padded_length);
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig_block, digest, verified_digest);
-    if (err != ESP_OK) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
-    }
-    bootloader_munmap(sig_block);
-    return err;
-}
-
-esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
-{
-    uint8_t i = 0;
-#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED /* Verify key against efuse block */
-    uint8_t sig_block_key_digest[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS][DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-
-    /* Note: in IDF verification we don't add any fault injection resistance, as we don't expect this to be called
-       during boot-time verification. */
-    memset(verified_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
-
-    /* Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
-    for (i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
-        bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha;
-        sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
-        bootloader_sha256_data(sig_block_sha, &sig_block->block[i].key, sizeof(sig_block->block[i].key));
-        bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, (unsigned char *)sig_block_key_digest[i]);
-    }
-
-#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS == 1
-    uint8_t efuse_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-    memcpy(efuse_trusted_digest, (uint8_t *) EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG, sizeof(efuse_trusted_digest));
-
-    if (memcmp(efuse_trusted_digest, sig_block_key_digest[0], DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
-        const uint8_t zeroes[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
-        /* Can't continue if secure boot is enabled, OR if a different digest is already written in efuse BLK2
-
-           (If BLK2 is empty and Secure Boot is disabled then we assume that it will be enabled later.)
-         */
-        if (esp_secure_boot_enabled() || memcmp(efuse_trusted_digest, zeroes, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
-            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Public key digest in eFuse BLK2 and the signature block don't match.");
-            return ESP_FAIL;
-        }
-    }
-#elif SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
-    bool match = false;
-    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t efuse_trusted_digest;
-    ETS_STATUS r;
-    r = ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&efuse_trusted_digest);
-    if (r != 0) {
-        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Could not read secure boot digests!");
-        return ESP_FAIL;
-    }
-#endif /* SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS */
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED */
-
-    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS...");
-    int ret = 0;
-    mbedtls_rsa_context pk;
-    mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
-    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
-    unsigned char *sig_be = calloc(1, RSA_KEY_SIZE);
-    unsigned char *buf = calloc(1, RSA_KEY_SIZE);
-    if (sig_be == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        return ESP_ERR_NO_MEM;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy);
-    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
-    ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, NULL, 0);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", ret);
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
-#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
-        for (uint8_t j = 0; j < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; j++) {
-            if (digest_matches(efuse_trusted_digest.key_digests[j], sig_block_key_digest[i])) {
-                ESP_LOGI(TAG, "eFuse key matches(%d) matches the application key(%d).", j, i);
-                match = true;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        if (match == false) {
-            continue; // Skip the public keys whose digests don't match.
-        }
-# endif // SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
-
-        const mbedtls_mpi N = { .s = 1,
-                                .n = sizeof(sig_block->block[i].key.n)/sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint),
-                                .p = (void *)sig_block->block[i].key.n,
-        };
-        const mbedtls_mpi e = { .s = 1,
-                                .n = sizeof(sig_block->block[i].key.e)/sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), // 1
-                                .p = (void *)&sig_block->block[i].key.e,
-        };
-        mbedtls_rsa_init(&pk, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(&pk, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &e);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_import, err: %d", ret);
-            goto exit;
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(&pk);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_complete, err: %d", ret);
-            goto exit;
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&pk);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Key is not an RSA key -%0x", -ret);
-            goto exit;
-        }
-
-        /* Signature needs to be byte swapped into BE representation */
-        for (int j = 0; j < RSA_KEY_SIZE; j++) {
-            sig_be[RSA_KEY_SIZE- j - 1] = sig_block->block[i].signature[j];
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( &pk, sig_be, buf);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "mbedtls_rsa_public failed, err: %d", ret);
-            goto exit;
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &pk, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, DIGEST_LEN,
-                                            image_digest, sig_be);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify, err: %d", ret);
-        } else {
-            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Signature verified successfully!");
-        }
-        exit:
-            mbedtls_rsa_free(&pk);
-            if (ret == 0) {
-                break;
-            }
-    }
-
-    free(sig_be);
-    free(buf);
-#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS == 1
-    return (ret != 0) ? ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID: ESP_OK;
-#elif SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
-    return (ret != 0 || match == false) ? ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID: ESP_OK;
-#endif /* CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32 */
-}
-#endif

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot.c

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Copyright 2015-2019 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <strings.h>
+#include "sdkconfig.h"
+#include "esp_log.h"
+#include "esp_efuse.h"
+#include "esp_efuse_table.h"
+#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
+
+#ifndef BOOTLOADER_BUILD
+static __attribute__((unused)) const char *TAG = "secure_boot";
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+
+static void rsa_check_signature_on_update_check(void)
+{
+    // We rely on the keys used to sign this app to verify the next app on OTA, so make sure there is at
+    // least one to avoid a stuck firmware
+    esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t digests = { 0 };
+
+    esp_err_t err = esp_secure_boot_get_signature_blocks_for_running_app(false, &digests);
+
+    if (err != ESP_OK || digests.num_digests == 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "This app is not signed, but check signature on update is enabled in config. It won't be possible to verify any update.");
+        abort();
+    }
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT && SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS > 1
+    if (digests.num_digests > 1) {
+        ESP_LOGW(TAG, "App has %d signatures. Only the first position of signature blocks is used to verify any update", digests.num_digests);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+
+void esp_secure_boot_init_checks(void)
+{
+
+
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+    rsa_check_signature_on_update_check();
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+
+}
+#endif // not BOOTLOADER_BUILD

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_app.c

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+#include "sdkconfig.h"
+
+#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
+#include "bootloader_sha.h"
+#include "bootloader_utility.h"
+#include "esp_log.h"
+#include "esp_image_format.h"
+#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
+static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v1";
+
+extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_start[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_start");
+extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_end");
+
+#define SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN 64
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
+{
+    uint8_t digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
+    uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
+    const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
+
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
+
+    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, length);
+        return err;
+    }
+
+    // Map the signature block and verify the signature
+    sigblock = (const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *)bootloader_mmap(src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
+    if (sigblock == NULL) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
+    bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
+    return err;
+}
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
+{
+#if !(defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED))
+    ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Signature verification requires ECDSA & SECP256R1 curve enabled");
+    return ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+#else
+    ptrdiff_t keylen;
+
+    /* Note: in IDF app image verification we don't add any fault injection resistance, boot-time checks only */
+    memset(verified_digest, 0, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
+
+    keylen = signature_verification_key_end - signature_verification_key_start;
+    if (keylen != SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Embedded public verification key has wrong length %d", keylen);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (sig_block->version != 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image has invalid signature version field 0x%08x", sig_block->version);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
+
+    int ret;
+    mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
+    mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
+
+    /* Extract r and s components from RAW ECDSA signature of 64 bytes */
+#define ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN 32
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, &sig_block->signature[0], ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(1), err:%d", ret);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, &sig_block->signature[ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN], ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(2), err:%d", ret);
+        mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Initialise ECDSA context */
+    mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_context;
+    mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa_context);
+
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecdsa_context.grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
+    size_t plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa_context.grp.P);
+    if (keylen != 2 * plen) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Incorrect ECDSA key length %d", keylen);
+        ret = ESP_FAIL;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Extract X and Y components from ECDSA public key */
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ecdsa_context.Q.X, signature_verification_key_start, plen));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ecdsa_context.Q.Y, signature_verification_key_start + plen, plen));
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ecdsa_context.Q.Z, 1));
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecdsa_context.grp, image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN, &ecdsa_context.Q, &r, &s);
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", ret);
+
+cleanup:
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
+    mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
+    mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa_context);
+    return ret == 0 ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
+#endif // CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+}
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot_v1/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.c

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+#include "sdkconfig.h"
+
+#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
+#include "bootloader_sha.h"
+#include "bootloader_utility.h"
+#include "esp_log.h"
+#include "esp_image_format.h"
+#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
+#include "esp_spi_flash.h"
+#include "esp_fault.h"
+#include "esp32/rom/sha.h"
+#include "uECC_verify_antifault.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static const char *TAG = "secure_boot";
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
+extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_start[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_start");
+extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_end");
+
+#define SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN 64
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
+{
+    uint8_t digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
+    uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* ignored in this function */
+    const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
+
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
+
+    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        return err;
+    }
+
+    // Map the signature block
+    sigblock = (const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *) bootloader_mmap(src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
+    if(!sigblock) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+    // Verify the signature
+    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
+    // Unmap
+    bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
+
+    return err;
+}
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest)
+{
+    uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 };
+    return esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sig_block, image_digest, verified_digest);
+}
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
+{
+    ptrdiff_t keylen;
+
+    keylen = signature_verification_key_end - signature_verification_key_start;
+    if (keylen != SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Embedded public verification key has wrong length %d", keylen);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (sig_block->version != 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image has invalid signature version field 0x%08x", sig_block->version);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
+
+    bool is_valid;
+    is_valid = uECC_verify_antifault(signature_verification_key_start,
+                           image_digest,
+                           ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN,
+                           sig_block->signature,
+                           uECC_secp256r1(),
+                           verified_digest);
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", is_valid);
+
+    return is_valid ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
+}
+
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_app.c

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+#include "sdkconfig.h"
+
+#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
+#include "bootloader_sha.h"
+#include "bootloader_utility.h"
+#include "esp_log.h"
+#include "esp_image_format.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
+#include "esp_ota_ops.h"
+
+// Secure boot V2 for app
+
+_Static_assert(SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS == SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS,
+               "Parts of this code rely on the max number of signatures appended to an image"
+               "being the same as the max number of trusted keys.");
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+
+static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
+#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
+
+/* A signature block is valid when it has correct magic byte, crc. */
+static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block)
+{
+    if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC
+        || block->block_crc != esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN)) {
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+    return ESP_OK;
+}
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_get_signature_blocks_for_running_app(bool digest_public_keys, esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
+{
+    esp_image_metadata_t metadata;
+    const esp_partition_t* running_app_part = esp_ota_get_running_partition();
+    if (running_app_part == NULL) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Cannot get running partition");
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+    const esp_partition_pos_t part_pos = {
+        .offset = running_app_part->address,
+        .size   = running_app_part->size,
+    };
+    esp_err_t err = esp_image_get_metadata(&part_pos, &metadata);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Error reading metadata from running app (err=0x%x)", err);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    memset(public_key_digests, 0, sizeof(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
+
+    // Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block
+
+    // metadata.image_len doesn't include any padding to start of the signature sector, so pad it here
+    size_t sig_block_addr = metadata.start_addr + ALIGN_UP(metadata.image_len, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "reading signatures for app address 0x%x sig block address 0x%x", part_pos.offset, sig_block_addr);
+    for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
+        ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t block;
+        size_t addr = sig_block_addr + sizeof(ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t) * i;
+        esp_err_t err = bootloader_flash_read(addr, &block, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t), true);
+        if (err == ESP_OK) {
+            if (validate_signature_block(&block) == ESP_OK) {
+                if (digest_public_keys) {
+                    bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
+                    bootloader_sha256_data(sig_block_sha, &block.key, sizeof(block.key));
+                    bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, public_key_digests->key_digests[i]);
+                }
+                public_key_digests->num_digests++;
+            }
+        } else {
+            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure boot sign blocks cannot be read from a running app (err=0x%x)", err);
+            return ESP_FAIL;
+        }
+    }
+    if (public_key_digests->num_digests > 0) {
+        return ESP_OK;
+    }
+    ESP_LOGE(TAG, "No signatures were found for the running app");
+    return ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+static esp_err_t get_secure_boot_key_digests(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+    // Gets key digests from running app
+    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Take trusted digest key(s) from running app");
+    return esp_secure_boot_get_signature_blocks_for_running_app(true, public_key_digests);
+#elif CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
+    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Take trusted digest key(s) from eFuse block(s)");
+#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
+    // Read key digests from efuse
+    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t efuse_trusted;
+    if (ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&efuse_trusted) == ETS_OK) {
+        for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
+            if (efuse_trusted.key_digests[i] != NULL) {
+                memcpy(public_key_digests->key_digests[i], (uint8_t *)efuse_trusted.key_digests[i], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
+                public_key_digests->num_digests++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (public_key_digests->num_digests > 0) {
+        return ESP_OK;
+    }
+    return ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+#else
+    memcpy(public_key_digests->key_digests[0], (uint8_t *)EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
+    public_key_digests->num_digests = 1;
+    return ESP_OK;
+#endif // SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
+}
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
+{
+    uint8_t digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+
+    /* Rounding off length to the upper 4k boundary */
+    uint32_t padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
+
+    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
+        return err;
+    }
+
+    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block = bootloader_mmap(src_addr + padded_length, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
+    if (sig_block == NULL) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to mmap data at offset 0x%x", src_addr + padded_length);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig_block, digest, verified_digest);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
+    }
+    bootloader_munmap(sig_block);
+    return err;
+}
+
+// This verify function is called only from app, during ota update.
+// This function is compiled in case when CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED==y or CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT==y.
+// if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED==y and key digests from eFuse are missing, then FAIL (eFuse blocks should be set).
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
+{
+    bool any_trusted_key = false;
+
+    /* Note: in IDF verification we don't add any fault injection resistance, as we don't expect this to be called
+        during boot-time verification. */
+    memset(verified_digest, 0, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
+
+    esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t trusted = {0};
+
+    if (get_secure_boot_key_digests(&trusted) != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Could not read secure boot digests!");
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+
+    int ret = 0;
+    mbedtls_rsa_context pk;
+    mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
+    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
+    const unsigned rsa_key_size = sizeof(sig_block->block[0].signature);
+    unsigned char *sig_be = calloc(1, rsa_key_size);
+    unsigned char *buf = calloc(1, rsa_key_size);
+    if (sig_be == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        return ESP_ERR_NO_MEM;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy);
+    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg);
+    ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, NULL, 0);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", ret);
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT
+    const unsigned secure_boot_num_blocks = 1;
+#else
+    const unsigned secure_boot_num_blocks = SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS;
+#endif
+
+    for (unsigned app_blk_idx = 0; app_blk_idx < secure_boot_num_blocks; app_blk_idx++) {
+        uint8_t app_blk_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 };
+        const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *app_blk = &sig_block->block[app_blk_idx];
+        const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *trusted_block = NULL;
+
+        if (validate_signature_block(app_blk) != ESP_OK) {
+            continue; // Skip invalid signature blocks
+        }
+
+        /* Generate the SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
+        bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
+        bootloader_sha256_data(sig_block_sha, &app_blk->key, sizeof(app_blk->key));
+        bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, app_blk_digest);
+
+        /* Check if the key is one we trust */
+        for (unsigned trusted_key_idx = 0; trusted_key_idx < secure_boot_num_blocks; trusted_key_idx++) {
+            if (memcmp(app_blk_digest, trusted.key_digests[trusted_key_idx], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN) == 0) {
+                ESP_LOGI(TAG, "#%d app key digest == #%d trusted key digest", app_blk_idx, trusted_key_idx);
+                trusted_block = app_blk;
+                any_trusted_key = true;
+                break;
+            }
+            ESP_LOGV(TAG, "not trusting app sig %d trust idx %d", app_blk_idx, trusted_key_idx);
+        }
+
+        if (trusted_block == NULL) {
+            continue; // Skip the signature blocks with no trusted digest
+        }
+
+        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS...");
+
+        const mbedtls_mpi N = { .s = 1,
+                                .n = sizeof(trusted_block->key.n)/sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint),
+                                .p = (void *)trusted_block->key.n,
+        };
+        const mbedtls_mpi e = { .s = 1,
+                                .n = sizeof(trusted_block->key.e)/sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), // 1
+                                .p = (void *)&trusted_block->key.e,
+        };
+        mbedtls_rsa_init(&pk, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(&pk, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &e);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_import, err: %d", ret);
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(&pk);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_complete, err: %d", ret);
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&pk);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Key is not an RSA key -%0x", -ret);
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        /* Signature needs to be byte swapped into BE representation */
+        for (int j = 0; j < rsa_key_size; j++) {
+            sig_be[rsa_key_size - j - 1] = trusted_block->signature[j];
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_public( &pk, sig_be, buf);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "mbedtls_rsa_public failed, err: %d", ret);
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &pk, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN,
+                                            image_digest, sig_be);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify, err: %d", ret);
+        } else {
+            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Signature verified successfully!");
+        }
+exit:
+        mbedtls_rsa_free(&pk);
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    free(sig_be);
+    free(buf);
+    return (ret != 0 || any_trusted_key == false) ? ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID: ESP_OK;
+}
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME || CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE_NO_SECURE_BOOT

components/bootloader_support/src/secure_boot_v2/secure_boot_signatures_bootloader.c

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+#include "sdkconfig.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "esp_fault.h"
+#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
+#include "bootloader_sha.h"
+#include "bootloader_utility.h"
+#include "esp_log.h"
+#include "esp_image_format.h"
+#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
+
+// Secure boot V2 for bootloader.
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
+
+static const char* TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
+
+#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
+
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
+{
+    uint8_t digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* Note: this function doesn't do any anti-FI checks on this buffer */
+
+    /* Rounding off length to the upper 4k boundary */
+    uint32_t padded_length = ALIGN_UP(length, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
+
+    /* Calculate digest of main image */
+    esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, padded_length, digest);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, padded_length);
+        return err;
+    }
+
+    const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block = bootloader_mmap(src_addr + padded_length, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
+    if (sig_block == NULL) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to mmap data at offset 0x%x", src_addr + padded_length);
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    err = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig_block, digest, verified_digest);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
+    }
+    bootloader_munmap(sig_block);
+    return err;
+}
+
+/* A signature block is valid when it has correct magic byte, crc. */
+static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block)
+{
+    if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC
+        || block->block_crc != esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN)) {
+        return ESP_FAIL;
+    }
+    return ESP_OK;
+}
+
+static esp_err_t get_secure_boot_key_digests(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
+{
+#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS > 1
+    // Read key digests from efuse
+    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_keys;
+    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_key_copies[2];
+    ETS_STATUS ets_ret;
+
+    memset(&trusted_keys, 0, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
+    memset(trusted_key_copies, 0, 2 * sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t));
+
+
+    ets_ret = ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_keys);
+
+    // Create the copies for FI checks (assuming result is ETS_OK, if it's not then it'll fail the fault check anyhow)
+    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[0]);
+    ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(&trusted_key_copies[1]);
+    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[0], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
+    ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(memcmp(&trusted_keys, &trusted_key_copies[1], sizeof(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t)) == 0);
+
+    if (ets_ret == ETS_OK) {
+        for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
+            if (trusted_keys.key_digests[i] != NULL) {
+                memcpy(public_key_digests->key_digests[i], (uint8_t *)trusted_keys.key_digests[i], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
+                public_key_digests->num_digests++;
+            }
+        }
+        if (public_key_digests->num_digests > 0) {
+            return ESP_OK;
+        }
+    }
+    return ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+#else
+    bool all_zeroes = true;
+    uint32_t *reg = (uint32_t*)&public_key_digests->key_digests[0];
+    for (int i = 0; i < ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN / 4; i++) {
+        *(reg + i) = REG_READ(EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG + i * 4);
+        all_zeroes = all_zeroes && (*(reg + i) == 0);
+    }
+    if (all_zeroes) {
+        return ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+    }
+    public_key_digests->num_digests = 1;
+    return ESP_OK;
+#endif // SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS
+}
+
+// if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED==y and key digests from eFuse are missing, then it is the first boot,
+// trusted.key_digests are filled from app sig_block.
+esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
+{
+    esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t trusted = {0};
+    bool efuse_keys_are_not_set = false;
+    if (get_secure_boot_key_digests(&trusted) != ESP_OK) {
+        if (esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
+            ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Could not read eFuse secure boot digests!");
+            return ESP_FAIL;
+        } else {
+            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure boot V2 is not enabled yet and eFuse digest keys are not set");
+            efuse_keys_are_not_set = true;
+            ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(!esp_secure_boot_enabled());
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
+        // It is the first boot. eFuse secure boot bit is not set yet. eFuse block(s) can be written or not.
+        // Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block
+        for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
+            if (validate_signature_block(&sig_block->block[i]) == ESP_OK) {
+                if (efuse_keys_are_not_set) {
+                    // if efuse key digests are not in eFuse yet due to it is the first boot
+                    // then use digests from app to skip error in ets_secure_boot_verify_signature().
+                    bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
+                    bootloader_sha256_data(sig_block_sha, &sig_block->block[i].key, sizeof(sig_block->block[i].key));
+                    bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, trusted.key_digests[i]);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        ESP_FAULT_ASSERT(!esp_secure_boot_enabled());
+    }
+
+    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Verifying with RSA-PSS...");
+#if SOC_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGESTS == 1
+    int sb_result = ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig_block, image_digest, trusted.key_digests[0], verified_digest);
+#else
+    ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t trusted_key_digests;
+    for (unsigned i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
+        trusted_key_digests.key_digests[i] = &trusted.key_digests[i];
+    }
+    int sb_result = ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(sig_block, image_digest, &trusted_key_digests, verified_digest);
+#endif
+    if (sb_result != SB_SUCCESS) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
+        return ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
+    } else {
+        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Signature verified successfully!");
+        return ESP_OK;
+    }
+}
+#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_RSA_SCHEME && CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED

components/bt/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -589,13 +589,15 @@ idf_component_register(SRCS "${srcs}"
 if(CONFIG_BT_ENABLED)
     target_compile_options(${COMPONENT_LIB} PRIVATE -Wno-implicit-fallthrough -Wno-unused-const-variable)
     if(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32)
-        target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} INTERFACE "-L${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/controller/lib/esp32")
+        target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} INTERFACE "-L${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/controller/lib_esp32/esp32")
         target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} PUBLIC btdm_app)
     elseif(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3)
-        target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} INTERFACE "-L${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/controller/lib/esp32c3")
+        target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} INTERFACE
+                "-L${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/controller/lib_esp32c3_family/esp32c3")
         target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} PUBLIC btdm_app btbb)
     elseif(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3)
-        target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} INTERFACE "-L${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/controller/lib/esp32s3")
+        target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} INTERFACE
+                "-L${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/controller/lib_esp32c3_family/esp32s3")
         target_link_libraries(${COMPONENT_LIB} PUBLIC btdm_app btbb)
     endif()
 endif()

components/bt/component.mk

@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ COMPONENT_ADD_INCLUDEDIRS := include
 
 LIBS := btdm_app
 
-COMPONENT_ADD_LDFLAGS     := -lbt -L $(COMPONENT_PATH)/controller/lib/esp32 \
+COMPONENT_ADD_LDFLAGS     := -lbt -L $(COMPONENT_PATH)/controller/lib_esp32/esp32 \
                            $(addprefix -l,$(LIBS))
 
 # re-link program if BT binary libs change
-COMPONENT_ADD_LINKER_DEPS := $(patsubst %,$(COMPONENT_PATH)/controller/lib/esp32/lib%.a,$(LIBS))
+COMPONENT_ADD_LINKER_DEPS := $(patsubst %,$(COMPONENT_PATH)/controller/lib_esp32/esp32/lib%.a,$(LIBS))
 
-COMPONENT_SUBMODULES += controller/lib
+COMPONENT_SUBMODULES += controller/lib_esp32
 
 
 # TODO: annotate fallthroughs in Bluedroid code with comments

components/bt/controller/esp32/bt.c

@@ -176,6 +176,14 @@ struct osi_funcs_t {
     int (* _coex_register_bt_cb)(coex_func_cb_t cb);
     uint32_t (* _coex_bb_reset_lock)(void);
     void (* _coex_bb_reset_unlock)(uint32_t restore);
+    int (* _coex_schm_register_btdm_callback)(void *callback);
+    void (* _coex_schm_status_bit_clear)(uint32_t type, uint32_t status);
+    void (* _coex_schm_status_bit_set)(uint32_t type, uint32_t status);
+    uint32_t (* _coex_schm_interval_get)(void);
+    uint8_t (* _coex_schm_curr_period_get)(void);
+    void *(* _coex_schm_curr_phase_get)(void);
+    int (* _coex_wifi_channel_get)(uint8_t *primary, uint8_t *secondary);
+    int (* _coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback)(void *cb);
     uint32_t _magic;
 };
 
@@ -224,6 +232,14 @@ extern int coex_bt_release(uint32_t event);
 extern int coex_register_bt_cb(coex_func_cb_t cb);
 extern uint32_t coex_bb_reset_lock(void);
 extern void coex_bb_reset_unlock(uint32_t restore);
+extern int coex_schm_register_btdm_callback(void *callback);
+extern void coex_schm_status_bit_clear(uint32_t type, uint32_t status);
+extern void coex_schm_status_bit_set(uint32_t type, uint32_t status);
+extern uint32_t coex_schm_interval_get(void);
+extern uint8_t coex_schm_curr_period_get(void);
+extern void * coex_schm_curr_phase_get(void);
+extern int coex_wifi_channel_get(uint8_t *primary, uint8_t *secondary);
+extern int coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback(void *cb);
 extern void coex_ble_adv_priority_high_set(bool high);
 
 extern char _bss_start_btdm;
@@ -294,7 +310,14 @@ static int coex_bt_release_wrapper(uint32_t event);
 static int coex_register_bt_cb_wrapper(coex_func_cb_t cb);
 static uint32_t coex_bb_reset_lock_wrapper(void);
 static void coex_bb_reset_unlock_wrapper(uint32_t restore);
-
+static int coex_schm_register_btdm_callback_wrapper(void *callback);
+static void coex_schm_status_bit_clear_wrapper(uint32_t type, uint32_t status);
+static void coex_schm_status_bit_set_wrapper(uint32_t type, uint32_t status);
+static uint32_t coex_schm_interval_get_wrapper(void);
+static uint8_t coex_schm_curr_period_get_wrapper(void);
+static void * coex_schm_curr_phase_get_wrapper(void);
+static int coex_wifi_channel_get_wrapper(uint8_t *primary, uint8_t *secondary);
+static int coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback_wrapper(void *cb);
 /* Local variable definition
  ***************************************************************************
  */
@@ -348,6 +371,14 @@ static const struct osi_funcs_t osi_funcs_ro = {
     ._coex_register_bt_cb = coex_register_bt_cb_wrapper,
     ._coex_bb_reset_lock = coex_bb_reset_lock_wrapper,
     ._coex_bb_reset_unlock = coex_bb_reset_unlock_wrapper,
+    ._coex_schm_register_btdm_callback = coex_schm_register_btdm_callback_wrapper,
+    ._coex_schm_status_bit_clear = coex_schm_status_bit_clear_wrapper,
+    ._coex_schm_status_bit_set = coex_schm_status_bit_set_wrapper,
+    ._coex_schm_interval_get = coex_schm_interval_get_wrapper,
+    ._coex_schm_curr_period_get = coex_schm_curr_period_get_wrapper,
+    ._coex_schm_curr_phase_get = coex_schm_curr_phase_get_wrapper,
+    ._coex_wifi_channel_get = coex_wifi_channel_get_wrapper,
+    ._coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback = coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback_wrapper,
     ._magic = OSI_MAGIC_VALUE,
 };
 
@@ -1001,7 +1032,7 @@ static void coex_bt_wakeup_request_end(void)
     return;
 }
 
-int IRAM_ATTR coex_bt_request_wrapper(uint32_t event, uint32_t latency, uint32_t duration)
+static int IRAM_ATTR coex_bt_request_wrapper(uint32_t event, uint32_t latency, uint32_t duration)
 {
 #if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
     return coex_bt_request(event, latency, duration);
@@ -1010,7 +1041,7 @@ int IRAM_ATTR coex_bt_request_wrapper(uint32_t event, uint32_t latency, uint32_t
 #endif
 }
 
-int IRAM_ATTR coex_bt_release_wrapper(uint32_t event)
+static int IRAM_ATTR coex_bt_release_wrapper(uint32_t event)
 {
 #if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
     return coex_bt_release(event);
@@ -1019,7 +1050,7 @@ int IRAM_ATTR coex_bt_release_wrapper(uint32_t event)
 #endif
 }
 
-int coex_register_bt_cb_wrapper(coex_func_cb_t cb)
+static int coex_register_bt_cb_wrapper(coex_func_cb_t cb)
 {
 #if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
     return coex_register_bt_cb(cb);
@@ -1028,7 +1059,7 @@ int coex_register_bt_cb_wrapper(coex_func_cb_t cb)
 #endif
 }
 
-uint32_t IRAM_ATTR coex_bb_reset_lock_wrapper(void)
+static uint32_t IRAM_ATTR coex_bb_reset_lock_wrapper(void)
 {
 #if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
     return coex_bb_reset_lock();
@@ -1037,13 +1068,81 @@ uint32_t IRAM_ATTR coex_bb_reset_lock_wrapper(void)
 #endif
 }
 
-void IRAM_ATTR coex_bb_reset_unlock_wrapper(uint32_t restore)
+static void IRAM_ATTR coex_bb_reset_unlock_wrapper(uint32_t restore)
 {
 #if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
     coex_bb_reset_unlock(restore);
 #endif
 }
 
+static int coex_schm_register_btdm_callback_wrapper(void *callback)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    return coex_schm_register_btdm_callback(callback);
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void coex_schm_status_bit_clear_wrapper(uint32_t type, uint32_t status)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    coex_schm_status_bit_clear(type, status);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void coex_schm_status_bit_set_wrapper(uint32_t type, uint32_t status)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    coex_schm_status_bit_set(type, status);
+#endif
+}
+
+static uint32_t coex_schm_interval_get_wrapper(void)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    return coex_schm_interval_get();
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static uint8_t coex_schm_curr_period_get_wrapper(void)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    return coex_schm_curr_period_get();
+#else
+    return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void * coex_schm_curr_phase_get_wrapper(void)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    return coex_schm_curr_phase_get();
+#else
+    return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int coex_wifi_channel_get_wrapper(uint8_t *primary, uint8_t *secondary)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    return coex_wifi_channel_get(primary, secondary);
+#else
+    return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback_wrapper(void *cb)
+{
+#if CONFIG_SW_COEXIST_ENABLE
+    return coex_register_wifi_channel_change_callback(cb);
+#else
+    return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
 bool esp_vhci_host_check_send_available(void)
 {
     return API_vhci_host_check_send_available();
@@ -1442,16 +1541,12 @@ esp_err_t esp_bt_controller_deinit(void)
 static void bt_shutdown(void)
 {
     esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK;
-    ESP_LOGD(BTDM_LOG_TAG, "stop/deinit bt");
+    ESP_LOGD(BTDM_LOG_TAG, "stop Bluetooth");
 
     ret = esp_bt_controller_disable();
     if (ESP_OK != ret) {
         ESP_LOGW(BTDM_LOG_TAG, "controller disable ret=%d", ret);
     }
-    ret = esp_bt_controller_deinit();
-    if (ESP_OK != ret) {
-        ESP_LOGW(BTDM_LOG_TAG, "controller deinit ret=%d", ret);
-    }
     return;
 }
 

components/bt/controller/esp32c3/Kconfig.in

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ config BT_CTRL_BLE_MAX_ACT
     default 10
     range 1 10
     help
-        BLE maximum instances of bluetooth controller.
+        BLE maximum activities of bluetooth controller，both of connections,
+        scan , sync and adv(periodic adv, multi-adv).
 
 config BT_CTRL_BLE_MAX_ACT_EFF
     int
@@ -126,10 +127,20 @@ config BT_CTRL_RX_ANTENNA_INDEX_EFF
 
 choice BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL
     prompt "BLE default Tx power level"
-    default BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P9
+    default BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P3
     help
         Specify default Tx power level
 
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N27
+        bool "-27dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N24
+        bool "-24dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N21
+        bool "-21dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N18
+        bool "-18dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N15
+        bool "-15dBm"
     config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N12
         bool "-12dBm"
     config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N9
@@ -146,18 +157,32 @@ choice BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL
         bool "+6dBm"
     config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P9
         bool "+9dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P12
+        bool "+12dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P15
+        bool "+15dBm"
+    config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P18
+        bool "+18dBm"
 endchoice
 
 config BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_EFF
     int
-    default 0 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N12
-    default 1 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N9
-    default 2 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N6
-    default 3 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N3
-    default 4 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N0
-    default 5 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P3
-    default 6 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P6
-    default 7 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P9
+    default 0 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N27
+    default 1 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N24
+    default 2 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N21
+    default 3 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N18
+    default 4 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N15
+    default 5 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N12
+    default 6 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N9
+    default 7 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N6
+    default 8 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N3
+    default 9 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_N0
+    default 10 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P3
+    default 11 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P6
+    default 12 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P9
+    default 13 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P12
+    default 14 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P15
+    default 15 if BT_CTRL_DFT_TX_POWER_LEVEL_P18
     default 0
 
 config BT_CTRL_BLE_ADV_REPORT_FLOW_CTRL_SUPP

components/bt/controller/esp32c3/bt.c

@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ extern void btdm_controller_disable(void);
 extern uint8_t btdm_controller_get_mode(void);
 extern const char *btdm_controller_get_compile_version(void);
 extern void btdm_rf_bb_init_phase2(void); // shall be called after PHY/RF is enabled
+
 /* Sleep */
 extern void btdm_controller_enable_sleep(bool enable);
 extern uint8_t btdm_controller_get_sleep_mode(void);
@@ -740,13 +741,16 @@ static void IRAM_ATTR btdm_sleep_exit_phase0(void *param)
     }
 #endif
 
-    btdm_wakeup_request();
+    int event = (int) param;
+    if (event == BTDM_ASYNC_WAKEUP_SRC_VHCI || event == BTDM_ASYNC_WAKEUP_SRC_DISA) {
+        btdm_wakeup_request();
+    }
 
     if (s_lp_cntl.wakeup_timer_required && s_lp_stat.wakeup_timer_started) {
         esp_timer_stop(s_btdm_slp_tmr);
         s_lp_stat.wakeup_timer_started = 0;
     }
-    int event = (int) param;
+
     if (event == BTDM_ASYNC_WAKEUP_SRC_VHCI || event == BTDM_ASYNC_WAKEUP_SRC_DISA) {
         semphr_give_wrapper(s_wakeup_req_sem);
     }
@@ -1331,14 +1335,51 @@ esp_bt_controller_status_t esp_bt_controller_get_status(void)
 /* extra functions */
 esp_err_t esp_ble_tx_power_set(esp_ble_power_type_t power_type, esp_power_level_t power_level)
 {
-    ESP_LOGW(BTDM_LOG_TAG, "%s not implemented, return OK", __func__);
-    return ESP_OK;
+    esp_err_t stat = ESP_FAIL;
+
+    switch (power_type) {
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_ADV:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_SCAN:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+        if (ble_txpwr_set(power_type, power_level) == 0) {
+            stat = ESP_OK;
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        stat = ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return stat;
 }
 
 esp_power_level_t esp_ble_tx_power_get(esp_ble_power_type_t power_type)
 {
-    ESP_LOGW(BTDM_LOG_TAG, "%s not implemented, return 0", __func__);
-    return 0;
+    esp_power_level_t lvl;
+
+    switch (power_type) {
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_ADV:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_SCAN:
+        lvl = (esp_power_level_t)ble_txpwr_get(power_type);
+        break;
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL0:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL1:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL2:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL3:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL4:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL5:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL6:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL7:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_CONN_HDL8:
+    case ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+        lvl = (esp_power_level_t)ble_txpwr_get(ESP_BLE_PWR_TYPE_DEFAULT);
+        break;
+    default:
+        lvl = ESP_PWR_LVL_INVALID;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return lvl;
 }
 
 esp_err_t esp_bt_sleep_enable (void)

components/bt/esp_ble_mesh/mesh_core/prov.c

@@ -751,7 +751,18 @@ static int prov_auth(uint8_t method, uint8_t action, uint8_t size)
             uint32_t num = 0U;
 
             bt_mesh_rand(&num, sizeof(num));
-            num %= div[size - 1];
+
+            if (output == BLE_MESH_BLINK ||
+                output == BLE_MESH_BEEP ||
+                output == BLE_MESH_VIBRATE) {
+                /** NOTE: According to the Bluetooth Mesh Profile Specification
+                 *  Section 5.4.2.4, blink, beep and vibrate should be a random
+                 *  integer between 0 and 10^size.
+                 */
+                num = (num % (div[size - 1] - 1)) + 1;
+            } else {
+                num %= div[size - 1];
+            }
 
             sys_put_be32(num, &link.auth[12]);
             (void)memset(link.auth, 0, 12);

components/bt/esp_ble_mesh/mesh_core/provisioner_prov.c

@@ -1954,7 +1954,17 @@ static int prov_auth(const uint8_t idx, uint8_t method, uint8_t action, uint8_t
             uint32_t num = 0U;
 
             bt_mesh_rand(&num, sizeof(num));
-            num %= div[size - 1];
+
+            if (input == BLE_MESH_PUSH ||
+                input == BLE_MESH_TWIST) {
+                /** NOTE: According to the Bluetooth Mesh Profile Specification
+                 *  Section 5.4.2.4, push and twist should be a random integer
+                 *  between 0 and 10^size.
+                 */
+                num = (num % (div[size - 1] - 1)) + 1;
+            } else {
+                num %= div[size - 1];
+            }
 
             sys_put_be32(num, &link[idx].auth[12]);
             memset(link[idx].auth, 0, 12);
@@ -2057,7 +2067,7 @@ int bt_mesh_provisioner_set_oob_input_data(const uint8_t idx, const uint8_t *val
     memset(link[idx].auth, 0, 16);
     if (num_flag) {
         /* Provisioner inputs number */
-        memcpy(link[idx].auth + 12, val, sizeof(uint32_t));
+        sys_memcpy_swap(link[idx].auth + 12, val, sizeof(uint32_t));
     } else {
         /* Provisioner inputs string */
         memcpy(link[idx].auth, val, link[idx].auth_size);
@@ -2094,7 +2104,7 @@ int bt_mesh_provisioner_set_oob_output_data(const uint8_t idx, const uint8_t *nu
     if (num_flag) {
         /* Provisioner output number */
         memset(link[idx].auth, 0, 16);
-        memcpy(link[idx].auth + 16 - size, num, size);
+        sys_memcpy_swap(link[idx].auth + 16 - size, num, size);
     } else {
         /* Provisioner output string */
         memset(link[idx].auth, 0, 16);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/Kconfig.in

@@ -143,6 +143,16 @@ config BT_BLE_BLUFI_ENABLE
     help
         This option can be close when the app does not require blufi function.
 
+config BT_GATT_SR_PROFILES
+    int "Max GATT Server Profiles"
+    depends on BT_GATTS_ENABLE && BT_BLUEDROID_ENABLED
+    range 1 32
+    default 8
+    help
+        Maximum GATT Server Profiles Count
+
+
+
 choice BT_GATTS_SEND_SERVICE_CHANGE_MODE
     prompt "GATTS Service Change Mode"
     default BT_GATTS_SEND_SERVICE_CHANGE_AUTO
@@ -183,6 +193,14 @@ config BT_GATTC_CACHE_NVS_FLASH
     help
         This select can save gattc cache data to nvs flash
 
+config BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT
+    int "The number of attempts to reconnect if the connection establishment failed"
+    depends on BT_GATTC_ENABLE
+    range 0 7
+    default 3
+    help
+        The number of attempts to reconnect if the connection establishment failed
+
 config BT_BLE_SMP_ENABLE
     bool "Include BLE security module(SMP)"
     depends on BT_BLE_ENABLED
@@ -945,7 +963,6 @@ menu "BT DEBUG LOG LEVEL"
 
 endmenu #BT DEBUG LOG LEVEL
 
-
 config BT_ACL_CONNECTIONS
     int "BT/BLE MAX ACL CONNECTIONS(1~7)"
     depends on BT_BLUEDROID_ENABLED
@@ -954,6 +971,13 @@ config BT_ACL_CONNECTIONS
     help
         Maximum BT/BLE connection count
 
+config BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE
+    bool "Enable BLE multi-conections"
+    depends on BT_BLUEDROID_ENABLED
+    default y
+    help
+        Enable this option if there are multiple connections
+
 config BT_ALLOCATION_FROM_SPIRAM_FIRST
     bool "BT/BLE will first malloc the memory from the PSRAM"
     depends on BT_BLUEDROID_ENABLED
@@ -1004,10 +1028,20 @@ config BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT
 
 config BT_BLE_RPA_SUPPORTED
     bool "Update RPA to Controller"
-    depends on (BT_BLUEDROID_ENABLED && (IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3))
-    default y
+    depends on BT_BLUEDROID_ENABLED
+    default y if (IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3)
+    default n if IDF_TARGET_ESP32
     help
         This enables controller RPA list function.
+        For ESP32, ESP32 only support network privacy mode. If this option is enabled, ESP32 will only accept
+        advertising packets from peer devices that contain private address, HW will not receive the advertising
+        packets contain identity address after IRK changed. If this option is disabled, address resolution will
+        be performed in the host, so the functions that require controller to resolve address in the white list
+        cannot be used. This option is disabled by default on ESP32, please enable or disable this option according
+        to your own needs.
+
+        For ESP32C3 and esp32s3, devices support network privacy mode and device privacy mode, users can switch the
+        two modes according to their own needs. So this option is enabled by default.
 
 config BT_BLE_50_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
     bool "Enable BLE 5.0 features"

components/bt/host/bluedroid/api/esp_spp_api.c

@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ esp_err_t esp_spp_start_srv(esp_spp_sec_t sec_mask,
     btc_spp_args_t arg;
     ESP_BLUEDROID_STATUS_CHECK(ESP_BLUEDROID_STATUS_ENABLED);
 
-    if (strlen(name) > ESP_SPP_SERVER_NAME_MAX) {
+    if (name == NULL || strlen(name) > ESP_SPP_SERVER_NAME_MAX) {
+        LOG_ERROR("Invalid server name!\n");
         return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
     }
 
@@ -157,13 +158,34 @@ esp_err_t esp_spp_start_srv(esp_spp_sec_t sec_mask,
 esp_err_t esp_spp_stop_srv(void)
 {
     btc_msg_t msg;
+    btc_spp_args_t arg;
     ESP_BLUEDROID_STATUS_CHECK(ESP_BLUEDROID_STATUS_ENABLED);
 
     msg.sig = BTC_SIG_API_CALL;
     msg.pid = BTC_PID_SPP;
     msg.act = BTC_SPP_ACT_STOP_SRV;
+    arg.stop_srv.scn = BTC_SPP_INVALID_SCN;
 
-    return (btc_transfer_context(&msg, NULL, sizeof(btc_spp_args_t), NULL) == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL);
+    return (btc_transfer_context(&msg, &arg, sizeof(btc_spp_args_t), NULL) == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL);
+}
+
+esp_err_t esp_spp_stop_srv_scn(uint8_t scn)
+{
+    btc_msg_t msg;
+    btc_spp_args_t arg;
+    ESP_BLUEDROID_STATUS_CHECK(ESP_BLUEDROID_STATUS_ENABLED);
+
+    if ((scn == 0) || (scn >= PORT_MAX_RFC_PORTS)) {
+        LOG_ERROR("Invalid SCN!\n");
+        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+    }
+
+    msg.sig = BTC_SIG_API_CALL;
+    msg.pid = BTC_PID_SPP;
+    msg.act = BTC_SPP_ACT_STOP_SRV;
+    arg.stop_srv.scn = scn;
+
+    return (btc_transfer_context(&msg, &arg, sizeof(btc_spp_args_t), NULL) == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS ? ESP_OK : ESP_FAIL);
 }
 
 

components/bt/host/bluedroid/api/include/api/esp_blufi_api.h

@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ typedef void (* esp_blufi_event_cb_t)(esp_blufi_cb_event_t event, esp_blufi_cb_p
  * @param len  : length of data from phone
  * @param output_data : data want to send to phone
  * @param output_len : length of data want to send to phone
+ * @param need_free : output reporting if memory needs to be freed or not *
  */
 typedef void (*esp_blufi_negotiate_data_handler_t)(uint8_t *data, int len, uint8_t **output_data, int *output_len, bool *need_free);
 
@@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ typedef void (*esp_blufi_negotiate_data_handler_t)(uint8_t *data, int len, uint8
  * @param crypt_len  : length of plain text
  * @return  Nonnegative number is encrypted length, if error, return negative number;
  */
-typedef int (* esp_blufi_encrypt_func_t)(uint8_t iv8, uint8_t *crypt_data, int cyprt_len);
+typedef int (* esp_blufi_encrypt_func_t)(uint8_t iv8, uint8_t *crypt_data, int crypt_len);
 
 /**
  * @brief BLUFI  decrypt the data after negotiate a share key

components/bt/host/bluedroid/api/include/api/esp_gattc_api.h

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ typedef union {
 /**
  * @brief GATT Client callback function type
  * @param event : Event type
- * @param gatts_if : GATT client access interface, normally
+ * @param gattc_if : GATT client access interface, normally
  *                   different gattc_if correspond to different profile
  * @param param : Point to callback parameter, currently is union type
  */
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_ble_gattc_app_unregister(esp_gatt_if_t gattc_if);
  * @param[in]       gattc_if: Gatt client access interface.
  * @param[in]       remote_bda: remote device bluetooth device address.
  * @param[in]       remote_addr_type: remote device bluetooth device the address type.
- * @param[in]       is_direct: direct connection or background auto connection
+ * @param[in]       is_direct: direct connection or background auto connection(by now, background auto connection is not supported).
  *
  * @return
  *                  - ESP_OK: success

components/bt/host/bluedroid/api/include/api/esp_hf_ag_api.h

@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ typedef void (* esp_hf_incoming_data_cb_t)(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len);
  *
  * @param[in]       len : size(in bytes) in buf
  *
- * @param[out]      length of data successfully read
+ * @return          length of data successfully read
  */
 typedef uint32_t (* esp_hf_outgoing_data_cb_t) (uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len);
 

components/bt/host/bluedroid/api/include/api/esp_hf_client_api.h

@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ typedef void (* esp_hf_client_incoming_data_cb_t)(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t l
  *
  * @param[in]       len : size(in bytes) in buf
  *
- * @param[out]      length of data successfully read
+ * @return          length of data successfully read
  *
  */
 typedef uint32_t (* esp_hf_client_outgoing_data_cb_t)(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/api/include/api/esp_spp_api.h

@@ -26,11 +26,12 @@ typedef enum {
     ESP_SPP_SUCCESS   = 0,          /*!< Successful operation. */
     ESP_SPP_FAILURE,                /*!< Generic failure. */
     ESP_SPP_BUSY,                   /*!< Temporarily can not handle this request. */
-    ESP_SPP_NO_DATA,                /*!< no data. */
+    ESP_SPP_NO_DATA,                /*!< No data */
     ESP_SPP_NO_RESOURCE,            /*!< No more resource */
     ESP_SPP_NEED_INIT,              /*!< SPP module shall init first */
     ESP_SPP_NEED_DEINIT,            /*!< SPP module shall deinit first */
-    ESP_SPP_NO_CONNECTION,          /*!< connection may have been closed */
+    ESP_SPP_NO_CONNECTION,          /*!< Connection may have been closed */
+    ESP_SPP_NO_SERVER,              /*!< No SPP server */
 } esp_spp_status_t;
 
 /* Security Setting Mask
@@ -101,9 +102,10 @@ typedef union {
      * @brief SPP_DISCOVERY_COMP_EVT
      */
     struct spp_discovery_comp_evt_param {
-        esp_spp_status_t    status;         /*!< status */
-        uint8_t             scn_num;        /*!< The num of scn_num */
-        uint8_t             scn[ESP_SPP_MAX_SCN];    /*!< channel # */
+        esp_spp_status_t status;                   /*!< status */
+        uint8_t scn_num;                           /*!< The num of scn_num */
+        uint8_t scn[ESP_SPP_MAX_SCN];              /*!< channel # */
+        const char *service_name[ESP_SPP_MAX_SCN]; /*!< service_name */
     } disc_comp;                            /*!< SPP callback param of SPP_DISCOVERY_COMP_EVT */
 
     /**
@@ -143,6 +145,7 @@ typedef union {
         esp_spp_status_t    status;         /*!< status */
         uint32_t            handle;         /*!< The connection handle */
         uint8_t             sec_id;         /*!< security ID used by this server */
+        uint8_t             scn;            /*!< Server channel number */
         bool                use_co;         /*!< TRUE to use co_rfc_data */
     } start;                                /*!< SPP callback param of ESP_SPP_START_EVT */
 
@@ -151,6 +154,7 @@ typedef union {
      */
     struct spp_srv_stop_evt_param {
         esp_spp_status_t    status;         /*!< status */
+        uint8_t             scn;            /*!< Server channel number */
     } srv_stop;                             /*!< SPP callback param of ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT */
 
     /**
@@ -304,7 +308,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_spp_disconnect(uint32_t handle);
 esp_err_t esp_spp_start_srv(esp_spp_sec_t sec_mask, esp_spp_role_t role, uint8_t local_scn, const char *name);
 
 /**
- * @brief       This function stops a SPP server.
+ * @brief       This function stops all SPP servers.
  *              The operation will close all active SPP connection first, then the callback function will be called
  *              with ESP_SPP_CLOSE_EVT, and the number of ESP_SPP_CLOSE_EVT is equal to the number of connection.
  *              When the operation is completed, the callback is called with ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT.
@@ -314,8 +318,24 @@ esp_err_t esp_spp_start_srv(esp_spp_sec_t sec_mask, esp_spp_role_t role, uint8_t
  *              - ESP_OK: success
  *              - other: failed
  */
+
 esp_err_t esp_spp_stop_srv(void);
 
+/**
+ * @brief       This function stops a specific SPP server.
+ *              The operation will close all active SPP connection first on the specific SPP server, then the callback function will be called
+ *              with ESP_SPP_CLOSE_EVT, and the number of ESP_SPP_CLOSE_EVT is equal to the number of connection.
+ *              When the operation is completed, the callback is called with ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT.
+ *              This funciton must be called after esp_spp_init() successful and before esp_spp_deinit().
+ *
+ * @param[in]   scn:         Server channel number.
+ *
+ * @return
+ *              - ESP_OK: success
+ *              - other: failed
+ */
+esp_err_t esp_spp_stop_srv_scn(uint8_t scn);
+
 /**
  * @brief       This function is used to write data, only for ESP_SPP_MODE_CB.
  *              When this function need to be called repeatedly, it is strongly recommended to call this function again after

components/bt/host/bluedroid/bta/gatt/bta_gattc_act.c

@@ -973,10 +973,11 @@ void bta_gattc_start_discover(tBTA_GATTC_CLCB *p_clcb, tBTA_GATTC_DATA *p_data)
             p_clcb->p_srcb->srvc_hdl_chg = FALSE;
             p_clcb->p_srcb->update_count = 0;
             p_clcb->p_srcb->state = BTA_GATTC_SERV_DISC_ACT;
-
+            #if (BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE == FALSE)
             if (p_clcb->transport == BTA_TRANSPORT_LE) {
                 L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_clcb->p_srcb->server_bda, FALSE);
             }
+            #endif
 
             /* set all srcb related clcb into discovery ST */
             bta_gattc_set_discover_st(p_clcb->p_srcb);
@@ -1683,8 +1684,7 @@ static void bta_gattc_conn_cback(tGATT_IF gattc_if, BD_ADDR bda, UINT16 conn_id,
     tBTA_GATTC_DATA *p_buf;
 
     if (reason != 0) {
-        APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s() - cif=%d connected=%d conn_id=%d reason=0x%04x",
-                           __FUNCTION__, gattc_if, connected, conn_id, reason);
+        APPL_TRACE_WARNING("gattc_conn_cb: if=%d st=%d id=%d rsn=0x%x", gattc_if, connected, conn_id, reason);
     }
 
     bt_bdaddr_t bdaddr;
@@ -1702,7 +1702,7 @@ static void bta_gattc_conn_cback(tGATT_IF gattc_if, BD_ADDR bda, UINT16 conn_id,
                 p_buf->int_conn.conn_params.latency = p_lcb->current_used_conn_latency;
                 p_buf->int_conn.conn_params.timeout = p_lcb->current_used_conn_timeout;
             } else {
-                APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s not found connection parameters of the device ", __func__);
+                APPL_TRACE_WARNING("gattc_conn_cb: conn params not found");
             }
         }
         p_buf->int_conn.hdr.layer_specific   = conn_id;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/bta/gatt/bta_gattc_cache.c

@@ -616,9 +616,11 @@ static void bta_gattc_explore_srvc(UINT16 conn_id, tBTA_GATTC_SERV *p_srvc_cb)
 
     //server discover end, update connection parameters
 #if BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE
+    #if (BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE == FALSE)
     if (p_clcb->transport == BTA_TRANSPORT_LE) {
         L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_clcb->p_srcb->server_bda, TRUE);
     }
+    #endif
     //discover service complete, trigger callback
     tBTA_GATTC cb_data;
     cb_data.dis_cmpl.status  = p_clcb->status;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/bta/include/bta/bta_jv_api.h

@@ -172,9 +172,10 @@ typedef struct {
 
 /* data associated with BTA_JV_DISCOVERY_COMP_EVT_ */
 typedef struct {
-    tBTA_JV_STATUS  status;     /* Whether the operation succeeded or failed. */
-    UINT8 scn_num;              /* num of channel */
-    UINT8 scn[BTA_JV_MAX_SCN];  /* channel # */
+    tBTA_JV_STATUS status;                    /* Whether the operation succeeded or failed. */
+    UINT8 scn_num;                            /* num of channel */
+    UINT8 scn[BTA_JV_MAX_SCN];                /* channel # */
+    const char *service_name[BTA_JV_MAX_SCN]; /* service_name */
 } tBTA_JV_DISCOVERY_COMP;
 
 /* data associated with BTA_JV_CREATE_RECORD_EVT */
@@ -305,6 +306,7 @@ typedef struct {
     tBTA_JV_STATUS  status;     /* Whether the operation succeeded or failed. */
     UINT32          handle;     /* The connection handle */
     UINT8           sec_id;     /* security ID used by this server */
+    UINT8           scn;        /* Server channe number */
     BOOLEAN         use_co;     /* TRUE to use co_rfc_data */
 } tBTA_JV_RFCOMM_START;
 
@@ -376,8 +378,9 @@ typedef struct {
 
 /* data associated with BTA_JV_FREE_SCN_EVT  */
 typedef struct {
-    tBTA_JV_STATUS          status; /* Status of the operation */
-    tBTA_JV_SERVER_STATUS   server_status;
+    tBTA_JV_STATUS          status;         /* Status of the operation */
+    tBTA_JV_SERVER_STATUS   server_status;  /* Server status */
+    UINT8                   scn;            /* Server channe number */
 } tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN;
 
 

components/bt/host/bluedroid/bta/jv/bta_jv_act.c

@@ -856,6 +856,7 @@ void bta_jv_free_scn(tBTA_JV_MSG *p_data)
     tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN evt_data = {
         .status = BTA_JV_SUCCESS,
         .server_status = BTA_JV_SERVER_STATUS_MAX,
+        .scn = scn
     };
 
     tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN_USER_DATA *user_data = NULL;
@@ -949,6 +950,7 @@ static void bta_jv_start_discovery_cback(UINT16 result, void *user_data)
         status = BTA_JV_FAILURE;
         if (result == SDP_SUCCESS || result == SDP_DB_FULL) {
             tSDP_DISC_REC       *p_sdp_rec = NULL;
+            tSDP_DISC_ATTR *p_attr = NULL;
             tSDP_PROTOCOL_ELEM  pe;
             logu("bta_jv_cb.uuid", bta_jv_cb.uuid.uu.uuid128);
             tBT_UUID su = shorten_sdp_uuid(&bta_jv_cb.uuid);
@@ -957,7 +959,13 @@ static void bta_jv_start_discovery_cback(UINT16 result, void *user_data)
                 p_sdp_rec = SDP_FindServiceUUIDInDb(p_bta_jv_cfg->p_sdp_db, &su, p_sdp_rec);
                 APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("p_sdp_rec:%p", p_sdp_rec);
                 if (p_sdp_rec && SDP_FindProtocolListElemInRec(p_sdp_rec, UUID_PROTOCOL_RFCOMM, &pe)){
-                    dcomp.scn[dcomp.scn_num++] = (UINT8) pe.params[0];
+                    dcomp.scn[dcomp.scn_num] = (UINT8) pe.params[0];
+                    if ((p_attr = SDP_FindAttributeInRec(p_sdp_rec, ATTR_ID_SERVICE_NAME)) != NULL) {
+                        dcomp.service_name[dcomp.scn_num] = (char *)p_attr->attr_value.v.array;
+                    } else {
+                        dcomp.service_name[dcomp.scn_num] = NULL;
+                    }
+                    dcomp.scn_num++;
                     status = BTA_JV_SUCCESS;
                 }
             } while (p_sdp_rec);
@@ -2154,6 +2162,7 @@ void bta_jv_rfcomm_start_server(tBTA_JV_MSG *p_data)
         evt_data.status = BTA_JV_SUCCESS;
         evt_data.handle = p_pcb->handle;
         evt_data.sec_id = sec_id;
+        evt_data.scn = rs->local_scn;
         evt_data.use_co = TRUE;
 
         PORT_ClearKeepHandleFlag(handle);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/btc/profile/std/hf_ag/btc_hf_ag.c

@@ -53,7 +53,11 @@
 /* Max HF Clients Supported From App */
 static UINT16 btc_max_hf_clients = 1;
 /* HF Param Definition */
+#if HFP_DYNAMIC_MEMORY == FALSE
 static hf_local_param_t hf_local_param[BTC_HF_NUM_CB];
+#else
+static hf_local_param_t *hf_local_param;
+#endif
 
 #if (BTM_WBS_INCLUDED == TRUE)
 #ifndef BTC_HF_FEATURES
@@ -296,7 +300,15 @@ bt_status_t btc_hf_execute_service(BOOLEAN b_enable)
 ************************************************************************************/
 bt_status_t btc_hf_init(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
 {
-    int idx = btc_hf_idx_by_bdaddr(bd_addr);
+    int idx = 0;
+    UNUSED(bd_addr);
+
+#if HFP_DYNAMIC_MEMORY == TRUE
+    if ((hf_local_param = (hf_local_param_t *)osi_malloc(sizeof(hf_local_param_t) * BTC_HF_NUM_CB)) == NULL) {
+        return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
+    }
+#endif
+
     BTC_TRACE_DEBUG("%s - max_hf_clients=%d", __func__, btc_max_hf_clients);
     /* Invoke the enable service API to the core to set the appropriate service_id
      * Internally, the HSP_SERVICE_ID shall also be enabled if HFP is enabled (phone)
@@ -322,10 +334,18 @@ bt_status_t btc_hf_init(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
 
 void btc_hf_deinit(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
 {
-    int idx = btc_hf_idx_by_bdaddr(bd_addr);
+    UNUSED(bd_addr);
+
     BTC_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
     btc_dm_disable_service(BTA_HFP_SERVICE_ID);
-    hf_local_param[idx].btc_hf_cb.initialized = false;
+#if HFP_DYNAMIC_MEMORY == TRUE
+    if (hf_local_param) {
+        osi_free(hf_local_param);
+        hf_local_param = NULL;
+    }
+#else
+    hf_local_param[0].btc_hf_cb.initialized = false;
+#endif
 }
 
 static bt_status_t connect_init(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr, uint16_t uuid)
@@ -917,6 +937,10 @@ void btc_hf_arg_deep_copy(btc_msg_t *msg, void *p_dest, void *p_src)
 
         case BTC_HF_COPS_RESPONSE_EVT:
         {
+            if (src->cops_rep.name == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+
             dst->cops_rep.name = (char *)osi_malloc(strlen(src->cops_rep.name)+1);
             if(dst->cops_rep.name) {
                 memcpy(dst->cops_rep.name, src->cops_rep.name, strlen(src->cops_rep.name)+1);
@@ -930,6 +954,10 @@ void btc_hf_arg_deep_copy(btc_msg_t *msg, void *p_dest, void *p_src)
 
         case BTC_HF_CLCC_RESPONSE_EVT:
         {
+            if (src->clcc_rep.number == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+
             dst->clcc_rep.number = (char *)osi_malloc(strlen(src->clcc_rep.number)+1);
             if(dst->clcc_rep.number) {
                 memcpy(dst->clcc_rep.number, src->clcc_rep.number, strlen(src->clcc_rep.number)+1);
@@ -943,6 +971,10 @@ void btc_hf_arg_deep_copy(btc_msg_t *msg, void *p_dest, void *p_src)
 
         case BTC_HF_CNUM_RESPONSE_EVT:
         {
+            if (src->cnum_rep.number == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+
             dst->cnum_rep.number = (char *)osi_malloc(strlen(src->cnum_rep.number)+1);
             if(dst->cnum_rep.number) {
                 memcpy(dst->cnum_rep.number, src->cnum_rep.number, strlen(src->cnum_rep.number)+1);
@@ -959,6 +991,10 @@ void btc_hf_arg_deep_copy(btc_msg_t *msg, void *p_dest, void *p_src)
         case BTC_HF_OUT_CALL_EVT:
         case BTC_HF_END_CALL_EVT:
         {
+            if (src->phone.number == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+
             dst->phone.number = (char *)osi_malloc(strlen(src->phone.number)+1);
             if(dst->phone.number) {
                 memcpy(dst->phone.number, src->phone.number, strlen(src->phone.number)+1);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/btc/profile/std/include/btc_hf_ag.h

@@ -206,11 +206,6 @@ typedef union
 /* APP ID definition*/
 #define BTC_HF_ID_1    0
 
-#if HFP_DYNAMIC_MEMORY == TRUE
-extern hf_local_param_t *hf_local_param_ptr;
-#define hf_local_param (*hf_local_param_ptr)
-#endif
-
 /* BTC-AG control block to map bdaddr to BTA handle */
 typedef struct
 {

components/bt/host/bluedroid/btc/profile/std/include/btc_spp.h

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 
 #define ESP_SPP_RINGBUF_SIZE 1000
 
+#define BTC_SPP_INVALID_SCN 0x00
+
 typedef enum {
     BTC_SPP_ACT_INIT = 0,
     BTC_SPP_ACT_UNINIT,
@@ -74,6 +76,10 @@ typedef union {
         UINT8 max_session;
         char name[ESP_SPP_SERVER_NAME_MAX + 1];
     } start_srv;
+    //BTC_SPP_ACT_STOP_SRV
+    struct stop_srv_arg {
+        UINT8 scn;
+    } stop_srv;
     //BTC_SPP_ACT_WRITE
     struct write_arg {
         UINT32 handle;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/btc/profile/std/spp/btc_spp.c

@@ -265,6 +265,10 @@ static void btc_create_server_fail_cb(void)
 {
     esp_spp_cb_param_t param;
     param.start.status = ESP_SPP_FAILURE;
+    param.start.handle = 0;
+    param.start.sec_id = 0;
+    param.start.scn = BTC_SPP_INVALID_SCN;
+    param.start.use_co = FALSE;
     btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_START_EVT, &param);
 }
 
@@ -531,6 +535,7 @@ static void btc_spp_uninit(void)
                     esp_spp_cb_param_t param;
                     BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to malloc user data!", __func__);
                     param.srv_stop.status = ESP_SPP_NO_RESOURCE;
+                    param.srv_stop.scn = spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn;
                     btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT, &param);
                 }
                 BTA_JvFreeChannel(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn, BTA_JV_CONN_TYPE_RFCOMM,
@@ -672,61 +677,117 @@ static void btc_spp_start_srv(btc_spp_args_t *arg)
     if (ret != ESP_SPP_SUCCESS) {
         esp_spp_cb_param_t param;
         param.start.status = ret;
+        param.start.handle = 0;
+        param.start.sec_id = 0;
+        param.start.scn = BTC_SPP_INVALID_SCN;
+        param.start.use_co = FALSE;
         btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_START_EVT, &param);
     }
 }
 
-static void btc_spp_stop_srv(void)
+static void btc_spp_stop_srv(btc_spp_args_t *arg)
 {
     esp_spp_status_t ret = ESP_SPP_SUCCESS;
+    bool is_remove_all = false;
+    uint8_t i, j, srv_cnt = 0;
+    uint8_t *srv_scn_arr = osi_malloc(MAX_RFC_PORTS);
+    if (arg->stop_srv.scn == BTC_SPP_INVALID_SCN) {
+        is_remove_all = true;
+    }
+
     do {
         if (!is_spp_init()) {
             BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s SPP have not been init\n", __func__);
             ret = ESP_SPP_NEED_INIT;
             break;
         }
+        if (srv_scn_arr == NULL) {
+            BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s malloc srv_scn_arr failed\n", __func__);
+            ret = ESP_SPP_NO_RESOURCE;
+            break;
+        }
+
         osi_mutex_lock(&spp_local_param.spp_slot_mutex, OSI_MUTEX_MAX_TIMEOUT);
-        // first, remove all connection
-        for (size_t i = 1; i <= MAX_RFC_PORTS; i++) {
-            if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i] != NULL && spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->connected) {
-                BTA_JvRfcommClose(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->rfc_handle, (tBTA_JV_RFCOMM_CBACK *)btc_spp_rfcomm_inter_cb,
-                                  (void *)spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->id);
+        // [1] find all server
+        for (i = 1; i <= MAX_RFC_PORTS; i++) {
+            if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i] != NULL && !spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->connected &&
+                spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle > 0) {
+                if (is_remove_all) {
+                    srv_scn_arr[srv_cnt++] = spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn;
+                } else if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn == arg->stop_srv.scn) {
+                    srv_scn_arr[srv_cnt++] = spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn;
+                    break;
+                }
             }
         }
-        // second, remove all server
-        for (size_t i = 1; i <= MAX_RFC_PORTS; i++) {
-            if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i] != NULL && !spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->connected) {
-                if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle > 0) {
-                    BTA_JvDeleteRecord(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle);
-                }
+        if (srv_cnt == 0) {
+            if (is_remove_all) {
+                BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s can not find any server!\n", __func__);
+            } else {
+                BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s can not find server:%d!\n", __func__, arg->stop_srv.scn);
+            }
+            ret = ESP_SPP_NO_SERVER;
+            break;
+        }
 
-                if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->rfc_handle > 0) {
-                    BTA_JvRfcommStopServer(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->rfc_handle,
-                                           (void *)spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->id);
+        // [2] remove all local related connection
+        for (j = 0; j < srv_cnt; j++) {
+            for (i = 1; i <= MAX_RFC_PORTS; i++) {
+                if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i] != NULL && spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->connected &&
+                    spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle > 0 &&
+                    spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn == srv_scn_arr[j]) {
+                    BTA_JvRfcommClose(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->rfc_handle,
+                                      (tBTA_JV_RFCOMM_CBACK *)btc_spp_rfcomm_inter_cb,
+                                      (void *)spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->id);
                 }
+            }
+        }
 
-                tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN_USER_DATA *user_data = osi_malloc(sizeof(tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN_USER_DATA));
-                if (user_data) {
-                    user_data->server_status = BTA_JV_SERVER_RUNNING;
-                    user_data->slot_id = spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->id;
-                } else {
-                    esp_spp_cb_param_t param;
-                    BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to malloc user data!", __func__);
-                    param.srv_stop.status = ESP_SPP_NO_RESOURCE;
-                    btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT, &param);
+        // [3] remove all server
+        for (j = 0; j < srv_cnt; j++) {
+            for (i = 1; i <= MAX_RFC_PORTS; i++) {
+                if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i] != NULL && !spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->connected &&
+                    spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle > 0 &&
+                    spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn == srv_scn_arr[j]) {
+                    if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle > 0) {
+                        BTA_JvDeleteRecord(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->sdp_handle);
+                    }
+
+                    if (spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->rfc_handle > 0) {
+                        BTA_JvRfcommStopServer(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->rfc_handle,
+                                               (void *)spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->id);
+                    }
+
+                    tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN_USER_DATA *user_data = osi_malloc(sizeof(tBTA_JV_FREE_SCN_USER_DATA));
+                    if (user_data) {
+                        user_data->server_status = BTA_JV_SERVER_RUNNING;
+                        user_data->slot_id = spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->id;
+                    } else {
+                        esp_spp_cb_param_t param;
+                        BTC_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to malloc user data!", __func__);
+                        param.srv_stop.status = ESP_SPP_NO_RESOURCE;
+                        param.srv_stop.scn = spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn;
+                        btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT, &param);
+                    }
+                    BTA_JvFreeChannel(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn, BTA_JV_CONN_TYPE_RFCOMM,
+                                      (tBTA_JV_RFCOMM_CBACK *)btc_spp_rfcomm_inter_cb, (void *)user_data);
                 }
-                BTA_JvFreeChannel(spp_local_param.spp_slots[i]->scn, BTA_JV_CONN_TYPE_RFCOMM,
-                                  (tBTA_JV_RFCOMM_CBACK *)btc_spp_rfcomm_inter_cb, (void *)user_data);
             }
         }
         osi_mutex_unlock(&spp_local_param.spp_slot_mutex);
-    } while(0);
+    } while (0);
 
     if (ret != ESP_SPP_SUCCESS) {
         esp_spp_cb_param_t param;
         param.srv_stop.status = ret;
+        param.srv_stop.scn = BTC_SPP_INVALID_SCN;
         btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT, &param);
     }
+
+    if (srv_scn_arr) {
+        osi_free(srv_scn_arr);
+        srv_scn_arr = NULL;
+    }
 }
 
 static void btc_spp_write(btc_spp_args_t *arg)
@@ -849,7 +910,7 @@ void btc_spp_call_handler(btc_msg_t *msg)
         btc_spp_start_srv(arg);
         break;
     case BTC_SPP_ACT_STOP_SRV:
-        btc_spp_stop_srv();
+        btc_spp_stop_srv(arg);
         break;
     case BTC_SPP_ACT_WRITE:
         btc_spp_write(arg);
@@ -876,6 +937,8 @@ void btc_spp_cb_handler(btc_msg_t *msg)
         param.disc_comp.status = p_data->disc_comp.status;
         param.disc_comp.scn_num = p_data->disc_comp.scn_num;
         memcpy(param.disc_comp.scn, p_data->disc_comp.scn, p_data->disc_comp.scn_num);
+        memcpy(param.disc_comp.service_name, p_data->disc_comp.service_name,
+               p_data->disc_comp.scn_num * sizeof(const char *));
         btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_DISCOVERY_COMP_EVT, &param);
         break;
     case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_CL_INIT_EVT:
@@ -909,6 +972,7 @@ void btc_spp_cb_handler(btc_msg_t *msg)
         param.start.status = p_data->rfc_start.status;
         param.start.handle = p_data->rfc_start.handle;
         param.start.sec_id = p_data->rfc_start.sec_id;
+        param.start.scn = p_data->rfc_start.scn;
         param.start.use_co = p_data->rfc_start.use_co;
         btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_START_EVT, &param);
         break;
@@ -1130,6 +1194,7 @@ void btc_spp_cb_handler(btc_msg_t *msg)
     case BTA_JV_FREE_SCN_EVT:
         if (p_data->free_scn.server_status == BTA_JV_SERVER_RUNNING) {
             param.srv_stop.status = p_data->free_scn.status;
+            param.srv_stop.scn = p_data->free_scn.scn;
             btc_spp_cb_to_app(ESP_SPP_SRV_STOP_EVT, &param);
         }
         break;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/common/include/common/bluedroid_user_config.h

@@ -134,6 +134,13 @@
 #define UC_BT_GATTC_CACHE_NVS_FLASH_ENABLED    FALSE
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT
+#define UC_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT    CONFIG_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT
+#else
+#define UC_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT    0
+#endif
+
+
 //SMP
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_SMP_ENABLE
 #define UC_BT_SMP_ENABLE                       CONFIG_BT_SMP_ENABLE
@@ -203,6 +210,12 @@
 #define UC_BT_ACL_CONNECTIONS                   5
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE
+#define UC_BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE            CONFIG_BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE
+#else
+#define UC_BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE            FALSE
+#endif
+
 //BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT
 #define UC_BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT          CONFIG_BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT
@@ -224,6 +237,14 @@
 #define UC_CONFIG_BT_GATTS_PPCP_CHAR_GAP        FALSE
 #endif
 
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BT_GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES
+#define UC_CONFIG_BT_GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES       CONFIG_BT_GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES
+#else
+#define UC_CONFIG_BT_GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES       8
+#endif
+
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_GATTS_SEND_SERVICE_CHANGE_MODE
 #define UC_BT_GATTS_SEND_SERVICE_CHANGE_MODE    CONFIG_BT_GATTS_SEND_SERVICE_CHANGE_MODE
 #else

components/bt/host/bluedroid/common/include/common/bt_target.h

@@ -202,6 +202,18 @@
 #define GATTC_CACHE_NVS             FALSE
 #endif  /* UC_BT_GATTC_ENABLE && UC_BT_GATTC_CACHE_NVS_FLASH_ENABLED */
 
+#if (UC_BT_GATTC_ENABLE && UC_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT)
+#define GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT             UC_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT
+#else
+#define GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT             0
+#endif  /* UC_BT_GATTC_ENABLE && UC_BT_GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT */
+
+#if (GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT > 0)
+#define GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_EN     TRUE
+#else
+#define GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_EN     FALSE
+#endif
+
 #if (UC_BT_SMP_ENABLE)
 #define SMP_INCLUDED                TRUE
 #if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE)
@@ -237,6 +249,16 @@
 #define GATT_MAX_PHY_CHANNEL        UC_BT_ACL_CONNECTIONS
 #endif  /* UC_BT_ACL_CONNECTIONS */
 
+#ifdef UC_BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE
+#define BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE  UC_BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE
+#endif
+
+#if(BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE && (CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3 || CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3))
+#define BLE_CE_LEN_MIN           5
+#else
+#define BLE_CE_LEN_MIN           0
+#endif
+
 #ifdef UC_BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT
 #define BLE_ESTABLISH_LINK_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT UC_BT_BLE_ESTAB_LINK_CONN_TOUT
 #endif
@@ -1224,7 +1246,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifndef GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES
-#define GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES        8 /* max is 32 */
+#define GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES        UC_CONFIG_BT_GATT_MAX_SR_PROFILES
 #endif
 
 #ifndef GATT_MAX_APPS

components/bt/host/bluedroid/main/bte_init.c

@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@
 #include "bta_hf_client_int.h"
 #endif
 
+#if BTA_AG_INCLUDED == TRUE
+#include "bta_ag_int.h"
+#endif
+
 #if BTA_SDP_INCLUDED == TRUE
 #include "bta_sdp_int.h"
 #endif
@@ -216,6 +220,12 @@ void BTE_DeinitStack(void)
         osi_free(bta_hf_client_cb_ptr);
         bta_hf_client_cb_ptr = NULL;
     }
+#endif
+#if (defined BTA_AG_INCLUDED && BTA_AG_INCLUDED == TRUE)
+    if (bta_ag_cb_ptr){
+        osi_free(bta_ag_cb_ptr);
+        bta_ag_cb_ptr = NULL;
+    }
 #endif
     if (bta_dm_conn_srvcs_ptr){
         osi_free(bta_dm_conn_srvcs_ptr);
@@ -374,6 +384,12 @@ bt_status_t BTE_InitStack(void)
     }
     memset((void *)bta_hf_client_cb_ptr, 0, sizeof(tBTA_HF_CLIENT_CB));
 #endif
+#if (defined BTA_AG_INCLUDED && BTA_AG_INCLUDED == TRUE)
+    if ((bta_ag_cb_ptr = (tBTA_AG_CB *)osi_malloc(sizeof(tBTA_AG_CB))) == NULL) {
+        goto error_exit;
+    }
+    memset((void *)bta_ag_cb_ptr, 0, sizeof(tBTA_AG_CB));
+#endif
 #if (defined BTA_JV_INCLUDED && BTA_JV_INCLUDED == TRUE)
     if ((bta_jv_cb_ptr = (tBTA_JV_CB *)osi_malloc(sizeof(tBTA_JV_CB))) == NULL) {
         goto error_exit;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/btm_ble.c

@@ -2076,6 +2076,30 @@ void btm_ble_create_ll_conn_complete (UINT8 status)
         btm_ble_update_mode_operation(HCI_ROLE_UNKNOWN, NULL, status);
     }
 }
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+** Function btm_ble_create_conn_cancel_complete
+**
+** Description LE connection cancel complete.
+**
+******************************************************************************/
+void btm_ble_create_conn_cancel_complete (UINT8 *p)
+{
+    UINT8       status;
+
+    STREAM_TO_UINT8 (status, p);
+
+    switch (status) {
+    case HCI_SUCCESS:
+        if (btm_ble_get_conn_st() == BLE_CONN_CANCEL) {
+            btm_ble_set_conn_st (BLE_CONN_IDLE);
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************
 **  Function        btm_proc_smp_cback
 **

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/btm_ble_5_gap.c

@@ -23,9 +23,26 @@ tBTM_BLE_EXTENDED_CB extend_adv_cb;
 
 tBTM_BLE_5_HCI_CBACK ble_5_hci_cb;
 
+#define INVALID_VALUE   0XFF
+extern BOOLEAN BTM_GetLocalResolvablePrivateAddr(BD_ADDR bda);
+extern void BTM_UpdateAddrInfor(uint8_t addr_type, BD_ADDR bda);
+extern void BTM_BleSetStaticAddr(BD_ADDR rand_addr);
+extern uint32_t BTM_BleUpdateOwnType(uint8_t *own_bda_type, tBTM_START_ADV_CMPL_CBACK *cb);
 static tBTM_STATUS btm_ble_ext_adv_params_validate(tBTM_BLE_GAP_EXT_ADV_PARAMS *params);
 static tBTM_STATUS btm_ble_ext_adv_set_data_validate(UINT8 instance, UINT16 len, UINT8 *data);
 
+typedef struct {
+    uint16_t ter_con_handle;
+    bool invalid;
+    UINT8 instance;
+    int duration;
+    int max_events;
+    uint8_t retry_count;
+} tBTM_EXT_ADV_RECORD;
+
+tBTM_EXT_ADV_RECORD adv_record[MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE] = {0};
+extern void btm_ble_inter_set(bool extble_inter);
+
 static char *btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(tHCI_STATUS status)
 {
     switch(status) {
@@ -176,6 +193,16 @@ static char *btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(tHCI_STATUS status)
     return NULL;
 }
 
+void btm_ble_extendadvcb_init(void)
+{
+    memset(&extend_adv_cb, 0, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_EXTENDED_CB));
+}
+
+void btm_ble_advrecod_init(void)
+{
+    memset(&adv_record[0], 0, sizeof(tBTM_EXT_ADV_RECORD)*MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE);
+}
+
 void BTM_BleGapRegisterCallback(tBTM_BLE_5_HCI_CBACK cb)
 {
     if (cb) {
@@ -185,6 +212,15 @@ void BTM_BleGapRegisterCallback(tBTM_BLE_5_HCI_CBACK cb)
     }
 }
 
+void BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_EVENT event, tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS *params)
+{
+    if(params && params->status == BTM_SUCCESS) {
+        btm_ble_inter_set(true);
+    }
+    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
+        ble_5_hci_cb(event, params);
+    }
+}
 
 tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleReadPhy(BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 *tx_phy, UINT8 *rx_phy)
 {
@@ -221,9 +257,9 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetPreferDefaultPhy(UINT8 tx_phy_mask, UINT8 rx_phy_mask)
     }
 
     cb_params.set_perf_def_phy.status = err;
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_PREFERED_DEFAULT_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_PREFERED_DEFAULT_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
+
     return status;
 
 }
@@ -247,9 +283,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetPreferPhy(BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 all_phys, UINT8 tx_phy_ma
 
     if (!btsnd_hcic_ble_set_phy(p_lcb->handle, all_phys, tx_phy_mask, rx_phy_mask, phy_options)) {
         cb_params.status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-        if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-            ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_PREFERED_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-        }
+        BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_PREFERED_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
     }
 
 
@@ -285,6 +319,12 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetExtendedAdvRandaddr(UINT8 instance, BD_ADDR rand_addr)
             BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
             status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+        } else {
+            // set random address success, update address infor
+            if(extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].configured && extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].connetable) {
+                BTM_BleSetStaticAddr(rand_addr);
+                BTM_UpdateAddrInfor(BLE_ADDR_RANDOM, rand_addr);
+            }
         }
     } else {
         BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s invalid random address", __func__);
@@ -295,9 +335,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetExtendedAdvRandaddr(UINT8 instance, BD_ADDR rand_addr)
 end:
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_RAND_ADDR_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_RAND_ADDR_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 
@@ -307,6 +345,8 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetExtendedAdvParams(UINT8 instance, tBTM_BLE_GAP_EXT_ADV_PAR
     tBTM_STATUS status = BTM_SUCCESS;
     tHCI_STATUS err = HCI_SUCCESS;
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
+    bool use_rpa_addr = false;
+    BD_ADDR rand_addr;
 
     if (instance >= MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE) {
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
@@ -335,27 +375,41 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetExtendedAdvParams(UINT8 instance, tBTM_BLE_GAP_EXT_ADV_PAR
     } else {
         extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].legacy_pdu = false;
     }
+    // if own_addr_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID or BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID,
+    if((params->own_addr_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID || params->own_addr_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID) && BTM_GetLocalResolvablePrivateAddr(rand_addr)) {
+        params->own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+        use_rpa_addr = true;
+    } else if(params->own_addr_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID){
+        params->own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+    } else if (params->own_addr_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID) {
+        params->own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+    }
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_set_ext_adv_params(instance, params->type, params->interval_min, params->interval_max,
                                       params->channel_map, params->own_addr_type, params->peer_addr_type,
                                       params->peer_addr, params->filter_policy, params->tx_power,
                                       params->primary_phy, params->max_skip,
                                       params->secondary_phy, params->sid, params->scan_req_notif)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EA SetParams: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-	goto end;
+        goto end;
     }
 
     extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].configured = true;
 
 end:
-
-    cb_params.status = status;
-
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_PARAMS_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
+    if(use_rpa_addr) {
+        // update RPA address
+        if((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_set_extend_rand_address(instance, rand_addr)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
+            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EA SetParams: cmd err=0x%x", err);
+            status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+        } else {
+            // set addr success, update address infor
+            BTM_UpdateAddrInfor(BLE_ADDR_RANDOM, rand_addr);
+        }
     }
+    cb_params.status = status;
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_PARAMS_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -390,14 +444,12 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleConfigExtendedAdvDataRaw(BOOLEAN is_scan_rsp, UINT8 instance,
         }
         if (!is_scan_rsp) {
             if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_set_ext_adv_data(instance, operation, 0, send_data_len, &data[data_offset])) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-                BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, line %d, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s",
-                                __func__, __LINE__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err));
+                BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EA SetAdvData: cmd err=0x%x", err);
                 status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
             }
         } else {
             if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_set_ext_adv_scan_rsp_data(instance, operation, 0, send_data_len, &data[data_offset])) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-                BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, line %d, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, __LINE__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+                BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EA SetScanRspData: cmd err=0x%x", err);
                 status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
             }
         }
@@ -408,10 +460,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleConfigExtendedAdvDataRaw(BOOLEAN is_scan_rsp, UINT8 instance,
 
 end:
     cb_params.status = status;
-
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(is_scan_rsp ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_SCAN_RSP_DATA_SET_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_DATA_SET_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(is_scan_rsp ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_SCAN_RSP_DATA_SET_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_DATA_SET_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -452,8 +501,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleStartExtAdv(BOOLEAN enable, UINT8 num, tBTM_BLE_EXT_ADV *ext_
 
         if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_ext_adv_enable(enable, num, instance,
                                       duration, max_events)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                                 __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EA En=%d: cmd err=0x%x", enable, err);
             status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         }
 
@@ -464,9 +512,8 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleStartExtAdv(BOOLEAN enable, UINT8 num, tBTM_BLE_EXT_ADV *ext_
         // enable = false, num == 0 or ext_adv = NULL
 
         if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_ext_adv_enable(enable, num, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
-             status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EA En=%d: cmd err=0x%x", enable, err);
+            status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         }
         goto end;
     }
@@ -480,17 +527,72 @@ end:
         for (int i = 0; i < MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE; i++) {
             extend_adv_cb.inst[i].configured = false;
         }
+        // disable all ext adv
+        if(num == 0) {
+
+            for (uint8_t i = 0; i < MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE; i++)
+            {
+                adv_record[i].invalid = false;
+                adv_record[i].instance = INVALID_VALUE;
+                adv_record[i].duration = INVALID_VALUE;
+                adv_record[i].max_events = INVALID_VALUE;
+                adv_record[i].retry_count = 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            for (uint8_t i = 0; i < num; i++)
+            {
+                uint8_t index = ext_adv[i].instance;
+                adv_record[index].invalid = false;
+                adv_record[index].instance = INVALID_VALUE;
+                adv_record[index].duration = INVALID_VALUE;
+                adv_record[index].max_events = INVALID_VALUE;
+                adv_record[index].retry_count = 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // start extend adv success, save the adv information
+    if(enable && status == BTM_SUCCESS) {
+        for (uint8_t i = 0; i < num; i++)
+        {
+            uint8_t index = ext_adv[i].instance;
+            adv_record[index].invalid = true;
+            adv_record[index].instance = ext_adv[i].instance;
+            adv_record[index].duration = ext_adv[i].duration;
+            adv_record[index].max_events = ext_adv[i].max_events;
+            adv_record[index].retry_count = 0;
+        }
     }
 
     cb_params.status = status;
-
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(enable ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_START_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_STOP_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(enable ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_START_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_STOP_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
 
+tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleStartExtAdvRestart(uint8_t con_handle)
+{
+   tBTM_BLE_EXT_ADV ext_adv;
+   uint8_t index = INVALID_VALUE;
+   for (uint8_t i = 0; i < MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE; i++)
+   {
+       if(adv_record[i].ter_con_handle == con_handle) {
+           index = i;
+           break;
+       }
+    }
+
+    if((index >= MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE) || (!adv_record[index].invalid) || (adv_record[index].retry_count > GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT)) {
+        return BTM_WRONG_MODE;
+    }
+
+    adv_record[index].retry_count ++;
+    BTM_TRACE_DEBUG("remote device did not reveive aux connect response, retatrt the extend adv to reconnect, adv handle %d con_handle %d\n", index, con_handle);
+    ext_adv.instance = adv_record[index].instance;
+    ext_adv.duration = adv_record[index].duration;
+    ext_adv.max_events = adv_record[index].max_events;
+    return BTM_BleStartExtAdv(true, 1, &ext_adv);
+}
+
 tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleExtAdvSetRemove(UINT8 instance)
 {
     tBTM_STATUS status = BTM_SUCCESS;
@@ -504,18 +606,21 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleExtAdvSetRemove(UINT8 instance)
     }
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_remove_adv_set(instance)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                                __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EAS Rm: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+    } else {
+        extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].configured = false;
+        extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].legacy_pdu = false;
+        extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].directed = false;
+        extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].scannable = false;
+        extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].connetable = false;
     }
 
 end:
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_REMOVE_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_REMOVE_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -527,16 +632,21 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleExtAdvSetClear(void)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_clear_adv_set()) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                                __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE EAS Clr: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+    } else {
+        for (uint8_t i = 0; i < MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE; i++) {
+            extend_adv_cb.inst[i].configured = false;
+            extend_adv_cb.inst[i].legacy_pdu = false;
+            extend_adv_cb.inst[i].directed = false;
+            extend_adv_cb.inst[i].scannable = false;
+            extend_adv_cb.inst[i].connetable = false;
+        }
     }
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_CLEAR_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_SET_CLEAR_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -559,15 +669,14 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvSetParams(UINT8 instance, tBTM_BLE_Periodic_Adv_Pa
         extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].connetable ||
         extend_adv_cb.inst[instance].legacy_pdu) {
         BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, instance = %d, Before set the periodic adv parameters, please configure the the \
-                extend adv to nonscannable and nonconnectable fisrt, and it shouldn't include the legacy bit.", __func__, instance);
+                extend adv to nonscannable and nonconnectable first, and it shouldn't include the legacy bit.", __func__, instance);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         goto end;
     }
 
     if ((err= btsnd_hcic_ble_set_periodic_adv_params(instance, params->interval_min,
                                                params->interval_max, params->properties)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA SetParams: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
@@ -575,9 +684,7 @@ end:
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SET_PARAMS_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SET_PARAMS_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -619,8 +726,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvCfgDataRaw(UINT8 instance, UINT16 len, UINT8 *data
         }
 
         if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_set_periodic_adv_data(instance, operation, send_data_len, &data[data_offset])) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+            BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA SetData: cmd err=0x%x", err);
             status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         }
         rem_len -= send_data_len;
@@ -629,9 +735,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvCfgDataRaw(UINT8 instance, UINT16 len, UINT8 *data
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_DATA_SET_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_DATA_SET_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -643,14 +747,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvEnable(UINT8 instance, BOOLEAN enable)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
 
     if (instance >= MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, invalid insatnce %d", __func__, instance);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, invalid instance %d", __func__, instance);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         goto end;
     }
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_periodic_adv_enable(enable, instance)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA En=%d: cmd err=0x%x", enable, err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
@@ -658,9 +761,7 @@ end:
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(enable ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_START_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_STOP_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(enable ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_START_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_STOP_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 
@@ -688,17 +789,16 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvCreateSync(tBTM_BLE_Periodic_Sync_Params *params)
 
     if (!btsnd_hcic_ble_periodic_adv_create_sync(params->filter_policy, params->sid, params->addr_type,
                                             params->addr, params->sync_timeout, 0)) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, send cmd failed", __func__);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA CreateSync cmd failed");
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
 end:
-    if((status != BTM_SUCCESS) && ble_5_hci_cb) {
+    if(status != BTM_SUCCESS) {
         cb_params.status = status;
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_CREATE_SYNC_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
+        BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_CREATE_SYNC_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
     }
 
-
     return status;
 }
 void btm_set_phy_callback(UINT8 status)
@@ -706,9 +806,7 @@ void btm_set_phy_callback(UINT8 status)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_PREFERED_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_PREFERED_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
 }
 void btm_create_sync_callback(UINT8 status)
@@ -716,9 +814,7 @@ void btm_create_sync_callback(UINT8 status)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_CREATE_SYNC_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_CREATE_SYNC_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 }
 
 void btm_read_phy_callback(uint8_t hci_status, uint16_t conn_handle, uint8_t tx_phy, uint8_t rx_phy)
@@ -737,9 +833,7 @@ void btm_read_phy_callback(uint8_t hci_status, uint16_t conn_handle, uint8_t tx_
     cb_params.read_phy.tx_phy = tx_phy;
     cb_params.read_phy.rx_phy = rx_phy;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_READ_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_READ_PHY_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 }
 
 tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvSyncCancel(void)
@@ -749,16 +843,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvSyncCancel(void)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_periodic_adv_create_sync_cancel()) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA SyncCancel, cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_CANCEL_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_CANCEL_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -770,16 +861,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvSyncTerm(UINT16 sync_handle)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
 
     if (( err = btsnd_hcic_ble_periodic_adv_term_sync(sync_handle)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA SyncTerm: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_TERMINATE_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_TERMINATE_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -797,16 +885,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvAddDevToList(tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type, BD_ADDR add
     }
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_add_dev_to_periodic_adv_list(addr_type, addr, sid)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA AddDevToList: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
 end:
     cb_params.status = status;
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_ADD_DEV_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_ADD_DEV_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -824,17 +909,14 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvRemoveDevFromList(tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type, BD_ADD
     }
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_rm_dev_from_periodic_adv_list(addr_type, addr, sid)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA RmDevFromList: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
 end:
 
     cb_params.status = status;
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_REMOVE_DEV_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_REMOVE_DEV_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
     return status;
 }
 
@@ -845,15 +927,12 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BlePeriodicAdvClearDev(void)
     tBTM_BLE_5_GAP_CB_PARAMS cb_params = {0};
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_clear_periodic_adv_list()) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE PA ClrDev: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
     cb_params.status = status;
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_CLEAR_DEV_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_CLEAR_DEV_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -890,12 +969,17 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetExtendedScanParams(tBTM_BLE_EXT_SCAN_PARAMS *params)
         phy_count++;
     }
 
+    if (BTM_BleUpdateOwnType(&params->own_addr_type, NULL) != 0 ) {
+        status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE UpdateOwnType err");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
     extend_adv_cb.scan_duplicate = params->scan_duplicate;
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_set_ext_scan_params(params->own_addr_type, params->filter_policy, phy_mask, phy_count,
                                       hci_params)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE ES SetParams: cmd err=0x%x", err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
@@ -903,9 +987,7 @@ end:
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_EXT_SCAN_PARAMS_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SET_EXT_SCAN_PARAMS_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return cb_params.status;
 }
@@ -923,8 +1005,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleExtendedScan(BOOLEAN enable, UINT16 duration, UINT16 period)
     }
 
     if ((err = btsnd_hcic_ble_ext_scan_enable(enable, extend_adv_cb.scan_duplicate, duration, period)) != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("%s, fail to send the hci command, the error code = %s(0x%x)",
-                                             __func__, btm_ble_hci_status_to_str(err), err);
+        BTM_TRACE_ERROR("LE ES En=%d: cmd err=0x%x", enable, err);
         status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
 
@@ -932,9 +1013,7 @@ end:
 
     cb_params.status = status;
 
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(enable ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_SCAN_START_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_SCAN_STOP_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(enable ? BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_SCAN_START_COMPLETE_EVT : BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_SCAN_STOP_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return status;
 }
@@ -1058,20 +1137,15 @@ void btm_ble_update_phy_evt(tBTM_BLE_UPDATE_PHY *params)
     memcpy(cb_params.phy_update.addr, p_lcb->remote_bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PHY_UPDATE_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PHY_UPDATE_COMPLETE_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 }
 
 void btm_ble_scan_timeout_evt(void)
 {
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SCAN_TIMEOUT_EVT, NULL);
-    }
-
-    return;
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SCAN_TIMEOUT_EVT, NULL);
 }
 
 void btm_ble_adv_set_terminated_evt(tBTM_BLE_ADV_TERMINAT *params)
@@ -1083,12 +1157,18 @@ void btm_ble_adv_set_terminated_evt(tBTM_BLE_ADV_TERMINAT *params)
         return;
     }
 
+    // adv terminated due to connection, save the adv handle and connection handle
+    if(params->completed_event == 0x00) {
+        adv_record[params->adv_handle].ter_con_handle = params->conn_handle;
+    } else {
+        adv_record[params->adv_handle].ter_con_handle = INVALID_VALUE;
+        adv_record[params->adv_handle].invalid = false;
+    }
+
     memcpy(&cb_params.adv_term, params, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_ADV_TERMINAT));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_ADV_TERMINATED_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_ADV_TERMINATED_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 }
@@ -1105,9 +1185,7 @@ void btm_ble_ext_adv_report_evt(tBTM_BLE_EXT_ADV_REPORT *params)
     memcpy(&cb_params.ext_adv_report, params, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_EXT_ADV_REPORT));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_REPORT_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_EXT_ADV_REPORT_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 
@@ -1125,9 +1203,7 @@ void btm_ble_scan_req_received_evt(tBTM_BLE_SCAN_REQ_RECEIVED *params)
     memcpy(&cb_params.scan_req, params, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_SCAN_REQ_RECEIVED));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SCAN_REQ_RECEIVED_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_SCAN_REQ_RECEIVED_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 }
@@ -1144,9 +1220,7 @@ void btm_ble_channel_select_algorithm_evt(tBTM_BLE_CHANNEL_SEL_ALG *params)
     memcpy(&cb_params.channel_sel, params, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_CHANNEL_SEL_ALG));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_CHANNEL_SELETE_ALGORITHM_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_CHANNEL_SELETE_ALGORITHM_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 }
@@ -1163,9 +1237,7 @@ void btm_ble_periodic_adv_report_evt(tBTM_PERIOD_ADV_REPORT *params)
     memcpy(&cb_params.period_adv_report, params, sizeof(tBTM_PERIOD_ADV_REPORT));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_REPORT_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_REPORT_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 
@@ -1183,9 +1255,7 @@ void btm_ble_periodic_adv_sync_lost_evt(tBTM_BLE_PERIOD_ADV_SYNC_LOST *params)
     memcpy(&cb_params.sync_lost, params, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_PERIOD_ADV_SYNC_LOST));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_LOST_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_LOST_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 
@@ -1203,9 +1273,7 @@ void btm_ble_periodic_adv_sync_establish_evt(tBTM_BLE_PERIOD_ADV_SYNC_ESTAB *par
     memcpy(&cb_params.sync_estab, params, sizeof(tBTM_BLE_PERIOD_ADV_SYNC_ESTAB));
 
     // If the user has register the callback function, should callback it to the application.
-    if (ble_5_hci_cb) {
-        ble_5_hci_cb(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_ESTAB_EVT, &cb_params);
-    }
+    BTM_ExtBleCallbackTrigger(BTM_BLE_5_GAP_PERIODIC_ADV_SYNC_ESTAB_EVT, &cb_params);
 
     return;
 

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/btm_ble_addr.c

@@ -414,12 +414,13 @@ void btm_ble_resolve_random_addr(BD_ADDR random_bda, tBTM_BLE_RESOLVE_CBACK *p_c
         /* start to resolve random address */
         /* check for next security record */
         for (p_node = list_begin(btm_cb.p_sec_dev_rec_list); p_node; p_node = list_next(p_node)) {
-	    p_dev_rec = list_node(p_node);
+            p_dev_rec = list_node(p_node);
             p_mgnt_cb->p_dev_rec = p_dev_rec;
             if (btm_ble_match_random_bda(p_dev_rec)) {
-	        break;
-	    }
-	}
+                break;
+            }
+            p_mgnt_cb->p_dev_rec = NULL;
+        }
         btm_ble_resolve_address_cmpl();
     } else {
         (*p_cback)(NULL, p);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/btm_ble_gap.c

@@ -82,12 +82,25 @@ static UINT8 btm_set_conn_mode_adv_init_addr(tBTM_BLE_INQ_CB *p_cb,
         tBLE_ADDR_TYPE *p_own_addr_type);
 static void btm_ble_stop_observe(void);
 static void btm_ble_stop_discover(void);
+uint32_t BTM_BleUpdateOwnType(uint8_t *own_bda_type, tBTM_START_ADV_CMPL_CBACK *cb);
 
 #define BTM_BLE_INQ_RESULT          0x01
 #define BTM_BLE_OBS_RESULT          0x02
 #define BTM_BLE_SEL_CONN_RESULT     0x04
 #define BTM_BLE_DISCO_RESULT        0x08
 
+static bool is_ble50_inter = false;
+
+void btm_ble_inter_set(bool extble_inter)
+{
+    is_ble50_inter = extble_inter;
+}
+
+bool btm_ble_inter_get(void)
+{
+    return is_ble50_inter;
+}
+
 /* LE states combo bit to check */
 const UINT8 btm_le_state_combo_tbl[BTM_BLE_STATE_MAX][BTM_BLE_STATE_MAX][2] = {
     {/* single state support */
@@ -908,6 +921,140 @@ BOOLEAN BTM_BleConfigPrivacy(BOOLEAN privacy_mode, tBTM_SET_LOCAL_PRIVACY_CBACK
 #endif
 }
 
+/*******************************************************************************
+**
+** Function         BTMGetLocalResolvablePrivateAddr
+**
+** Description      This function is called to get local RPA address
+**
+** Parameters       bda: address pointer.
+**
+**
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOLEAN BTM_GetLocalResolvablePrivateAddr(BD_ADDR bda)
+{
+    tBTM_LE_RANDOM_CB *p_cb = &btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb;
+    BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("get owm resolvable random address");
+
+    if (bda) {
+        /* if privacy disabled, return false */
+        if ((p_cb->exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
+            memcpy(bda, p_cb->resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+            BTM_TRACE_DEBUG("own resolvable random address: 0x%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x",
+                            p_cb->resolvale_addr[0], p_cb->resolvale_addr[1],
+                            p_cb->resolvale_addr[2], p_cb->resolvale_addr[3],
+                            p_cb->resolvale_addr[4], p_cb->resolvale_addr[5]);
+            return TRUE;
+        }
+
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+   return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+**
+** Function         BTM_UpdateAddrInfor
+**
+** Description      This function is called to update address information
+**
+** Parameters       addr_type: address type
+**                  bda: address pointer.
+**
+**
+*******************************************************************************/
+void BTM_UpdateAddrInfor(uint8_t addr_type, BD_ADDR bda)
+{
+    btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = addr_type;
+    memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, bda, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+**
+** Function         BTM_BleSetStaticAddr
+**
+** Description      This function is called to save random address
+**
+** Parameters       rand_addr: address pointer.
+**
+**
+*******************************************************************************/
+void BTM_BleSetStaticAddr(BD_ADDR rand_addr)
+{
+    memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+    btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit |= BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM;
+}
+
+uint32_t BTM_BleUpdateOwnType(uint8_t *own_bda_type, tBTM_START_ADV_CMPL_CBACK *cb)
+{
+    if(*own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM) {
+        if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) {
+            //close privacy
+            #if BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE
+            if (btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode != BTM_PRIVACY_NONE) {
+                BTM_BleConfigPrivacy(FALSE, NULL);
+            }
+            #endif
+            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+            // set address to controller
+            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
+
+        } else if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
+            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr);
+        }else {
+            BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("No random address yet, please set random address and try\n");
+            if(cb) {
+                (* cb)(HCI_ERR_ESP_VENDOR_FAIL);
+            }
+            return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+        }
+    } else if(*own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID || *own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID) {
+        if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
+            *own_bda_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr);
+        } else {
+            #if BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE
+            if(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode != BTM_PRIVACY_NONE) {
+                BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("Error state\n");
+                if(cb) {
+                    (* cb)(HCI_ERR_ESP_VENDOR_FAIL);
+                }
+                return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+            }
+            #endif
+            if(*own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID) {
+                *own_bda_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+                btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+            } else { //own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID
+                if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) {
+                    *own_bda_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+                    btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+                    memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
+                    btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
+                } else {
+                    BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("No RPA and no random address yet, please set RPA or random address and try\n");
+                    if(cb) {
+                        (* cb)(HCI_ERR_ESP_VENDOR_FAIL);
+                    }
+                    return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+    }
+
+    return BTM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
 /*******************************************************************************
 **
 ** Function         BTM_BleConfigLocalIcon
@@ -1345,69 +1492,9 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetAdvParamsAll(UINT16 adv_int_min, UINT16 adv_int_max, UINT8
     if (!controller_get_interface()->supports_ble()) {
         return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
-
-    if(own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM) {
-        if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) {
-            //close privacy
-            #if BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE
-            if (btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode != BTM_PRIVACY_NONE) {
-                BTM_BleConfigPrivacy(FALSE, NULL);
-            }
-            #endif
-            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            // set address to controller
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
-
-        } else if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
-            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr);
-        }else {
-            BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("No random address yet, please set random address and try\n");
-            if(adv_cb) {
-                (* adv_cb)(HCI_ERR_ESP_VENDOR_FAIL);
-            }
-            return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-        }
-    } else if(own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID || own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID) {
-        if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
-            own_bda_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr);
-        } else {
-            #if BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE
-            if(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode != BTM_PRIVACY_NONE) {
-                BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("Error state\n");
-                if(adv_cb) {
-                    (* adv_cb)(HCI_ERR_ESP_VENDOR_FAIL);
-                }
-                return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-            }
-            #endif
-            if(own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID) {
-                own_bda_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
-                btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
-            } else { //own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID
-                if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) {
-                    own_bda_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-                    btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-                    memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-                    btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
-                } else {
-                    BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("No RPA and no random address yet, please set RPA or random address and try\n");
-                    if(adv_cb) {
-                        (* adv_cb)(HCI_ERR_ESP_VENDOR_FAIL);
-                    }
-                    return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+    if (BTM_BleUpdateOwnType(&own_bda_type, adv_cb) != 0) {
+        return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
-
     if (!BTM_BLE_ISVALID_PARAM(adv_int_min, BTM_BLE_ADV_INT_MIN, BTM_BLE_ADV_INT_MAX) ||
             !BTM_BLE_ISVALID_PARAM(adv_int_max, BTM_BLE_ADV_INT_MIN, BTM_BLE_ADV_INT_MAX)) {
          BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("adv_int_min or adv_int_max is invalid\n");
@@ -1579,61 +1666,9 @@ tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleSetScanFilterParams(tGATT_IF client_if, UINT32 scan_interval,
     if (!controller_get_interface()->supports_ble()) {
         return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
-
-    if(addr_type_own == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM) {
-        if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) {
-            //close privacy
-            #if BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE
-            if (btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode != BTM_PRIVACY_NONE) {
-                BTM_BleConfigPrivacy(FALSE, NULL);
-            }
-            #endif
-            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            // set address to controller
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
-
-        } else if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
-            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr);
-        }else {
-            BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("No random address yet, please set random address and try\n");
-            return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-        }
-    } else if(addr_type_own == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID || addr_type_own == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID) {
-        if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RESOLVABLE) {
-            addr_type_own = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-            memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.resolvale_addr);
-        } else {
-            #if BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE
-            if(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode != BTM_PRIVACY_NONE) {
-                BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("Error state\n");
-                return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-            }
-            #endif
-            if(addr_type_own == BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC_ID) {
-                addr_type_own = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
-                btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
-            } else {
-                //own_bda_type == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM_ID
-                if((btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.exist_addr_bit & BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) == BTM_BLE_GAP_ADDR_BIT_RANDOM) {
-                    addr_type_own = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-                    btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
-                    memcpy(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.private_addr, btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-                    btsnd_hcic_ble_set_random_addr(btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.static_rand_addr);
-                } else {
-                    BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("No RPA and no random address yet, please set RPA or random address and try\n");
-                    return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+    if (BTM_BleUpdateOwnType(&addr_type_own, NULL) != 0) {
+        return BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
     }
-
     /* If not supporting extended scan support, use the older range for checking */
     if (btm_cb.cmn_ble_vsc_cb.extended_scan_support == 0) {
         max_scan_interval = BTM_BLE_SCAN_INT_MAX;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/btm_main.c

@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ tBTM_CB  btm_cb;
 tBTM_CB  *btm_cb_ptr;
 #endif
 
+#if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+extern void btm_ble_extendadvcb_init(void);
+extern void btm_ble_advrecod_init(void);
+#endif
+
+
 /*******************************************************************************
 **
 ** Function         btm_init
@@ -80,6 +86,11 @@ void btm_init (void)
     btm_ble_sem_init();
 #endif
     btm_sec_dev_init();
+#if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+    btm_ble_extendadvcb_init();
+    btm_ble_advrecod_init();
+#endif
+
 }
 
 

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/btm_sec.c

@@ -4589,26 +4589,6 @@ void btm_sec_disconnected (UINT16 handle, UINT8 reason)
 #endif  ///BT_USE_TRACES == TRUE && SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE
     BTM_TRACE_EVENT("%s before update sec_flags=0x%x\n", __func__, p_dev_rec->sec_flags);
 
-    /* If we are in the process of bonding we need to tell client that auth failed */
-    if ( (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
-            && (memcmp (btm_cb.pairing_bda, p_dev_rec->bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0)) {
-        btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
-        p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN;
-        if (btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) {
-            /* If the disconnection reason is REPEATED_ATTEMPTS,
-               send this error message to complete callback function
-               to display the error message of Repeated attempts.
-               All others, send HCI_ERR_AUTH_FAILURE. */
-            if (reason == HCI_ERR_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS) {
-                result = HCI_ERR_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS;
-            } else if (old_pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) {
-                result = HCI_ERR_HOST_REJECT_SECURITY;
-            }
-            (*btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr,     p_dev_rec->dev_class,
-                                                    p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, result);
-        }
-    }
-
 #if BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE && SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE
     btm_ble_update_mode_operation(HCI_ROLE_UNKNOWN, p_dev_rec->bd_addr, HCI_SUCCESS);
     /* see sec_flags processing in btm_acl_removed */
@@ -4645,6 +4625,26 @@ void btm_sec_disconnected (UINT16 handle, UINT8 reason)
     }
 
     BTM_TRACE_EVENT("%s after update sec_flags=0x%x\n", __func__, p_dev_rec->sec_flags);
+
+    /* If we are in the process of bonding we need to tell client that auth failed */
+    if ( (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
+            && (memcmp (btm_cb.pairing_bda, p_dev_rec->bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0)) {
+        btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE);
+        p_dev_rec->sec_flags &= ~BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN;
+        if (btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) {
+            /* If the disconnection reason is REPEATED_ATTEMPTS,
+               send this error message to complete callback function
+               to display the error message of Repeated attempts.
+               All others, send HCI_ERR_AUTH_FAILURE. */
+            if (reason == HCI_ERR_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS) {
+                result = HCI_ERR_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS;
+            } else if (old_pairing_flags & BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD) {
+                result = HCI_ERR_HOST_REJECT_SECURITY;
+            }
+            (*btm_cb.api.p_auth_complete_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr,     p_dev_rec->dev_class,
+                                                    p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, result);
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /*******************************************************************************

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btm/include/btm_ble_int.h

@@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_ble_start_adv(void);
 tBTM_STATUS btm_ble_stop_adv(void);
 tBTM_STATUS btm_ble_start_scan(void);
 void btm_ble_create_ll_conn_complete (UINT8 status);
+void btm_ble_create_conn_cancel_complete (UINT8 *p);
 
 /* LE security function from btm_sec.c */
 #if SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/btu/btu_hcif.c

@@ -707,6 +707,10 @@ static void btu_hcif_disconnection_comp_evt (UINT8 *p)
 
     handle = HCID_GET_HANDLE (handle);
 
+    if (reason != HCI_ERR_PEER_USER && reason != HCI_ERR_CONN_CAUSE_LOCAL_HOST) {
+        HCI_TRACE_WARNING("DiscCmpl evt: hdl=%d, rsn=0x%x", handle, reason);
+    }
+
 #if BTM_SCO_INCLUDED == TRUE
     /* If L2CAP doesn't know about it, send it to SCO */
     if (!l2c_link_hci_disc_comp (handle, reason)) {
@@ -1067,6 +1071,9 @@ static void btu_hcif_hdl_command_complete (UINT16 opcode, UINT8 *p, UINT16 evt_l
     case HCI_BLE_TEST_END:
         btm_ble_test_command_complete(p);
         break;
+    case HCI_BLE_CREATE_CONN_CANCEL:
+        btm_ble_create_conn_cancel_complete(p);
+        break;
 
 #if (defined BLE_PRIVACY_SPT && BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE)
     case HCI_BLE_ADD_DEV_RESOLVING_LIST:
@@ -1126,7 +1133,7 @@ static void btu_hcif_hdl_command_complete (UINT16 opcode, UINT8 *p, UINT16 evt_l
         uint8_t status;
         STREAM_TO_UINT8  (status, p);
         if(status != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-            HCI_TRACE_ERROR("%s opcode 0x%x status 0x%x", __func__, opcode, status);
+            HCI_TRACE_ERROR("CC evt: op=0x%x, status=0x%x", opcode, status);
         }
         break;
     }
@@ -1259,7 +1266,7 @@ static void btu_hcif_hdl_command_status (UINT16 opcode, UINT8 status, UINT8 *p_c
     {
         uint8_t btm_status = BTM_SUCCESS;
         if(status != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-            HCI_TRACE_ERROR("%s, Create sync error, the error code = 0x%x", __func__, status);
+            HCI_TRACE_ERROR("CS evt: LE PA CreateSync status=0x%x", status);
             btm_status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         }
         btm_create_sync_callback(btm_status);
@@ -1269,7 +1276,7 @@ static void btu_hcif_hdl_command_status (UINT16 opcode, UINT8 status, UINT8 *p_c
     {
         uint8_t btm_status = BTM_SUCCESS;
         if(status != HCI_SUCCESS) {
-            HCI_TRACE_ERROR("%s, Set phy error, the error code = 0x%x", __func__, status);
+            HCI_TRACE_ERROR("CS evt: LE SetPhy status=0x%x", status);
             btm_status = BTM_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
         }
         btm_set_phy_callback(btm_status);
@@ -2064,6 +2071,8 @@ static void btu_ble_ext_adv_report_evt(UINT8 *p, UINT16 evt_len)
     UINT8 num_reports = {0};
     //UINT8 legacy_event_type = 0;
     UINT16 evt_type = 0;
+    uint8_t addr_type;
+    BD_ADDR bda;
 
     if (!p) {
         HCI_TRACE_ERROR("%s, Invalid params.", __func__);
@@ -2095,8 +2104,16 @@ static void btu_ble_ext_adv_report_evt(UINT8 *p, UINT16 evt_len)
             }
         }
 
-        STREAM_TO_UINT8(ext_adv_report.addr_type, p);
-        STREAM_TO_BDADDR(ext_adv_report.addr, p);
+        STREAM_TO_UINT8(addr_type, p);
+        STREAM_TO_BDADDR(bda, p);
+        // If it is an anonymous adv, skip address resolution
+        if(addr_type != 0xFF) {
+#if (defined BLE_PRIVACY_SPT && BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE)
+            btm_identity_addr_to_random_pseudo(bda, &addr_type, FALSE);
+#endif
+        }
+        ext_adv_report.addr_type = addr_type;
+        memcpy(ext_adv_report.addr, bda, 6);
         STREAM_TO_UINT8(ext_adv_report.primary_phy, p);
         STREAM_TO_UINT8(ext_adv_report.secondry_phy, p);
         STREAM_TO_UINT8(ext_adv_report.sid, p);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/hcic/hciblecmds.c

@@ -1568,8 +1568,8 @@ BOOLEAN btsnd_hcic_ble_create_ext_conn(tHCI_CreatExtConn *p_conn)
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->conn_interval_max);
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->conn_latency);
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->sup_timeout);
-        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->min_ce_len);
-        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->max_ce_len);
+        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
+        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
     }
 
     if (p_conn->init_phy_mask & 0x02) {
@@ -1580,8 +1580,8 @@ BOOLEAN btsnd_hcic_ble_create_ext_conn(tHCI_CreatExtConn *p_conn)
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->conn_interval_max);
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->conn_latency);
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->sup_timeout);
-        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->min_ce_len);
-        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->max_ce_len);
+        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
+        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
     }
 
     if (p_conn->init_phy_mask & 0x04) {
@@ -1592,8 +1592,8 @@ BOOLEAN btsnd_hcic_ble_create_ext_conn(tHCI_CreatExtConn *p_conn)
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->conn_interval_max);
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->conn_latency);
         UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->sup_timeout);
-        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->min_ce_len);
-        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, params->max_ce_len);
+        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
+        UINT16_TO_STREAM(pp, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
     }
 
     btu_hcif_send_cmd(LOCAL_BR_EDR_CONTROLLER_ID, p);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/include/stack/btm_ble_api.h

@@ -168,7 +168,11 @@ typedef UINT8   tBTM_BLE_SFP;
 
 /* default connection interval max */
 #ifndef BTM_BLE_CONN_INT_MAX_DEF
+#if CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32
 #define BTM_BLE_CONN_INT_MAX_DEF     12      /* recommended max: 15 ms = 12 * 1.25 */
+#else
+#define BTM_BLE_CONN_INT_MAX_DEF     (((MAX_ACL_CONNECTIONS + 1) * 4) > 12 ? ((MAX_ACL_CONNECTIONS + 1) * 4) : 12)     /* recommended max:  BTM_BLE_CONN_INT_MAX_DEF * 1.25 ms*/
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /* default slave latency */
@@ -700,8 +704,6 @@ typedef void (tBTM_BLE_PF_PARAM_CBACK) (tBTM_BLE_PF_ACTION action_type,
 #define MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE 10
 typedef struct {
     UINT8                       inst_id;
-    BOOLEAN                     in_use;
-    UINT8                       adv_evt;
     BOOLEAN                     configured;
     BOOLEAN                     legacy_pdu;
 
@@ -714,7 +716,6 @@ typedef struct {
 typedef struct {
     tBTM_BLE_EXTENDED_INST inst[MAX_BLE_ADV_INSTANCE]; /* dynamic array to store adv instance */
     UINT8  scan_duplicate;
-    tBTM_BLE_MULTI_ADV_OPQ  op_q;
 } tBTM_BLE_EXTENDED_CB;
 
 #define BTM_BLE_GAP_SET_EXT_ADV_PROP_CONNECTABLE       (1 << 0)

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/l2cap/include/l2c_int.h

@@ -455,6 +455,9 @@ typedef struct t_l2c_linkcb {
     /* connection parameters update order:
        waiting_update_conn_xx -> updating_conn_xx -> current_used_conn_xx
     */
+   /* create connection retry count*/
+   UINT8                retry_create_con;
+   UINT32               start_time_s;
 #endif
 
 #if (L2CAP_ROUND_ROBIN_CHANNEL_SERVICE == TRUE)
@@ -597,6 +600,7 @@ extern BOOLEAN  l2cu_start_post_bond_timer (UINT16 handle);
 extern void     l2cu_release_lcb (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb);
 extern tL2C_LCB *l2cu_find_lcb_by_bd_addr (BD_ADDR p_bd_addr, tBT_TRANSPORT transport);
 extern tL2C_LCB *l2cu_find_lcb_by_handle (UINT16 handle);
+extern uint8_t l2cu_plcb_active_count(void);
 extern void     l2cu_update_lcb_4_bonding (BD_ADDR p_bd_addr, BOOLEAN is_bonding);
 
 extern UINT8    l2cu_get_conn_role (tL2C_LCB *p_this_lcb);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/l2cap/l2c_api.c

@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ UINT16 L2CA_SendFixedChnlData (UINT16 fixed_cid, BD_ADDR rem_bda, BT_HDR *p_buf)
     }
 
     // If already congested, do not accept any more packets
-    if (p_lcb->p_fixed_ccbs[fixed_cid - L2CAP_FIRST_FIXED_CHNL]->cong_sent) {
+    if (p_lcb->p_fixed_ccbs[fixed_cid - L2CAP_FIRST_FIXED_CHNL]->cong_sent && fixed_cid != L2CAP_SMP_CID) {
         L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG ("L2CAP - CID: 0x%04x cannot send, already congested\
             xmit_hold_q.count: %u buff_quota: %u", fixed_cid,
             fixed_queue_length(p_lcb->p_fixed_ccbs[fixed_cid - L2CAP_FIRST_FIXED_CHNL]->xmit_hold_q),

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/l2cap/l2c_ble.c

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ const tHCI_ExtConnParams ext_conn_params = {
 #endif // #if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
 
 static BOOLEAN l2cble_start_conn_update (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb);
+extern int64_t esp_system_get_time(void);
 
 /*******************************************************************************
 **
@@ -204,6 +205,10 @@ BOOLEAN L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams (BD_ADDR rem_bda, BOOLEAN enable)
     if (p_lcb->current_used_conn_interval <= BTM_BLE_CONN_INT_MAX_DEF && (p_lcb->conn_update_mask & L2C_BLE_CONN_UPDATE_DISABLE) == 0){
         return (FALSE);
     }
+    bool is_disable = (p_lcb->conn_update_mask & L2C_BLE_CONN_UPDATE_DISABLE);
+    if(l2cu_plcb_active_count() >1 && !(enable && is_disable)) {
+        return FALSE;
+    }
 
     if (enable) {
         p_lcb->conn_update_mask &= ~L2C_BLE_CONN_UPDATE_DISABLE;
@@ -363,7 +368,7 @@ void l2cble_scanner_conn_comp (UINT16 handle, BD_ADDR bda, tBLE_ADDR_TYPE type,
                                            p_dev_rec->conn_params.max_conn_int,
                                            p_dev_rec->conn_params.slave_latency,
                                            p_dev_rec->conn_params.supervision_tout,
-                                           0, 0);
+                                           BLE_CE_LEN_MIN, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
     }
 
     /* Tell BTM Acl management about the link */
@@ -524,7 +529,7 @@ static BOOLEAN l2cble_start_conn_update (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
 #endif
                ) {
                 btsnd_hcic_ble_upd_ll_conn_params(p_lcb->handle, min_conn_int, max_conn_int,
-                                                  slave_latency, supervision_tout, 0, 0);
+                                                  slave_latency, supervision_tout, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
             } else {
                 l2cu_send_peer_ble_par_req (p_lcb, min_conn_int, max_conn_int, slave_latency, supervision_tout);
             }
@@ -552,7 +557,7 @@ static BOOLEAN l2cble_start_conn_update (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
 #endif
                ) {
                 btsnd_hcic_ble_upd_ll_conn_params(p_lcb->handle, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_min_interval,
-                                                  p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_max_interval, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_latency, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_timeout, 0, 0);
+                                                  p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_max_interval, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_latency, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_timeout, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
             } else {
                 l2cu_send_peer_ble_par_req (p_lcb, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_min_interval, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_max_interval,
                                             p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_latency, p_lcb->waiting_update_conn_timeout);
@@ -591,7 +596,7 @@ void l2cble_process_conn_update_evt (UINT16 handle, UINT8 status, UINT16 conn_in
     /* See if we have a link control block for the remote device */
     p_lcb = l2cu_find_lcb_by_handle(handle);
     if (!p_lcb) {
-        L2CAP_TRACE_WARNING("l2cble_process_conn_update_evt: Invalid handle: %d", handle);
+        L2CAP_TRACE_WARNING("le con upd: inv hdl=%d", handle);
         return;
     }
     if (status == HCI_SUCCESS){
@@ -599,7 +604,7 @@ void l2cble_process_conn_update_evt (UINT16 handle, UINT8 status, UINT16 conn_in
         p_lcb->current_used_conn_latency = conn_latency;
         p_lcb->current_used_conn_timeout = conn_timeout;
     }else{
-        L2CAP_TRACE_WARNING("l2cble_process_conn_update_evt: Error status: %d", status);
+        L2CAP_TRACE_WARNING("le con upd: err_stat=0x%x", status);
     }
 
     p_lcb->conn_update_mask &= ~L2C_BLE_UPDATE_PENDING;
@@ -617,7 +622,7 @@ void l2cble_process_conn_update_evt (UINT16 handle, UINT8 status, UINT16 conn_in
 
     btu_stop_timer (&p_lcb->timer_entry);
 
-    L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG("l2cble_process_conn_update_evt: conn_update_mask=%d", p_lcb->conn_update_mask);
+    L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG("le con upd: conn_update_mask=%d", p_lcb->conn_update_mask);
 }
 
 /*******************************************************************************
@@ -801,7 +806,6 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
 
 #if ( (defined BLE_PRIVACY_SPT) && (BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE))
     own_addr_type = btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.addr_mgnt_cb.own_addr_type;
-
 #if (!CONTROLLER_RPA_LIST_ENABLE)
     if(dev_rec_exist) {
         // if the current address information is valid, get the real address information
@@ -825,7 +829,7 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
 
 #endif // (!CONTROLLER_RPA_LIST_ENABLE)
 
-#if CONTROLLER_RPA_LIST_ENABLE
+#if (CONTROLLER_RPA_LIST_ENABLE)
 
     if (p_dev_rec->ble.in_controller_list & BTM_RESOLVING_LIST_BIT) {
         if (btm_cb.ble_ctr_cb.privacy_mode >=  BTM_PRIVACY_1_2) {
@@ -839,7 +843,6 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
     }
 
 #endif // CONTROLLER_RPA_LIST_ENABLE
-
 #endif // (defined BLE_PRIVACY_SPT) && (BLE_PRIVACY_SPT == TRUE)
 
     if (!btm_ble_topology_check(BTM_BLE_STATE_INIT)) {
@@ -847,6 +850,18 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
         L2CAP_TRACE_ERROR("initate direct connection fail, topology limitation");
         return FALSE;
     }
+    uint32_t link_timeout = L2CAP_BLE_LINK_CONNECT_TOUT;
+    if(GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT) {
+        if(!p_lcb->retry_create_con) {
+            p_lcb->start_time_s = (esp_system_get_time()/1000);
+        }
+        uint32_t current_time = (esp_system_get_time()/1000);
+        link_timeout = (L2CAP_BLE_LINK_CONNECT_TOUT*1000 - (current_time - p_lcb->start_time_s))/1000;
+
+        if(link_timeout == 0 || link_timeout > L2CAP_BLE_LINK_CONNECT_TOUT) {
+            link_timeout = L2CAP_BLE_LINK_CONNECT_TOUT;
+        }
+    }
 
     if (!p_lcb->is_aux) {
         if (!btsnd_hcic_ble_create_ll_conn (scan_int,/* UINT16 scan_int      */
@@ -863,8 +878,8 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
                                                     p_dev_rec->conn_params.slave_latency : BTM_BLE_CONN_SLAVE_LATENCY_DEF), /* UINT16 conn_latency  */
                                             (UINT16) ((p_dev_rec->conn_params.supervision_tout != BTM_BLE_CONN_PARAM_UNDEF) ?
                                                     p_dev_rec->conn_params.supervision_tout : BTM_BLE_CONN_TIMEOUT_DEF), /* conn_timeout */
-                                            0,                       /* UINT16 min_len       */
-                                            0)) {                    /* UINT16 max_len       */
+                                            BLE_CE_LEN_MIN,                       /* UINT16 min_len       */
+                                            BLE_CE_LEN_MIN)) {                    /* UINT16 max_len       */
             l2cu_release_lcb (p_lcb);
             L2CAP_TRACE_ERROR("initate direct connection fail, no resources");
             return (FALSE);
@@ -872,13 +887,28 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
             p_lcb->link_state = LST_CONNECTING;
             l2cb.is_ble_connecting = TRUE;
             memcpy (l2cb.ble_connecting_bda, p_lcb->remote_bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-            btu_start_timer (&p_lcb->timer_entry, BTU_TTYPE_L2CAP_LINK, L2CAP_BLE_LINK_CONNECT_TOUT);
+            btu_start_timer (&p_lcb->timer_entry, BTU_TTYPE_L2CAP_LINK, link_timeout);
             btm_ble_set_conn_st (BLE_DIR_CONN);
 
             return (TRUE);
         }
     } else {
 #if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+
+        /*
+        * 0x00 Public Device Address
+        * 0x01 Random Device Address
+        * 0x02 Public Identity Address (corresponds to Resolved Private Address)
+        * 0x03 Random (static) Identity Address (corresponds to Resolved Private Address)
+        * 0xFF No address provided (anonymous advertisement)
+        */
+
+        if ((peer_addr_type & BLE_ADDR_RANDOM) == BLE_ADDR_RANDOM) {
+            peer_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_RANDOM;
+        } else {
+            peer_addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC;
+        }
+
         tHCI_CreatExtConn aux_conn = {0};
         aux_conn.filter_policy = FALSE;
         aux_conn.own_addr_type = own_addr_type;
@@ -899,7 +929,7 @@ BOOLEAN l2cble_init_direct_conn (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
         p_lcb->link_state = LST_CONNECTING;
         l2cb.is_ble_connecting = TRUE;
         memcpy (l2cb.ble_connecting_bda, p_lcb->remote_bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN);
-        btu_start_timer (&p_lcb->timer_entry, BTU_TTYPE_L2CAP_LINK, L2CAP_BLE_LINK_CONNECT_TOUT);
+        btu_start_timer (&p_lcb->timer_entry, BTU_TTYPE_L2CAP_LINK, link_timeout);
         btm_ble_set_conn_st (BLE_DIR_CONN);
         if(!btsnd_hcic_ble_create_ext_conn(&aux_conn)) {
             l2cu_release_lcb (p_lcb);
@@ -1104,12 +1134,12 @@ void l2cble_process_rc_param_request_evt(UINT16 handle, UINT16 int_min, UINT16 i
         /* if update is enabled, always accept connection parameter update */
         if ((p_lcb->conn_update_mask & L2C_BLE_CONN_UPDATE_DISABLE) == 0) {
             p_lcb->conn_update_mask |= L2C_BLE_UPDATE_PENDING;
-            btsnd_hcic_ble_rc_param_req_reply(handle, int_min, int_max, latency, timeout, 0, 0);
+            btsnd_hcic_ble_rc_param_req_reply(handle, int_min, int_max, latency, timeout, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
         }else {
             /* always accept connection parameters request which is sent by itself */
             if (int_max == BTM_BLE_CONN_INT_MIN) {
                 p_lcb->conn_update_mask |= L2C_BLE_UPDATE_PENDING;
-                btsnd_hcic_ble_rc_param_req_reply(handle, int_min, int_max, latency, timeout, 0, 0);
+                btsnd_hcic_ble_rc_param_req_reply(handle, int_min, int_max, latency, timeout, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN, BLE_CE_LEN_MIN);
             }else {
                 L2CAP_TRACE_EVENT ("L2CAP - LE - update currently disabled");
                 p_lcb->conn_update_mask |= L2C_BLE_NEW_CONN_PARAM;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/l2cap/l2c_link.c

@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@
 
 static BOOLEAN l2c_link_send_to_lower (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb, BT_HDR *p_buf);
 
+#if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+extern tBTM_STATUS BTM_BleStartExtAdvRestart(uint8_t handle);
+#endif// #if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+extern bool btm_ble_inter_get(void);
+
 /*******************************************************************************
 **
 ** Function         l2c_link_hci_conn_req
@@ -333,7 +338,6 @@ void l2c_link_sec_comp (BD_ADDR p_bda, tBT_TRANSPORT transport, void *p_ref_data
     }
 }
 
-
 /*******************************************************************************
 **
 ** Function         l2c_link_hci_disc_comp
@@ -456,7 +460,38 @@ BOOLEAN l2c_link_hci_disc_comp (UINT16 handle, UINT8 reason)
         }
 
         p_lcb->p_pending_ccb = NULL;
+#if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE && GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_EN == TRUE)
+        if(reason == HCI_ERR_CONN_FAILED_ESTABLISHMENT && p_lcb->transport == BT_TRANSPORT_LE) {
 
+            if(p_lcb->link_role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER && p_lcb->retry_create_con < GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT) {
+                L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG("master retry connect, retry count %d reason 0x%x\n",  p_lcb->retry_create_con, reason);
+                p_lcb->retry_create_con ++;
+                // create connection retry
+                if (l2cu_create_conn(p_lcb, BT_TRANSPORT_LE)) {
+                    btm_acl_removed (p_lcb->remote_bd_addr, BT_TRANSPORT_LE);
+                    lcb_is_free = FALSE;    /* still using this lcb */
+                }
+            }
+
+            #if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+            if(btm_ble_inter_get() && p_lcb->link_role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE && p_lcb->retry_create_con < GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT) {
+                p_lcb->retry_create_con ++;
+                L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG("slave restart extend adv, retry count %d reason 0x%x\n", p_lcb->retry_create_con, reason);
+                BTM_BleStartExtAdvRestart(handle);
+            }
+            #endif // #if (BLE_50_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+
+            #if (BLE_42_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+            if(!btm_ble_inter_get() && p_lcb->link_role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE && p_lcb->retry_create_con < GATTC_CONNECT_RETRY_COUNT) {
+                p_lcb->retry_create_con ++;
+                L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG("slave resatrt adv, retry count %d reason 0x%x\n", p_lcb->retry_create_con, reason);
+                btm_ble_start_adv();
+            }
+            #endif // #if (BLE_42_FEATURE_SUPPORT == TRUE)
+        }
+
+
+#endif // #if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE)
         /* Release the LCB */
         if (lcb_is_free) {
             l2cu_release_lcb (p_lcb);

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/l2cap/l2c_utils.c

@@ -158,6 +158,10 @@ void l2cu_release_lcb (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb)
 
     p_lcb->in_use     = FALSE;
     p_lcb->is_bonding = FALSE;
+#if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE)
+    p_lcb->retry_create_con = 0;
+    p_lcb->start_time_s = 0;
+#endif // #if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE)
 
     /* Stop and release timers */
     btu_free_timer (&p_lcb->timer_entry);
@@ -335,6 +339,26 @@ tL2C_LCB  *l2cu_find_free_lcb (void)
     return (NULL);
 }
 
+uint8_t l2cu_plcb_active_count(void)
+{
+    list_node_t *p_node = NULL;
+    tL2C_LCB    *p_lcb  = NULL;
+    uint8_t active_count = 0;
+    for (p_node = list_begin(l2cb.p_lcb_pool); p_node; p_node = list_next(p_node)) {
+        p_lcb = list_node(p_node);
+        if (p_lcb && p_lcb->in_use) {
+            active_count ++;
+        }
+    }
+    if (active_count >= MAX_L2CAP_CHANNELS) {
+        L2CAP_TRACE_ERROR("error active count");
+        active_count = 0;
+    }
+    L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG("plcb active count %d", active_count);
+    return active_count;
+
+}
+
 /*******************************************************************************
 **
 ** Function         l2cu_get_conn_role
@@ -1456,9 +1480,11 @@ void l2cu_change_pri_ccb (tL2C_CCB *p_ccb, tL2CAP_CHNL_PRIORITY priority)
 ** Returns          pointer to CCB, or NULL if none
 **
 *******************************************************************************/
+bool l2cu_find_ccb_in_list(void *p_ccb_node, void *p_local_cid);
 tL2C_CCB *l2cu_allocate_ccb (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb, UINT16 cid)
 {
     tL2C_CCB    *p_ccb = NULL;
+    uint16_t tmp_cid = L2CAP_BASE_APPL_CID;
     L2CAP_TRACE_DEBUG ("l2cu_allocate_ccb: cid 0x%04x", cid);
 
     p_ccb = l2cu_find_free_ccb ();
@@ -1481,7 +1507,13 @@ tL2C_CCB *l2cu_allocate_ccb (tL2C_LCB *p_lcb, UINT16 cid)
     p_ccb->in_use = TRUE;
 
     /* Get a CID for the connection */
-    p_ccb->local_cid = L2CAP_BASE_APPL_CID + (list_length(l2cb.p_ccb_pool) - 1);
+    for (tmp_cid = L2CAP_BASE_APPL_CID; tmp_cid < MAX_L2CAP_CHANNELS + L2CAP_BASE_APPL_CID; tmp_cid++) {
+        if (list_foreach(l2cb.p_ccb_pool, l2cu_find_ccb_in_list, &tmp_cid) == NULL) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    assert(tmp_cid != MAX_L2CAP_CHANNELS + L2CAP_BASE_APPL_CID);
+    p_ccb->local_cid = tmp_cid;
     p_ccb->p_lcb = p_lcb;
     p_ccb->p_rcb = NULL;
     p_ccb->should_free_rcb = false;

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/smp/smp_act.c

@@ -1540,9 +1540,11 @@ void smp_idle_terminate(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
 *******************************************************************************/
 void smp_fast_conn_param(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
 {
+#if (BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE == FALSE)
     if(p_cb->role == BTM_ROLE_MASTER) {
         L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE);
     }
+#endif
 #if (SMP_SLAVE_CON_PARAMS_UPD_ENABLE == TRUE)
     else {
         tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC    *p_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda);
@@ -1554,7 +1556,9 @@ void smp_fast_conn_param(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
         some peripherals are not able to revert to fast connection parameters
         during the start of service discovery. Connection paramter updates
         get enabled again once service discovery completes. */
+        #if (BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE == FALSE)
         L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE);
+        #endif
     }
 #endif
 }

components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/smp/smp_utils.c

@@ -1021,7 +1021,9 @@ void smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
             //clear flag
             p_rec->ble.skip_update_conn_param = false;
         } else {
+            #if (BT_MULTI_CONNECTION_ENBALE == FALSE)
             L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE);
+            #endif
         }
     }
 

components/bt/host/nimble/Kconfig.in

@@ -72,11 +72,15 @@ config BT_NIMBLE_LOG_LEVEL
 
 config BT_NIMBLE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
     int "Maximum number of concurrent connections"
-    range 1 9
-    default BTDM_CTRL_BLE_MAX_CONN
+    range 1 8 if (IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3)
+    range 1 9 if IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+    default 3
     depends on BT_NIMBLE_ENABLED
     help
-        Defines maximum number of concurrent BLE connections
+        Defines maximum number of concurrent BLE connections. For ESP32, user
+        is expected to configure BTDM_CTRL_BLE_MAX_CONN from controller menu
+        along with this option. Similarly for ESP32-C3 or ESP32-S3, user is expected to
+        configure BT_CTRL_BLE_MAX_ACT from controller menu.
 
 config BT_NIMBLE_MAX_BONDS
     int "Maximum number of bonds to save across reboots"
@@ -431,6 +435,22 @@ config BT_NIMBLE_HOST_BASED_PRIVACY
         Use this option to do host based Random Private Address resolution.
         If this option is disabled then controller based privacy is used.
 
+config BT_NIMBLE_ENABLE_CONN_REATTEMPT
+    bool "Enable connection reattempts on connection establishment error"
+    default y if (IDF_TARGET_ESP32C3 || IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3)
+    default n if IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+    help
+        Enable to make the NimBLE host to reattempt GAP connection on connection
+        establishment failure.
+
+config BT_NIMBLE_MAX_CONN_REATTEMPT
+    int "Maximum number connection reattempts"
+    range 1 7
+    default 3
+    depends on BT_NIMBLE_ENABLED && BT_NIMBLE_ENABLE_CONN_REATTEMPT
+    help
+        Defines maximum number of connection reattempts.
+
 config BT_NIMBLE_EXT_ADV
     bool "Enable extended advertising."
     default n

components/bt/host/nimble/esp-hci/src/esp_nimble_hci.c

@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static struct os_mbuf *ble_hci_trans_acl_buf_alloc(void)
 static void ble_hci_rx_acl(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len)
 {
     struct os_mbuf *m;
+    int rc;
     int sr;
     if (len < BLE_HCI_DATA_HDR_SZ || len > MYNEWT_VAL(BLE_ACL_BUF_SIZE)) {
         return;
@@ -260,9 +261,11 @@ static void ble_hci_rx_acl(uint8_t *data, uint16_t len)
     m = ble_hci_trans_acl_buf_alloc();
 
     if (!m) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "%s failed to allocate ACL buffers; increase ACL_BUF_COUNT", __func__);
         return;
     }
-    if (os_mbuf_append(m, data, len)) {
+    if ((rc = os_mbuf_append(m, data, len)) != 0) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "%s failed to os_mbuf_append; rc = %d", __func__, rc);
         os_mbuf_free_chain(m);
         return;
     }

components/bt/include/esp32/include/esp_bt.h

@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_bt_sleep_disable(void);
  * Note that scan duplicate list will be automatically cleared when the maximum amount of device in the filter is reached
  * the amount of device in the filter can be configured in menuconfig.
  *
+ * @note This function name is incorrectly spelled, it will be fixed in release 5.x version.
  *
  * @return
  *                  - ESP_OK : success

components/bt/include/esp32c3/include/esp_bt.h

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 #define ESP_BT_CTRL_CONFIG_MAGIC_VAL    0x5A5AA5A5
-#define ESP_BT_CTRL_CONFIG_VERSION      0x02101290
+#define ESP_BT_CTRL_CONFIG_VERSION      0x02103310
 
 #define ESP_BT_HCI_TL_MAGIC_VALUE   0xfadebead
 #define ESP_BT_HCI_TL_VERSION       0x00010000
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ enum {
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_ENABLED
 
 #define BT_CTRL_BLE_MAX_ACT_LIMIT           10  //Maximum BLE activity limitation
+#define SLAVE_CE_LEN_MIN_DEFAULT             5
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_CTRL_SCAN_DUPL_TYPE
 #define SCAN_DUPLICATE_TYPE_VALUE  CONFIG_BT_CTRL_SCAN_DUPL_TYPE
@@ -133,6 +134,8 @@ enum {
 
 #define CFG_NASK      CFG_MASK_BIT_SCAN_DUPLICATE_OPTION
 
+#define BLE_HW_TARGET_CODE_ESP32C3_CHIP_ECO0                      (0x01010000)
+
 #define BT_CONTROLLER_INIT_CONFIG_DEFAULT() {                              \
     .magic = ESP_BT_CTRL_CONFIG_MAGIC_VAL,                                 \
     .version = ESP_BT_CTRL_CONFIG_VERSION,                                 \
@@ -158,6 +161,8 @@ enum {
     .normal_adv_size = NORMAL_SCAN_DUPLICATE_CACHE_SIZE,                   \
     .mesh_adv_size = MESH_DUPLICATE_SCAN_CACHE_SIZE,                       \
     .coex_phy_coded_tx_rx_time_limit = CONFIG_BT_CTRL_COEX_PHY_CODED_TX_RX_TLIM_EFF, \
+    .hw_target_code = BLE_HW_TARGET_CODE_ESP32C3_CHIP_ECO0,                \
+    .slave_ce_len_min = SLAVE_CE_LEN_MIN_DEFAULT,                          \
 };
 
 #else
@@ -221,6 +226,8 @@ typedef struct {
     uint16_t normal_adv_size;               /*!< Normal adv size for scan duplicate */
     uint16_t mesh_adv_size;                 /*!< Mesh adv size for scan duplicate */
     uint8_t coex_phy_coded_tx_rx_time_limit;  /*!< limit on max tx/rx time in case of connection using CODED-PHY with Wi-Fi coexistence */
+    uint32_t hw_target_code;                /*!< hardware target */
+    uint8_t slave_ce_len_min;
 } esp_bt_controller_config_t;
 
 /**
@@ -263,22 +270,23 @@ typedef enum {
  * @brief Bluetooth TX power level(index), it's just a index corresponding to power(dbm).
  */
 typedef enum {
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N12 = 0,                /*!< Corresponding to -12dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N9  = 1,                /*!< Corresponding to  -9dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N6  = 2,                /*!< Corresponding to  -6dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N3  = 3,                /*!< Corresponding to  -3dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N0  = 4,                /*!< Corresponding to   0dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_P3  = 5,                /*!< Corresponding to  +3dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_P6  = 6,                /*!< Corresponding to  +6dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_P9  = 7,                /*!< Corresponding to  +9dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N14 = ESP_PWR_LVL_N12,  /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to -14dbm will actually result to -12dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N11 = ESP_PWR_LVL_N9,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to -11dbm will actually result to  -9dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N8  = ESP_PWR_LVL_N6,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to  -8dbm will actually result to  -6dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N5  = ESP_PWR_LVL_N3,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to  -5dbm will actually result to  -3dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_N2  = ESP_PWR_LVL_N0,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to  -2dbm will actually result to   0dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_P1  = ESP_PWR_LVL_P3,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to  +1dbm will actually result to  +3dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_P4  = ESP_PWR_LVL_P6,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to  +4dbm will actually result to  +6dbm */
-    ESP_PWR_LVL_P7  = ESP_PWR_LVL_P9,   /*!< Backward compatibility! Setting to  +7dbm will actually result to  +9dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N27 = 0,              /*!< Corresponding to -27dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N24 = 1,              /*!< Corresponding to -24dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N21 = 2,              /*!< Corresponding to -21dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N18 = 3,              /*!< Corresponding to -18dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N15 = 4,              /*!< Corresponding to -15dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N12 = 5,              /*!< Corresponding to -12dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N9  = 6,              /*!< Corresponding to  -9dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N6  = 7,              /*!< Corresponding to  -6dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N3  = 8,              /*!< Corresponding to  -3dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_N0  = 9,              /*!< Corresponding to   0dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_P3  = 10,             /*!< Corresponding to  +3dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_P6  = 11,             /*!< Corresponding to  +6dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_P9  = 12,             /*!< Corresponding to  +9dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_P12 = 13,             /*!< Corresponding to  +12dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_P15 = 14,             /*!< Corresponding to  +15dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_P18 = 15,             /*!< Corresponding to  +18dbm */
+    ESP_PWR_LVL_INVALID = 0xFF,         /*!< Indicates an invalid value */
 } esp_power_level_t;
 
 /**

components/driver/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ idf_component_register(SRCS "${srcs}"
                     INCLUDE_DIRS ${includes}
                     PRIV_INCLUDE_DIRS "include/driver"
                     PRIV_REQUIRES efuse esp_pm esp_timer esp_ipc
-                    REQUIRES esp_ringbuf freertos soc hal esp_hw_support)
+                    REQUIRES esp_ringbuf freertos soc hal esp_hw_support
+                    LDFRAGMENTS linker.lf)
 # (REQUIRES cannot hide soc headers, since many arguments in the driver headers are chip-dependent)
 
 # uses C11 atomic feature

components/driver/Kconfig

@@ -87,6 +87,48 @@ menu "Driver configurations"
                 - Alert logging (i.e., setting of the TWAI_ALERT_AND_LOG flag)
                 will have no effect.
 
+        config TWAI_ERRATA_FIX_BUS_OFF_REC
+            bool "Add SW workaround for REC change during bus-off"
+            depends on IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+            default n
+            help
+                When the bus-off condition is reached, the REC should be reset to 0 and frozen (via LOM) by the
+                driver's ISR. However on the ESP32, there is an edge case where the REC will increase before the
+                driver's ISR can respond in time (e.g., due to the rapid occurrence of bus errors), thus causing the
+                REC to be non-zero after bus-off. A non-zero REC can prevent bus-off recovery as the bus-off recovery
+                condition is that both TEC and REC become 0. Enabling this option will add a workaround in the driver
+                to forcibly reset REC to zero on reaching bus-off.
+
+        config TWAI_ERRATA_FIX_TX_INTR_LOST
+            bool "Add SW workaround for TX interrupt lost errata"
+            depends on IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+            default n
+            help
+                On the ESP32, when a transmit interrupt occurs, and interrupt register is read on the same APB clock
+                cycle, the transmit interrupt could be lost. Enabling this option will add a workaround that checks the
+                transmit buffer status bit to recover any lost transmit interrupt.
+
+        config TWAI_ERRATA_FIX_RX_FRAME_INVALID
+            bool "Add SW workaround for invalid RX frame errata"
+            depends on IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+            default n
+            help
+                On the ESP32, when receiving a data or remote frame, if a bus error occurs in the data or CRC field,
+                the data of the next received frame could be invalid. Enabling this option will add a workaround that
+                will reset the peripheral on detection of this errata condition. Note that if a frame is transmitted on
+                the bus whilst the reset is ongoing, the message will not be receive by the peripheral sent on the bus
+                during the reset, the message will be lost.
+
+        config TWAI_ERRATA_FIX_RX_FIFO_CORRUPT
+            bool "Add SW workaround for RX FIFO corruption errata"
+            depends on IDF_TARGET_ESP32
+            default n
+            help
+                On the ESP32, when the RX FIFO overruns and the RX message counter maxes out at 64 messages, the entire
+                RX FIFO is no longer recoverable. Enabling this option will add a workaround that resets the peripheral
+                on detection of this errata condition. Note that if a frame is being sent on the bus during the reset
+                bus during the reset, the message will be lost.
+
     endmenu # TWAI Configuration
 
     menu "UART configuration"

components/driver/adc_common.c

@@ -160,17 +160,12 @@ static void adc_power_on_internal(void)
 
 void adc_power_acquire(void)
 {
-    bool powered_on = false;
     ADC_POWER_ENTER();
     s_adc_power_on_cnt++;
     if (s_adc_power_on_cnt == 1) {
         adc_power_on_internal();
-        powered_on = true;
     }
     ADC_POWER_EXIT();
-    if (powered_on) {
-        ESP_LOGV(ADC_TAG, "%s: ADC powered on", __func__);
-    }
 }
 
 void adc_power_on(void)
@@ -182,12 +177,15 @@ void adc_power_on(void)
 
 static void adc_power_off_internal(void)
 {
+#if CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32
     adc_hal_set_power_manage(ADC_POWER_SW_OFF);
+#else
+    adc_hal_set_power_manage(ADC_POWER_BY_FSM);
+#endif
 }
 
 void adc_power_release(void)
 {
-    bool powered_off = false;
     ADC_POWER_ENTER();
     s_adc_power_on_cnt--;
     /* Sanity check */
@@ -197,12 +195,8 @@ void adc_power_release(void)
         abort();
     } else if (s_adc_power_on_cnt == 0) {
         adc_power_off_internal();
-        powered_off = true;
     }
     ADC_POWER_EXIT();
-    if (powered_off) {
-        ESP_LOGV(ADC_TAG, "%s: ADC powered off", __func__);
-    }
 }
 
 void adc_power_off(void)
@@ -212,6 +206,33 @@ void adc_power_off(void)
     ADC_POWER_EXIT();
 }
 
+esp_err_t adc1_pad_get_io_num(adc1_channel_t channel, gpio_num_t *gpio_num)
+{
+    ADC_CHANNEL_CHECK(ADC_NUM_1, channel);
+
+    int io = ADC_GET_IO_NUM(ADC_NUM_1, channel);
+    if (io < 0) {
+        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+    } else {
+        *gpio_num = (gpio_num_t)io;
+    }
+
+    return ESP_OK;
+}
+
+esp_err_t adc2_pad_get_io_num(adc2_channel_t channel, gpio_num_t *gpio_num)
+{
+    ADC_CHANNEL_CHECK(ADC_NUM_2, channel);
+
+    int io = ADC_GET_IO_NUM(ADC_NUM_2, channel);
+    if (io < 0) {
+        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+    } else {
+        *gpio_num = (gpio_num_t)io;
+    }
+
+    return ESP_OK;
+}
 
 #if CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32 || CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S2 || CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3
 esp_err_t adc_set_clk_div(uint8_t clk_div)
@@ -323,20 +344,6 @@ esp_err_t adc_rtc_reset(void)
 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  *                      ADC1
  *------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-esp_err_t adc1_pad_get_io_num(adc1_channel_t channel, gpio_num_t *gpio_num)
-{
-    ADC_CHANNEL_CHECK(ADC_NUM_1, channel);
-
-    int io = ADC_GET_IO_NUM(ADC_NUM_1, channel);
-    if (io < 0) {
-        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
-    } else {
-        *gpio_num = (gpio_num_t)io;
-    }
-
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
 esp_err_t adc1_config_channel_atten(adc1_channel_t channel, adc_atten_t atten)
 {
     ADC_CHANNEL_CHECK(ADC_NUM_1, channel);
@@ -466,20 +473,6 @@ void adc1_ulp_enable(void)
 /*---------------------------------------------------------------
                     ADC2
 ---------------------------------------------------------------*/
-esp_err_t adc2_pad_get_io_num(adc2_channel_t channel, gpio_num_t *gpio_num)
-{
-    ADC_CHANNEL_CHECK(ADC_NUM_2, channel);
-
-    int io = ADC_GET_IO_NUM(ADC_NUM_2, channel);
-    if (io < 0) {
-        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
-    } else {
-        *gpio_num = (gpio_num_t)io;
-    }
-
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
 /** For ESP32S2 the ADC2 The right to use ADC2 is controlled by the arbiter, and there is no need to set a lock.*/
 esp_err_t adc2_wifi_acquire(void)
 {
@@ -562,6 +555,7 @@ static inline void adc2_dac_disable( adc2_channel_t channel)
  */
 esp_err_t adc2_get_raw(adc2_channel_t channel, adc_bits_width_t width_bit, int *raw_out)
 {
+    esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK;
     int adc_value = 0;
 
     ADC_CHECK(raw_out != NULL, "ADC out value err", ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
@@ -601,7 +595,8 @@ esp_err_t adc2_get_raw(adc2_channel_t channel, adc_bits_width_t width_bit, int *
 #endif //CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
 #endif //CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32
 
-    if (adc_hal_convert(ADC_NUM_2, channel, &adc_value)) {
+    ret = adc_hal_convert(ADC_NUM_2, channel, &adc_value);
+    if (ret != ESP_OK) {
         adc_value = -1;
     }
 
@@ -618,13 +613,8 @@ esp_err_t adc2_get_raw(adc2_channel_t channel, adc_bits_width_t width_bit, int *
     adc_power_release();
     SARADC2_RELEASE();
 
-    if (adc_value < 0) {
-        ESP_LOGD( ADC_TAG, "ADC2 ARB: Return data is invalid." );
-        return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;
-    }
-
     *raw_out = adc_value;
-    return ESP_OK;
+    return ret;
 }
 
 esp_err_t adc2_vref_to_gpio(gpio_num_t gpio)

components/driver/dedic_gpio.c

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "soc/io_mux_reg.h"
 #include "hal/cpu_hal.h"
 #include "hal/cpu_ll.h"
+#include "hal/gpio_hal.h"
 #include "driver/periph_ctrl.h"
 #include "esp_rom_gpio.h"
 #include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
@@ -267,13 +268,13 @@ esp_err_t dedic_gpio_new_bundle(const dedic_gpio_bundle_config_t *config, dedic_
     // route dedicated GPIO channel signals to GPIO matrix
     if (config->flags.in_en) {
         for (size_t i = 0; i < config->array_size; i++) {
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(GPIO_PIN_MUX_REG[config->gpio_array[i]], PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(GPIO_PIN_MUX_REG[config->gpio_array[i]], PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
             esp_rom_gpio_connect_in_signal(config->gpio_array[i], dedic_gpio_periph_signals.cores[core_id].in_sig_per_channel[in_offset + i], config->flags.in_invert);
         }
     }
     if (config->flags.out_en) {
         for (size_t i = 0; i < config->array_size; i++) {
-            PIN_FUNC_SELECT(GPIO_PIN_MUX_REG[config->gpio_array[i]], PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
+            gpio_hal_iomux_func_sel(GPIO_PIN_MUX_REG[config->gpio_array[i]], PIN_FUNC_GPIO);
             esp_rom_gpio_connect_out_signal(config->gpio_array[i], dedic_gpio_periph_signals.cores[core_id].out_sig_per_channel[out_offset + i], config->flags.out_invert, false);
         }
     }

components/driver/esp32/adc.c

@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_init(void)
 
 esp_err_t adc_digi_deinit(void)
 {
+    adc_power_release();
     ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
     adc_hal_digi_deinit();
     ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
@@ -143,6 +144,8 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_deinit(void)
 
 esp_err_t adc_digi_controller_config(const adc_digi_config_t *config)
 {
+    /* If enable digital controller, adc xpd should always on. */
+    adc_power_acquire();
     ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
     adc_hal_digi_controller_config(config);
     ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();

components/driver/esp32c3/adc.c

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include "sdkconfig.h"
 #include "esp_intr_alloc.h"
 #include "esp_log.h"
+#include "esp_pm.h"
 #include "sys/lock.h"
 #include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
 #include "freertos/semphr.h"
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "hal/adc_hal.h"
 #include "hal/dma_types.h"
 #include "esp32c3/esp_efuse_rtc_calib.h"
+#include "esp_private/gdma.h"
 
 #define ADC_CHECK_RET(fun_ret) ({                  \
     if (fun_ret != ESP_OK) {                                \
@@ -57,37 +59,34 @@ extern portMUX_TYPE rtc_spinlock; //TODO: Will be placed in the appropriate posi
 #define ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL()  portENTER_CRITICAL(&rtc_spinlock)
 #define ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL()  portEXIT_CRITICAL(&rtc_spinlock)
 
-/*---------------------------------------------------------------
-                    Digital Controller Context
----------------------------------------------------------------*/
 /**
- * 1. adc_digi_mutex: this mutex lock is used for ADC digital controller. On ESP32-C3, the ADC single read APIs (unit1 & unit2)
- * and ADC DMA continuous read APIs share the ``apb_saradc_struct.h`` regs.
- *
- * 2. sar_adc_mutex: this mutex lock is used for SARADC2 module. On ESP32C-C3, the ADC single read APIs (unit2), ADC DMA
- * continuous read APIs and WIFI share the SARADC2 analog IP.
- *
- * Sequence:
- *          Acquire: 1. sar_adc_mutex;  2. adc_digi_mutex;
- *          Release: 1. adc_digi_mutex; 2. sar_adc_mutex;
+ * 1. sar_adc1_lock: this mutex lock is to protect the SARADC1 module.
+ * 2. sar_adc2_lock: this mutex lock is to protect the SARADC2 module. On C3, it is controlled by the digital controller
+ *    and PWDET controller.
+ * 3. adc_reg_lock:  this spin lock is to protect the shared registers used by ADC1 / ADC2 single read mode.
  */
-static _lock_t adc_digi_mutex;
-#define ADC_DIGI_LOCK_ACQUIRE()     _lock_acquire(&adc_digi_mutex)
-#define ADC_DIGI_LOCK_RELEASE()     _lock_release(&adc_digi_mutex)
-static _lock_t sar_adc2_mutex;
-#define SAC_ADC2_LOCK_ACQUIRE()     _lock_acquire(&sar_adc2_mutex)
-#define SAC_ADC2_LOCK_RELEASE()     _lock_release(&sar_adc2_mutex)
+static _lock_t sar_adc1_lock;
+#define SAR_ADC1_LOCK_ACQUIRE()    _lock_acquire(&sar_adc1_lock)
+#define SAR_ADC1_LOCK_RELEASE()    _lock_release(&sar_adc1_lock)
+static _lock_t sar_adc2_lock;
+#define SAR_ADC2_LOCK_ACQUIRE()    _lock_acquire(&sar_adc2_lock)
+#define SAR_ADC2_LOCK_RELEASE()    _lock_release(&sar_adc2_lock)
+portMUX_TYPE adc_reg_lock = portMUX_INITIALIZER_UNLOCKED;
+#define ADC_REG_LOCK_ENTER()       portENTER_CRITICAL(&adc_reg_lock)
+#define ADC_REG_LOCK_EXIT()        portEXIT_CRITICAL(&adc_reg_lock)
 
 #define INTERNAL_BUF_NUM 5
 #define IN_SUC_EOF_BIT GDMA_LL_EVENT_RX_SUC_EOF
 
+/*---------------------------------------------------------------
+                    Digital Controller Context
+---------------------------------------------------------------*/
 typedef struct adc_digi_context_t {
-    intr_handle_t           dma_intr_hdl;               //MD interrupt handle
-    uint32_t                bytes_between_intr;         //bytes between in suc eof intr
     uint8_t                 *rx_dma_buf;                //dma buffer
-    adc_dma_hal_context_t   hal_dma;                    //dma context (hal)
-    adc_dma_hal_config_t    hal_dma_config;             //dma config (hal)
+    adc_hal_context_t       hal;                        //hal context
+    gdma_channel_handle_t   rx_dma_channel;             //dma rx channel handle
     RingbufHandle_t         ringbuf_hdl;                //RX ringbuffer handler
+    intptr_t                rx_eof_desc_addr;           //eof descriptor address of RX channel
     bool                    ringbuf_overflow_flag;      //1: ringbuffer overflow
     bool                    driver_start_flag;          //1: driver is started; 0: driver is stoped
     bool                    use_adc1;                   //1: ADC unit1 will be used; 0: ADC unit1 won't be used.
@@ -95,6 +94,7 @@ typedef struct adc_digi_context_t {
     adc_atten_t             adc1_atten;                 //Attenuation for ADC1. On this chip each ADC can only support one attenuation.
     adc_atten_t             adc2_atten;                 //Attenuation for ADC2. On this chip each ADC can only support one attenuation.
     adc_digi_config_t       digi_controller_config;     //Digital Controller Configuration
+    esp_pm_lock_handle_t    pm_lock;                    //For power management
 } adc_digi_context_t;
 
 static adc_digi_context_t *s_adc_digi_ctx = NULL;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static uint32_t adc_get_calibration_offset(adc_ll_num_t adc_n, adc_channel_t cha
 /*---------------------------------------------------------------
                    ADC Continuous Read Mode (via DMA)
 ---------------------------------------------------------------*/
-static void adc_dma_intr(void* arg);
+static IRAM_ATTR bool adc_dma_in_suc_eof_callback(gdma_channel_handle_t dma_chan, gdma_event_data_t *event_data, void *user_data);
 
 static int8_t adc_digi_get_io_num(uint8_t adc_unit, uint8_t adc_channel)
 {
@@ -149,11 +149,6 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_initialize(const adc_digi_init_config_t *init_config)
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    ret = esp_intr_alloc(SOC_GDMA_ADC_INTR_SOURCE, 0, adc_dma_intr, (void *)s_adc_digi_ctx, &s_adc_digi_ctx->dma_intr_hdl);
-    if (ret != ESP_OK) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
     //ringbuffer
     s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl = xRingbufferCreate(init_config->max_store_buf_size, RINGBUF_TYPE_BYTEBUF);
     if (!s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl) {
@@ -161,22 +156,19 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_initialize(const adc_digi_init_config_t *init_config)
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    //malloc internal buffer
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->bytes_between_intr = init_config->conv_num_each_intr;
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf = heap_caps_calloc(1, s_adc_digi_ctx->bytes_between_intr * INTERNAL_BUF_NUM, MALLOC_CAP_INTERNAL);
+    //malloc internal buffer used by DMA
+    s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf = heap_caps_calloc(1, init_config->conv_num_each_intr * INTERNAL_BUF_NUM, MALLOC_CAP_INTERNAL);
     if (!s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf) {
         ret = ESP_ERR_NO_MEM;
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
     //malloc dma descriptor
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.rx_desc = heap_caps_calloc(1, (sizeof(dma_descriptor_t)) * INTERNAL_BUF_NUM, MALLOC_CAP_DMA);
-    if (!s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.rx_desc) {
+    s_adc_digi_ctx->hal.rx_desc = heap_caps_calloc(1, (sizeof(dma_descriptor_t)) * INTERNAL_BUF_NUM, MALLOC_CAP_DMA);
+    if (!s_adc_digi_ctx->hal.rx_desc) {
         ret = ESP_ERR_NO_MEM;
         goto cleanup;
     }
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_max_num = INTERNAL_BUF_NUM;
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.dma_chan = init_config->dma_chan;
 
     //malloc pattern table
     s_adc_digi_ctx->digi_controller_config.adc_pattern = calloc(1, SOC_ADC_PATT_LEN_MAX * sizeof(adc_digi_pattern_table_t));
@@ -185,6 +177,14 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_initialize(const adc_digi_init_config_t *init_config)
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
+#if CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+    ret = esp_pm_lock_create(ESP_PM_APB_FREQ_MAX, 0, "adc_dma", &s_adc_digi_ctx->pm_lock);
+    if (ret != ESP_OK) {
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+#endif //CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+
+    //init gpio pins
     if (init_config->adc1_chan_mask) {
         ret = adc_digi_gpio_init(ADC_NUM_1, init_config->adc1_chan_mask);
         if (ret != ESP_OK) {
@@ -198,8 +198,39 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_initialize(const adc_digi_init_config_t *init_config)
         }
     }
 
+    //alloc rx gdma channel
+    gdma_channel_alloc_config_t rx_alloc_config = {
+        .direction = GDMA_CHANNEL_DIRECTION_RX,
+    };
+    ret = gdma_new_channel(&rx_alloc_config, &s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel);
+    if (ret != ESP_OK) {
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    gdma_connect(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel, GDMA_MAKE_TRIGGER(GDMA_TRIG_PERIPH_ADC, 0));
+
+    gdma_strategy_config_t strategy_config = {
+        .auto_update_desc = true,
+        .owner_check = true
+    };
+    gdma_apply_strategy(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel, &strategy_config);
+
+    gdma_rx_event_callbacks_t cbs = {
+        .on_recv_eof = adc_dma_in_suc_eof_callback
+    };
+    gdma_register_rx_event_callbacks(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel, &cbs, s_adc_digi_ctx);
+
+    int dma_chan;
+    gdma_get_channel_id(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel, &dma_chan);
+
+    adc_hal_config_t config = {
+        .desc_max_num = INTERNAL_BUF_NUM,
+        .dma_chan = dma_chan,
+        .eof_num = init_config->conv_num_each_intr / ADC_HAL_DATA_LEN_PER_CONV
+    };
+    adc_hal_context_config(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal, &config);
+
+    //enable SARADC module clock
     periph_module_enable(PERIPH_SARADC_MODULE);
-    periph_module_enable(PERIPH_GDMA_MODULE);
 
     adc_hal_calibration_init(ADC_NUM_1);
     adc_hal_calibration_init(ADC_NUM_2);
@@ -212,46 +243,42 @@ cleanup:
 
 }
 
-static IRAM_ATTR void adc_dma_intr(void *arg)
+static IRAM_ATTR bool adc_dma_intr(adc_digi_context_t *adc_digi_ctx);
+
+static IRAM_ATTR bool adc_dma_in_suc_eof_callback(gdma_channel_handle_t dma_chan, gdma_event_data_t *event_data, void *user_data)
+{
+    assert(event_data);
+    adc_digi_context_t *adc_digi_ctx = (adc_digi_context_t *)user_data;
+    adc_digi_ctx->rx_eof_desc_addr = event_data->rx_eof_desc_addr;
+    return adc_dma_intr(adc_digi_ctx);
+}
+
+static IRAM_ATTR bool adc_dma_intr(adc_digi_context_t *adc_digi_ctx)
 {
     portBASE_TYPE taskAwoken = 0;
     BaseType_t ret;
+    adc_hal_dma_desc_status_t status = false;
+    dma_descriptor_t *current_desc = NULL;
 
-    //clear the in suc eof interrupt
-    adc_hal_digi_clr_intr(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, IN_SUC_EOF_BIT);
-
-    while (s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr->dw0.owner == 0) {
-
-        dma_descriptor_t *current_desc = s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr;
-        ret = xRingbufferSendFromISR(s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl, current_desc->buffer, current_desc->dw0.length, &taskAwoken);
-        if (ret == pdFALSE) {
-            //ringbuffer overflow
-            s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_overflow_flag = 1;
-        }
-
-        s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_cnt += 1;
-        //cycle the dma descriptor and buffers
-        s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr = s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr->next;
-        if (!s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr) {
+    while (1) {
+        status = adc_hal_get_reading_result(&adc_digi_ctx->hal, adc_digi_ctx->rx_eof_desc_addr, &current_desc);
+        if (status != ADC_HAL_DMA_DESC_VALID) {
             break;
         }
+
+        ret = xRingbufferSendFromISR(adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl, current_desc->buffer, current_desc->dw0.length, &taskAwoken);
+        if (ret == pdFALSE) {
+            //ringbuffer overflow
+            adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_overflow_flag = 1;
+        }
     }
 
-    if (!s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr) {
-
-        assert(s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_cnt == s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_max_num);
-        //reset the current descriptor status
-        s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr = s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.rx_desc;
-        s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_cnt = 0;
-
+    if (status == ADC_HAL_DMA_DESC_NULL) {
         //start next turns of dma operation
-        adc_hal_digi_dma_multi_descriptor(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf, s_adc_digi_ctx->bytes_between_intr, s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_max_num);
-        adc_hal_digi_rxdma_start(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config);
+        adc_hal_digi_rxdma_start(&adc_digi_ctx->hal, adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf);
     }
 
-    if(taskAwoken == pdTRUE) {
-        portYIELD_FROM_ISR();
-    }
+    return (taskAwoken == pdTRUE);
 }
 
 esp_err_t adc_digi_start(void)
@@ -260,15 +287,21 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_start(void)
         ESP_LOGE(ADC_TAG, "The driver is already started");
         return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;
     }
+    adc_power_acquire();
     //reset flags
     s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_overflow_flag = 0;
     s_adc_digi_ctx->driver_start_flag = 1;
-
-    //When using SARADC2 module, this task needs to be protected from WIFI
-    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc2) {
-        SAC_ADC2_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc1) {
+        SAR_ADC1_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
     }
-    ADC_DIGI_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc2) {
+        SAR_ADC2_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
+    }
+
+#if CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+    // Lock APB frequency while ADC driver is in use
+    esp_pm_lock_acquire(s_adc_digi_ctx->pm_lock);
+#endif
 
     adc_arbiter_t config = ADC_ARBITER_CONFIG_DEFAULT();
     if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc1) {
@@ -281,26 +314,16 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_start(void)
     }
 
     adc_hal_init();
-
     adc_hal_arbiter_config(&config);
-    adc_hal_digi_init(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config);
+    adc_hal_digi_init(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal);
     adc_hal_digi_controller_config(&s_adc_digi_ctx->digi_controller_config);
 
-    //create dma descriptors
-    adc_hal_digi_dma_multi_descriptor(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf, s_adc_digi_ctx->bytes_between_intr, s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_max_num);
-    adc_hal_digi_set_eof_num(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, (s_adc_digi_ctx->bytes_between_intr)/4);
-    //set the current descriptor pointer
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.cur_desc_ptr = s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.rx_desc;
-    s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.desc_cnt = 0;
-
-    //enable in suc eof intr
-    adc_hal_digi_ena_intr(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, IN_SUC_EOF_BIT);
-
-    //start ADC
-    adc_hal_digi_start(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config);
-
+    //reset ADC and DMA
+    adc_hal_fifo_reset(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal);
     //start DMA
-    adc_hal_digi_rxdma_start(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config);
+    adc_hal_digi_rxdma_start(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal, s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf);
+    //start ADC
+    adc_hal_digi_start(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal);
 
     return ESP_OK;
 }
@@ -314,20 +337,27 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_stop(void)
     s_adc_digi_ctx->driver_start_flag = 0;
 
     //disable the in suc eof intrrupt
-    adc_hal_digi_dis_intr(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, IN_SUC_EOF_BIT);
+    adc_hal_digi_dis_intr(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal, IN_SUC_EOF_BIT);
     //clear the in suc eof interrupt
-    adc_hal_digi_clr_intr(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config, IN_SUC_EOF_BIT);
-    //stop DMA
-    adc_hal_digi_rxdma_stop(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config);
+    adc_hal_digi_clr_intr(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal, IN_SUC_EOF_BIT);
     //stop ADC
-    adc_hal_digi_stop(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma, &s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config);
+    adc_hal_digi_stop(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal);
+    //stop DMA
+    adc_hal_digi_rxdma_stop(&s_adc_digi_ctx->hal);
     adc_hal_digi_deinit();
-
-    ADC_DIGI_LOCK_RELEASE();
-    //When using SARADC2 module, this task needs to be protected from WIFI
-    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc2) {
-        SAC_ADC2_LOCK_RELEASE();
+#if CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->pm_lock) {
+        esp_pm_lock_release(s_adc_digi_ctx->pm_lock);
     }
+#endif  //CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc1) {
+        SAR_ADC1_LOCK_RELEASE();
+    }
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc2) {
+        SAR_ADC2_LOCK_RELEASE();
+    }
+    adc_power_release();
 
     return ESP_OK;
 }
@@ -375,23 +405,27 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_deinitialize(void)
         return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;
     }
 
-    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->dma_intr_hdl) {
-        esp_intr_free(s_adc_digi_ctx->dma_intr_hdl);
-    }
-
-    if(s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl) {
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl) {
         vRingbufferDelete(s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl);
         s_adc_digi_ctx->ringbuf_hdl = NULL;
     }
 
+#if CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+    if (s_adc_digi_ctx->pm_lock) {
+        esp_pm_lock_delete(s_adc_digi_ctx->pm_lock);
+    }
+#endif  //CONFIG_PM_ENABLE
+
     free(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_buf);
-    free(s_adc_digi_ctx->hal_dma_config.rx_desc);
+    free(s_adc_digi_ctx->hal.rx_desc);
     free(s_adc_digi_ctx->digi_controller_config.adc_pattern);
+    gdma_disconnect(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel);
+    gdma_del_channel(s_adc_digi_ctx->rx_dma_channel);
+
     free(s_adc_digi_ctx);
     s_adc_digi_ctx = NULL;
 
     periph_module_disable(PERIPH_SARADC_MODULE);
-    periph_module_disable(PERIPH_GDMA_MODULE);
 
     return ESP_OK;
 }
@@ -402,6 +436,38 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_deinitialize(void)
 static adc_atten_t s_atten1_single[ADC1_CHANNEL_MAX];    //Array saving attenuate of each channel of ADC1, used by single read API
 static adc_atten_t s_atten2_single[ADC2_CHANNEL_MAX];    //Array saving attenuate of each channel of ADC2, used by single read API
 
+esp_err_t adc_vref_to_gpio(adc_unit_t adc_unit, gpio_num_t gpio)
+{
+    esp_err_t ret;
+    uint32_t channel = ADC2_CHANNEL_MAX;
+    if (adc_unit == ADC_UNIT_2) {
+        for (int i = 0; i < ADC2_CHANNEL_MAX; i++) {
+            if (gpio == ADC_GET_IO_NUM(ADC_NUM_2, i)) {
+                channel = i;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (channel == ADC2_CHANNEL_MAX) {
+            return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+        }
+    }
+
+    adc_power_acquire();
+    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
+        ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
+        adc_hal_vref_output(ADC_NUM_1, channel, true);
+        ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL()
+    } else if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_2) {
+        ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
+        adc_hal_vref_output(ADC_NUM_2, channel, true);
+        ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL()
+    }
+
+    ret = adc_digi_gpio_init(ADC_NUM_2, BIT(channel));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
 esp_err_t adc1_config_width(adc_bits_width_t width_bit)
 {
     //On ESP32C3, the data width is always 12-bits.
@@ -429,41 +495,26 @@ esp_err_t adc1_config_channel_atten(adc1_channel_t channel, adc_atten_t atten)
 int adc1_get_raw(adc1_channel_t channel)
 {
     int raw_out = 0;
-    adc_digi_config_t dig_cfg = {
-        .conv_limit_en = 0,
-        .conv_limit_num = 250,
-        .sample_freq_hz = SOC_ADC_SAMPLE_FREQ_THRES_HIGH,
-    };
-
-    ADC_DIGI_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
 
     periph_module_enable(PERIPH_SARADC_MODULE);
+    adc_power_acquire();
+
+    SAR_ADC1_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
 
     adc_atten_t atten = s_atten1_single[channel];
     uint32_t cal_val = adc_get_calibration_offset(ADC_NUM_1, channel, atten);
     adc_hal_set_calibration_param(ADC_NUM_1, cal_val);
 
-    adc_hal_digi_controller_config(&dig_cfg);
+    ADC_REG_LOCK_ENTER();
+    adc_hal_set_atten(ADC_NUM_2, channel, atten);
+    adc_hal_convert(ADC_NUM_1, channel, &raw_out);
+    ADC_REG_LOCK_EXIT();
 
-    adc_hal_intr_clear(ADC_EVENT_ADC1_DONE);
+    SAR_ADC1_LOCK_RELEASE();
 
-    adc_hal_adc1_onetime_sample_enable(true);
-    adc_hal_onetime_channel(ADC_NUM_1, channel);
-    adc_hal_set_onetime_atten(atten);
-
-    //Trigger single read.
-    adc_hal_onetime_start(&dig_cfg);
-    while (!adc_hal_intr_get_raw(ADC_EVENT_ADC1_DONE));
-    adc_hal_single_read(ADC_NUM_1, &raw_out);
-
-    adc_hal_intr_clear(ADC_EVENT_ADC1_DONE);
-    adc_hal_adc1_onetime_sample_enable(false);
-
-    adc_hal_digi_deinit();
+    adc_power_release();
     periph_module_disable(PERIPH_SARADC_MODULE);
 
-    ADC_DIGI_LOCK_RELEASE();
-
     return raw_out;
 }
 
@@ -489,42 +540,26 @@ esp_err_t adc2_get_raw(adc2_channel_t channel, adc_bits_width_t width_bit, int *
     }
 
     esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK;
-    adc_digi_config_t dig_cfg = {
-        .conv_limit_en = 0,
-        .conv_limit_num = 250,
-        .sample_freq_hz = SOC_ADC_SAMPLE_FREQ_THRES_HIGH,
-    };
 
-    SAC_ADC2_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
-    ADC_DIGI_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
     periph_module_enable(PERIPH_SARADC_MODULE);
+    adc_power_acquire();
+
+    SAR_ADC2_LOCK_ACQUIRE();
 
     adc_atten_t atten = s_atten2_single[channel];
     uint32_t cal_val = adc_get_calibration_offset(ADC_NUM_2, channel, atten);
     adc_hal_set_calibration_param(ADC_NUM_2, cal_val);
 
-    adc_hal_digi_controller_config(&dig_cfg);
+    ADC_REG_LOCK_ENTER();
+    adc_hal_set_atten(ADC_NUM_2, channel, atten);
+    ret = adc_hal_convert(ADC_NUM_2, channel, raw_out);
+    ADC_REG_LOCK_EXIT();
 
-    adc_hal_intr_clear(ADC_EVENT_ADC2_DONE);
+    SAR_ADC2_LOCK_RELEASE();
 
-    adc_hal_adc2_onetime_sample_enable(true);
-    adc_hal_onetime_channel(ADC_NUM_2, channel);
-    adc_hal_set_onetime_atten(atten);
-
-    //Trigger single read.
-    adc_hal_onetime_start(&dig_cfg);
-    while (!adc_hal_intr_get_raw(ADC_EVENT_ADC2_DONE));
-    ret = adc_hal_single_read(ADC_NUM_2, raw_out);
-
-    adc_hal_intr_clear(ADC_EVENT_ADC2_DONE);
-    adc_hal_adc2_onetime_sample_enable(false);
-
-    adc_hal_digi_deinit();
+    adc_power_release();
     periph_module_disable(PERIPH_SARADC_MODULE);
 
-    ADC_DIGI_LOCK_RELEASE();
-    SAC_ADC2_LOCK_RELEASE();
-
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -551,7 +586,7 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_controller_config(const adc_digi_config_t *config)
     s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc1 = 0;
     s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc2 = 0;
     for (int i = 0; i < config->adc_pattern_len; i++) {
-        const adc_digi_pattern_table_t* pat = &config->adc_pattern[i];
+        const adc_digi_pattern_table_t *pat = &config->adc_pattern[i];
         if (pat->unit == ADC_NUM_1) {
             s_adc_digi_ctx->use_adc1 = 1;
 
@@ -575,86 +610,6 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_controller_config(const adc_digi_config_t *config)
     return ESP_OK;
 }
 
-esp_err_t adc_arbiter_config(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_arbiter_t *config)
-{
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
-        return ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-    }
-    ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
-    adc_hal_arbiter_config(config);
-    ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
-/**
- * @brief Set ADC module controller.
- *        There are five SAR ADC controllers:
- *        Two digital controller: Continuous conversion mode (DMA). High performance with multiple channel scan modes;
- *        Two RTC controller: Single conversion modes (Polling). For low power purpose working during deep sleep;
- *        the other is dedicated for Power detect (PWDET / PKDET), Only support ADC2.
- *
- * @note  Only ADC2 support arbiter to switch controllers automatically. Access to the ADC is based on the priority of the controller.
- * @note  For ADC1, Controller access is mutually exclusive.
- *
- * @param adc_unit ADC unit.
- * @param ctrl ADC controller, Refer to `adc_controller_t`.
- *
- * @return
- *      - ESP_OK Success
- */
-esp_err_t adc_set_controller(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_controller_t ctrl)
-{
-    adc_arbiter_t config = {0};
-    adc_arbiter_t cfg = ADC_ARBITER_CONFIG_DEFAULT();
-
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
-        adc_hal_set_controller(ADC_NUM_1, ctrl);
-    }
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_2) {
-        adc_hal_set_controller(ADC_NUM_2, ctrl);
-        switch (ctrl) {
-        case ADC2_CTRL_FORCE_PWDET:
-            config.pwdet_pri = 2;
-            config.mode = ADC_ARB_MODE_SHIELD;
-            adc_hal_arbiter_config(&config);
-            adc_hal_set_controller(ADC_NUM_2, ADC2_CTRL_PWDET);
-            break;
-        case ADC2_CTRL_FORCE_RTC:
-            config.rtc_pri = 2;
-            config.mode = ADC_ARB_MODE_SHIELD;
-            adc_hal_arbiter_config(&config);
-            adc_hal_set_controller(ADC_NUM_2, ADC_CTRL_RTC);
-            break;
-        case ADC2_CTRL_FORCE_DIG:
-            config.dig_pri = 2;
-            config.mode = ADC_ARB_MODE_SHIELD;
-            adc_hal_arbiter_config(&config);
-            adc_hal_set_controller(ADC_NUM_2, ADC_CTRL_DIG);
-            break;
-        default:
-            adc_hal_arbiter_config(&cfg);
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
-/**
- * @brief Reset FSM of adc digital controller.
- *
- * @return
- *      - ESP_OK Success
- */
-esp_err_t adc_digi_reset(void)
-{
-    ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
-    adc_hal_digi_reset();
-    adc_hal_digi_clear_pattern_table(ADC_NUM_1);
-    adc_hal_digi_clear_pattern_table(ADC_NUM_2);
-    ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
 /*************************************/
 /* Digital controller filter setting */
 /*************************************/
@@ -712,90 +667,6 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_monitor_enable(adc_digi_monitor_idx_t idx, bool enable)
     return ESP_OK;
 }
 
-/**************************************/
-/*   Digital controller intr setting  */
-/**************************************/
-
-esp_err_t adc_digi_intr_enable(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_digi_intr_t intr_mask)
-{
-    ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
-        adc_hal_digi_intr_enable(ADC_NUM_1, intr_mask);
-    }
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_2) {
-        adc_hal_digi_intr_enable(ADC_NUM_2, intr_mask);
-    }
-    ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
-esp_err_t adc_digi_intr_disable(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_digi_intr_t intr_mask)
-{
-    ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
-        adc_hal_digi_intr_disable(ADC_NUM_1, intr_mask);
-    }
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_2) {
-        adc_hal_digi_intr_disable(ADC_NUM_2, intr_mask);
-    }
-    ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
-esp_err_t adc_digi_intr_clear(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_digi_intr_t intr_mask)
-{
-    ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
-        adc_hal_digi_intr_clear(ADC_NUM_1, intr_mask);
-    }
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_2) {
-        adc_hal_digi_intr_clear(ADC_NUM_2, intr_mask);
-    }
-    ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
-    return ESP_OK;
-}
-
-uint32_t adc_digi_intr_get_status(adc_unit_t adc_unit)
-{
-    uint32_t ret = 0;
-    ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_1) {
-        ret = adc_hal_digi_get_intr_status(ADC_NUM_1);
-    }
-    if (adc_unit & ADC_UNIT_2) {
-        ret = adc_hal_digi_get_intr_status(ADC_NUM_2);
-    }
-    ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static bool s_isr_registered = 0;
-static intr_handle_t s_adc_isr_handle = NULL;
-
-esp_err_t adc_digi_isr_register(void (*fn)(void *), void *arg, int intr_alloc_flags)
-{
-    ADC_CHECK((fn != NULL), "Parameter error", ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
-    ADC_CHECK(s_isr_registered == 0, "ADC ISR have installed, can not install again", ESP_FAIL);
-
-    esp_err_t ret = esp_intr_alloc(ETS_APB_ADC_INTR_SOURCE, intr_alloc_flags, fn, arg, &s_adc_isr_handle);
-    if (ret == ESP_OK) {
-        s_isr_registered = 1;
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-
-esp_err_t adc_digi_isr_deregister(void)
-{
-    esp_err_t ret = ESP_FAIL;
-    if (s_isr_registered) {
-        ret = esp_intr_free(s_adc_isr_handle);
-        if (ret == ESP_OK) {
-            s_isr_registered = 0;
-        }
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-
 /*---------------------------------------------------------------
                     RTC controller setting
 ---------------------------------------------------------------*/

components/driver/esp32c3/include/driver/adc.h

@@ -22,25 +22,6 @@ extern "C" {
 /*---------------------------------------------------------------
                     Common setting
 ---------------------------------------------------------------*/
-
-/**
- * @brief Config ADC module arbiter.
- *        The arbiter is to improve the use efficiency of ADC2. After the control right is robbed by the high priority,
- *        the low priority controller will read the invalid ADC2 data, and the validity of the data can be judged by the flag bit in the data.
- *
- * @note Only ADC2 support arbiter.
- * @note Default priority: Wi-Fi > RTC > Digital;
- * @note In normal use, there is no need to call this interface to config arbiter.
- *
- * @param adc_unit ADC unit.
- * @param config Refer to `adc_arbiter_t`.
- *
- * @return
- *      - ESP_OK Success
- *      - ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED ADC unit not support arbiter.
- */
-esp_err_t adc_arbiter_config(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_arbiter_t *config);
-
 /*************************************/
 /* Digital controller filter setting */
 /*************************************/
@@ -114,78 +95,6 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_monitor_set_config(adc_digi_monitor_idx_t idx, adc_digi_monit
  */
 esp_err_t adc_digi_monitor_enable(adc_digi_monitor_idx_t idx, bool enable);
 
-/**************************************/
-/*   Digital controller intr setting  */
-/**************************************/
-
-/**
- * @brief Enable interrupt of adc digital controller by bitmask.
- *
- * @param adc_unit ADC unit.
- * @param intr_mask Interrupt bitmask. See ``adc_digi_intr_t``.
- *
- * @return
- *      - ESP_OK Success
- */
-esp_err_t adc_digi_intr_enable(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_digi_intr_t intr_mask);
-
-/**
- * @brief Disable interrupt of adc digital controller by bitmask.
- *
- * @param adc_unit ADC unit.
- * @param intr_mask Interrupt bitmask. See ``adc_digi_intr_t``.
- *
- * @return
- *      - ESP_OK Success
- */
-esp_err_t adc_digi_intr_disable(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_digi_intr_t intr_mask);
-
-/**
- * @brief Clear interrupt of adc digital controller by bitmask.
- *
- * @param adc_unit ADC unit.
- * @param intr_mask Interrupt bitmask. See ``adc_digi_intr_t``.
- *
- * @return
- *      - ESP_OK Success
- */
-esp_err_t adc_digi_intr_clear(adc_unit_t adc_unit, adc_digi_intr_t intr_mask);
-
-/**
- * @brief Get interrupt status mask of adc digital controller.
- *
- * @param adc_unit ADC unit.
- * @return
- *     - intr Interrupt bitmask, See ``adc_digi_intr_t``.
- */
-uint32_t adc_digi_intr_get_status(adc_unit_t adc_unit);
-
-/**
- * @brief Register ADC interrupt handler, the handler is an ISR.
- *        The handler will be attached to the same CPU core that this function is running on.
- *
- * @param fn Interrupt handler function.
- * @param arg Parameter for handler function
- * @param intr_alloc_flags Flags used to allocate the interrupt. One or multiple (ORred)
- *        ESP_INTR_FLAG_* values. See esp_intr_alloc.h for more info.
- *
- * @return
- *     - ESP_OK Success
- *     - ESP_ERR_NOT_FOUND Can not find the interrupt that matches the flags.
- *     - ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG Function pointer error.
- */
-esp_err_t adc_digi_isr_register(void (*fn)(void *), void *arg, int intr_alloc_flags);
-
-/**
- * @brief Deregister ADC interrupt handler, the handler is an ISR.
- *
- * @return
- *     - ESP_OK Success
- *     - ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG hander error.
- *     - ESP_FAIL ISR not be registered.
- */
-esp_err_t adc_digi_isr_deregister(void);
-
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

components/driver/esp32c3/rtc_tempsensor.c

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <esp_types.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
+#include <math.h>
 #include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
 #include "freertos/semphr.h"
 #include "esp_log.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "driver/temp_sensor.h"
 #include "regi2c_ctrl.h"
 #include "esp32c3/rom/ets_sys.h"
+#include "esp32c3/esp_efuse_rtc_calib.h"
 
 static const char *TAG = "tsens";
 
@@ -58,6 +60,8 @@ static const tsens_dac_offset_t dac_offset[TSENS_DAC_MAX] = {
     {TSENS_DAC_L4,    2,    10,   -40,   20,   3},
 };
 
+static float s_deltaT = NAN; // unused number
+
 esp_err_t temp_sensor_set_config(temp_sensor_config_t tsens)
 {
     REG_SET_BIT(SYSTEM_PERIP_CLK_EN1_REG, SYSTEM_TSENS_CLK_EN);
@@ -112,6 +116,28 @@ esp_err_t temp_sensor_read_raw(uint32_t *tsens_out)
     return ESP_OK;
 }
 
+static void read_delta_t_from_efuse(void)
+{
+    uint32_t version = esp_efuse_rtc_calib_get_ver();
+    if (version == 1) {
+        // fetch calibration value for temp sensor from eFuse
+        s_deltaT = esp_efuse_rtc_calib_get_cal_temp(version);
+    } else {
+        // no value to fetch, use 0.
+        s_deltaT = 0;
+    }
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "s_deltaT = %f", s_deltaT);
+}
+
+static float parse_temp_sensor_raw_value(uint32_t tsens_raw, const int dac_offset)
+{
+    if (isnan(s_deltaT)) { //suggests that the value is not initialized
+        read_delta_t_from_efuse();
+    }
+    float result = (TSENS_ADC_FACTOR * (float)tsens_raw - TSENS_DAC_FACTOR * dac_offset - TSENS_SYS_OFFSET) - s_deltaT / 10.0;
+    return result;
+}
+
 esp_err_t temp_sensor_read_celsius(float *celsius)
 {
     TSENS_CHECK(celsius != NULL, ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
@@ -123,7 +149,7 @@ esp_err_t temp_sensor_read_celsius(float *celsius)
         printf("tsens_out %d\r\n", tsens_out);
         TSENS_CHECK(ret == ESP_OK, ret);
         const tsens_dac_offset_t *dac = &dac_offset[tsens.dac_offset];
-        *celsius = (TSENS_ADC_FACTOR * (float)tsens_out - TSENS_DAC_FACTOR * dac->offset - TSENS_SYS_OFFSET);
+        *celsius = parse_temp_sensor_raw_value(tsens_out, dac->offset);
         if (*celsius < dac->range_min || *celsius > dac->range_max) {
             ESP_LOGW(TAG, "Exceeding the temperature range!");
             ret = ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;

components/driver/esp32s2/adc.c

@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_deinit(void)
         s_adc_digi_arbiter_lock = NULL;
     }
 #endif
+    adc_power_release();
     ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
     adc_hal_digi_deinit();
     ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ esp_err_t adc_digi_controller_config(const adc_digi_config_t *config)
         }
     }
 
+    /* If enable digtal controller, adc xpd should always on. */
+    adc_power_acquire();
     ADC_ENTER_CRITICAL();
     adc_hal_digi_controller_config(config);
     ADC_EXIT_CRITICAL();

components/driver/esp32s2/include/driver/touch_sensor.h

@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@
 
 #pragma once
 
+#include "driver/touch_sensor_common.h"
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
-#include "driver/touch_sensor_common.h"
-
 /**
  * @brief Set touch sensor FSM start
  * @note  Start FSM after the touch sensor FSM mode is set.
@@ -579,6 +579,22 @@ esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_reset_benchmark(void);
  */
 esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_read_proximity_cnt(touch_pad_t pad_num, uint32_t *proximity_cnt);
 
+/**
+ * @brief Change the operating frequency of touch pad in deep sleep state. Reducing the operating frequency can effectively reduce power consumption.
+ *        If this function is not called, the working frequency of touch in the deep sleep state is the same as that in the wake-up state.
+ *
+ * @param sleep_cycle The touch sensor will sleep after each measurement.
+ *                    sleep_cycle decide the interval between each measurement.
+ *                    t_sleep = sleep_cycle / (RTC_SLOW_CLK frequency).
+ *                    The approximate frequency value of RTC_SLOW_CLK can be obtained using rtc_clk_slow_freq_get_hz function.
+ * @param meas_times The times of charge and discharge in each measure process of touch channels.
+ *                  The timer frequency is 8Mhz. Range: 0 ~ 0xffff.
+ *                  Recommended typical value: Modify this value to make the measurement time around 1ms.
+ * @return
+ *     - ESP_OK Success
+ */
+esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_set_work_time(uint16_t sleep_cycle, uint16_t meas_times);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

components/driver/esp32s2/rtc_tempsensor.c

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
+#include <math.h>
 #include "esp_types.h"
 #include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
 #include "freertos/semphr.h"
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ static const tsens_dac_offset_t dac_offset[TSENS_DAC_MAX] = {
 
 static SemaphoreHandle_t rtc_tsens_mux = NULL;
 
-static float deltaT = 1000; // greater than range
+static float s_deltaT = NAN; // Unused number
 
 esp_err_t temp_sensor_set_config(temp_sensor_config_t tsens)
 {
@@ -142,20 +143,20 @@ static void read_delta_t_from_efuse(void)
     uint32_t version = esp_efuse_rtc_table_read_calib_version();
     if (version == 1 || version == 2) {
         // fetch calibration value for temp sensor from eFuse
-        deltaT = esp_efuse_rtc_table_get_parsed_efuse_value(RTCCALIB_IDX_TMPSENSOR, false) / 10.0;
+        s_deltaT = esp_efuse_rtc_table_get_parsed_efuse_value(RTCCALIB_IDX_TMPSENSOR, false) / 10.0;
     } else {
         // no value to fetch, use 0.
-        deltaT = 0;
+        s_deltaT = 0;
     }
-    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "deltaT = %f\n", deltaT);
+    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "s_deltaT = %f\n", s_deltaT);
 }
 
-static float parse_temp_sensor_raw_value(uint32_t tsens_raw, const tsens_dac_offset_t *dac)
+static float parse_temp_sensor_raw_value(uint32_t tsens_raw, const int dac_offset)
 {
-    if (deltaT > 512) { //suggests that the value is not initialized
+    if (isnan(s_deltaT)) { //suggests that the value is not initialized
         read_delta_t_from_efuse();
     }
-    float result = (TSENS_ADC_FACTOR * (float)tsens_raw - TSENS_DAC_FACTOR * dac->offset - TSENS_SYS_OFFSET) - deltaT;
+    float result = (TSENS_ADC_FACTOR * (float)tsens_raw - TSENS_DAC_FACTOR * dac_offset - TSENS_SYS_OFFSET) - s_deltaT;
     return result;
 }
 
@@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ esp_err_t temp_sensor_read_celsius(float *celsius)
         ret = temp_sensor_read_raw(&tsens_out);
         TSENS_CHECK(ret == ESP_OK, ret);
         const tsens_dac_offset_t *dac = &dac_offset[tsens.dac_offset];
-        *celsius = parse_temp_sensor_raw_value(tsens_out, dac);
+        *celsius = parse_temp_sensor_raw_value(tsens_out, dac->offset);
         if (*celsius < dac->range_min || *celsius > dac->range_max) {
             ESP_LOGW(TAG, "Exceeding the temperature range!");
             ret = ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;

components/driver/esp32s2/touch_sensor.c

@@ -629,3 +629,9 @@ esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_read_proximity_cnt(touch_pad_t pad_num, uint32
     touch_hal_sleep_read_proximity_cnt(approach_cnt);
     return ESP_OK;
 }
+
+esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_set_work_time(uint16_t sleep_cycle, uint16_t meas_times)
+{
+    touch_hal_sleep_channel_set_work_time(sleep_cycle, meas_times);
+    return ESP_OK;
+}

components/driver/esp32s3/include/driver/touch_sensor.h

@@ -577,6 +577,22 @@ esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_reset_benchmark(void);
  */
 esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_read_proximity_cnt(touch_pad_t pad_num, uint32_t *proximity_cnt);
 
+/**
+ * @brief Change the operating frequency of touch pad in deep sleep state. Reducing the operating frequency can effectively reduce power consumption.
+ *        If this function is not called, the working frequency of touch in the deep sleep state is the same as that in the wake-up state.
+ *
+ * @param sleep_cycle The touch sensor will sleep after each measurement.
+ *                    sleep_cycle decide the interval between each measurement.
+ *                    t_sleep = sleep_cycle / (RTC_SLOW_CLK frequency).
+ *                    The approximate frequency value of RTC_SLOW_CLK can be obtained using rtc_clk_slow_freq_get_hz function.
+ * @param meas_times The times of charge and discharge in each measure process of touch channels.
+ *                  The timer frequency is 8Mhz. Range: 0 ~ 0xffff.
+ *                  Recommended typical value: Modify this value to make the measurement time around 1ms.
+ * @return
+ *     - ESP_OK Success
+ */
+esp_err_t touch_pad_sleep_channel_set_work_time(uint16_t sleep_cycle, uint16_t meas_times);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif